FEDERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS: THE CASE OF THE ARGENTINE SENATE by Hirokazu Kikuchi LL.B. in Political Science, Keio University, 2001 LL.M. in Political Science, Keio University, 2003 Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh 2012 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH THE DIETRICH SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES This dissertation was presented by Hirokazu Kikuchi It was defended on November 2, 2012 and approved by Ernesto F. Calvo, Associate Professor, Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland Scott Morgenstern, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science Jennifer Nicoll Victor, Assistant Professor, Department of Public and International Affairs, George Mason University Dissertation Advisor: Aníbal S. Pérez-Liñán, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science ii Copyright © by Hirokazu Kikuchi 2012 iii FEDERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS: THE CASE OF THE ARGENTINE SENATE Hirokazu Kikuchi, PhD University of Pittsburgh, 2012 Under what conditions can subnational governments be national veto players? Many studies of federal countries have regarded governors as national veto players even though they do not have such a constitutional status. However, the statistical tests of comparative legislative studies and those of comparative federalism have not succeeded in showing gubernatorial effects on a national political arena. In this dissertation, I study the conditions under which governors can be national veto players by focusing on the treatment of presidential bills between 1983 and 2007 in the Argentine Senate. The dissertation shows that the Senate serves as an arena for subnational governments to influence national politics. Developing a theory about the subnational electoral connection, accoriding to which national legislators represent political actors at the subnational level in order to advance their careers, I claim that senators strategically choose their actions according to their institutional positions. Using qualitative and quantitative evidence from committee decisions and floor voting at the Senate, I argue that only governors with tenure stability can be national veto players by making their senators shelve unwelcome presidential initiatives in committees. This dissertation makes three contributions to comparative politics and to the studies of Argentine politics. First, by developing a theory of the subnational electoral connection, this study sheds light on an institutional mechanism: tenure stability of governors and their control over the candidate selection process allow subnational governments to be national veto players iv through their senators. Second, it also reveals that legislators under the same electoral rules may face different principals, and that they adjust their credit-claiming and position-taking strategies according to their institutional positions. Third, by studying committee decisions as well as floor voting at the Senate, this dissertation shows that committees have a considerable influence over the presidents’ legislative success. v TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ....................................................................................................... XIV 1.0 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 1 1.1 THEORETICAL PUZZLE AND RESEARCH STRATEGY ......................... 3 1.2 ROAD MAP OF THIS DISSERTATION ....................................................... 11 2.0 THE SUBNATIONAL ELECTORAL CONNECTION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS UNDER FEDERALISM ............................................................. 13 2.1 TOWARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF A THEORY ON THE SUBNATIONAL ELECTORAL CONNECTION IN FEDERAL COUNTRIES ........ 14 2.2 COMPETING PRINCIPALS UNDER FEDERALISM ................................ 20 2.2.1 Voters .............................................................................................................. 20 2.2.2 National parties .............................................................................................. 22 2.2.2.1 Functions of national parties .............................................................. 22 2.2.2.2 Resources for party discipline ............................................................ 24 2.2.3 The president.................................................................................................. 27 2.2.3.1 Objectives of the president ................................................................. 27 2.2.3.2 Resources of the president .................................................................. 29 2.2.4 Governors ....................................................................................................... 31 2.2.4.1 Objectives of governors ...................................................................... 32 vi 2.2.4.2 Resources of governors ...................................................................... 34 2.2.5 Summary ........................................................................................................ 36 2.3 PLAYERS OF LEGISLATIVE POLITICS IN THE ARGENTINE SENATE. ............................................................................................................................. 37 2.3.1 National parties in Argentina ....................................................................... 39 2.3.2 The president of Argentina ........................................................................... 45 2.3.3 Governors and provincial party bosses in Argentina ................................. 47 2.3.4 Voters in Argentina ....................................................................................... 55 2.3.5 Argentine senators as agents ........................................................................ 57 2.3.5.1 The conventional wisdom on the Argentine Congress ..................... 58 2.3.5.2 A typology of senators......................................................................... 60 2.4 THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS AND SENATORIAL BEHAVIOR ......... 63 2.4.1 Opportunities for credit-claiming and position-taking in the legislative process ......................................................................................................................... 63 2.4.2 Legislative behavior of governors’ subordinates ........................................ 67 2.4.3 Legislative behavior of Senate bosses .......................................................... 70 2.4.4 Legislative behavior of Senate bosses’ subordinates .................................. 75 2.4.5 Content of presidential bills and legislative behavior ................................ 76 2.5 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 78 3.0 HUNTING FOR THE INFORMATION ABOUT THE ARGENTINE SENATE…................................................................................................................................... 80 3.1 DOCUMENTS ABOUT COMMITTEES ....................................................... 81 3.1.1 Committee reports ......................................................................................... 81 vii 3.1.2 The listing of committees .............................................................................. 87 3.1.3 Records of committee meetings .................................................................... 89 3.2 DOCUMENTS ABOUT FLOOR BEHAVIOR .............................................. 90 3.2.1 Records of floor sessions ............................................................................... 91 3.2.2 A document about the leaders of legislative party blocs ............................ 93 3.2.3 Ideal point estimation .................................................................................... 98 3.3 WHO IS WHO? ............................................................................................... 103 3.3.1 The Argentine federalism and governors .................................................. 104 3.3.2 Who are governors’ subordinates? ............................................................ 119 3.3.3 Who are Senate bosses and Senate bosses’ subordinates? ....................... 123 3.3.4 Who are local subordinates? ...................................................................... 128 3.4 INTERVIEWS ................................................................................................. 133 3.5 SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... 134 4.0 THE DRAWER OF COMMITTEES .................................................................... 137 4.1 THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN COMMITTEES ................................ 138 4.1.1 Committee membership .............................................................................. 139 4.1.2 Committees and the legislative process ..................................................... 142 4.2 THE CASE OF THE 2005 ANTI-SMOKING BILL.................................... 148 4.2.1 The 2005 anti-smoking bill and the conflict between the president and governors ................................................................................................................... 150 4.2.2 The drawer of committees and a counter proposal .................................. 151 4.2.3 Committee meetings and the majority report with amendments ........... 154