INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE Citizenship and nation-building in Ukraine by Oxana Shevel Purdue University ■ PAPER PRESENTED AT THE WORKSHOP Understanding the Transformation of Ukraine: Assessing What Has Been Learned, Devising a Research Agenda Chair of Ukrainian Studies University of Ottawa (Canada) 15-16 October 2004 DRAFT/NOT FOR CITATION ■ 1. Introduction Although citizenship policy is a key element of nation-building in any state, citizenship policy has been a rather neglected area of Ukrainian studies. Just a handful of articles on the citizenship problem and policy in Ukraine have been written,1 and, to my knowledge, there is no book-length treatment on the subject. This apparent scholarly neglect could be attributed to the fact that in the post-Soviet Ukraine citizenship issue turned out to be a “dog that did not bark.” Unlike in Estonia and Latvia, where initial citizenship laws dis- enfranchised a significant part of the non-titular populations from citizenship, in Ukraine the first citizenship law embraced the so-called “zero option” and extended Ukrainian cit- izenship to all permanent residents of Ukraine. In subsequent years, the only aspect of citizenship policy that attracted media attention was the issue of dual citizenship, specif- ically Ukraine’s disagreements with Russia over it. Dual citizenship controversy found its reflection in the press headlines in the early and the mid-1990s, but has since receded from the headlines and has not received much scholarly attention either. In sum, Ukrainian citizenship policy has been an understudied issue. This paper makes a case against such neglect. It argues that important insights into the larger dynamic of 1. English-language scholarly studies that focused explicitly on Ukrainian citizenship policies include Barrington 1995 that has a chapter devoted to the Ukrainian case; Ginsburgs 1996; Jackson and Wolczuk 1997; Shevchuk 1996; Shevel 2000; and Shevel 2002. Ukrainian-language studies have been written mainly by Ukrainian citizen- ship policy practitioners and have either focused on technical legal issues (e.g. Subotenko 1999), and/or have made political arguments for certain policies (in particular, against dual citizenship – see Khandogii 1997 for an example). INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE Ukrainian state and nation-building can be gained from the studying citizenship policy. This paper will thus first offer an analysis of Ukrainian citizenship policy and politics over, and will then suggest ways in which the Ukrainian case in particular, and citizen- ship policy studies in general, can be integrated into broader social scientific research agendas. 2. Citizenship policy and politics in independent Ukraine. The “official” nation in the citizenship law Citizenship policy has many aspects and can be studied from many angles. Legal policy scholars tend to scrutinize the citizenship laws’ compatibility with the international legal principles. Social scientists generally focus on the relative inclusively or exclusivity of cit- izenship laws, and analyzes reasons for cross-national variations in this regard. Who is included into the initial body of citizens in a new state? What criteria must subsequent applicants for citizenship fulfill? Who is entitled to gain citizenship under simplified rules? Citizenship laws provide official answers to these questions, and by doing so delin- eate the official boundary between the “us” and the “other” of a given state. Citizenship laws thus define what can be called the “official” nation of a given state: the initial body of citizens and those who are entitled to become citizens under a simplified procedure. Let us consider how Ukraine defined its official nation, and why the official nation was defined this particular way. Ta ble 1 illustrates how the definition of the “official” Ukrainian nation has evolved over the decade of Ukraine’s independence. As we can see, the citizenship law defines the nation by the territory of the states. This definition was reflected already in the 1991 citizenship law, and was upheld and broadened in the subsequent editions of the law adopted in 1997 and in 2001. TABLE 1 “OFFICIAL” UKRAINIAN NATION IN CITIZENSHIP LEGISLATION, 1991-2001 1991 citizenship law April 1997 amendments 2001 citizenship law to the 1991 law Those who were born on the Those who were born on or Those who were born or territory of Ukraine, or at permanently resided on the permanently resided on the least one of whose parents or territory of Ukraine, and their territory of Ukraine, or at grandparents was born in descendents (children, grand- least one of whose parents, Ukraine children) grandparents, a full-blood brother or a sister, was born or permanently resided on the territory of Ukraine 2 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE The 1991 citizenship law, adopted when the Soviet Union was still legally in existence,2 defined the “official” nation as those who, at the time of the law’s entry into force, were permanently residing in Ukraine, who were not citizens of other states, and who did not object to becoming citizens of Ukraine, plus those who have previously permanently resided in Ukraine but at the time of the law’s entry into force were abroad studying, working on state business, or serving in the armed forces.3 This group – those who were born, or had at least one parent or grandparent born on the territory of Ukraine – has become the “official” Ukrainian nation, eligible to acquire citizenship under a simplified procedure. New edition of the citizenship law approved in April 1997 extended the “official” nation to include those who permanently resided (in addition to those born) on the territory of Ukraine, plus their children and grandchildren.4 The latest edition of the citizenship law approved in January 2001 added brothers and sisters of those who were born or permanently resided on the territory of Ukraine to the “official” nation. The simplified procedure under which those defined as belonging to the nation were eligible to acquire citizenship was been made simpler with each edition of the law. Thus, the 1991 law exempted those who were born, or had at least one of the parents or grandparents born on the territory of Ukraine, from 5 year residency requirement,5 the 1997 law exempted them from residency and language requirement,6 while the 2001 law additionally exempted this group from requirements to present documentary evidence of the legal source of income and a proof of release from prior citizenship at the time of application.7 Theories of citizenship policy and the Ukrainian case. Ukraine’s citizenship law thus defined the official nation territorially. The question to ask is why the official nation was defined this particular way. More generally, how does the political elites arrive at a particular definition of the “official” nation? Scholars of citi- 2. Draft 1991 citizenship law was first debated in the Rada in July 1991; repeated first reading took place on 12 September 1991; the law was approved on 8 October 1991 and entered into force on 13 November 1991. 3. Article 2 paragraphs 1 and 2 of the 1991 citizenship law, text of the law in Pravda Ukrainy, 14 November 1991. Under the 1991 law, the latter group (those studying, working on state business, or serving in the armed forces) could become citizens of Ukraine if they were not citizens of other states and declared their desire to become cit- izens of Ukraine within one year after the law’s entry into force. This deadline was extended to two years in January 1993 and to five years in October 1994. See Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy 1993; Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy 1994. 4. Article 2 paragraph 3 of the 1997 law, for text of the law see Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy 1997a. 5. Article 17 paragraph 2 of the 1991 law. 6. Article 16 of the 1997 law. 7. Article 8 of the 2001 law. The 2001law still required these persons to present a proof of release from prior citi- zenship within a year after submitting citizenship application. For text of the law see Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy 2001a. 3 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE zenship policies have advanced hypotheses about factors that drive citizenship policies in modern states. Following Rogers Brubaker’s seminal study of French and German citi- zenship policies, conventional wisdom today attributes variation in rules governing admittance to citizenship to national identity.8 Or, to use Brubaker’s term, to historical- ly-formed and deeply-rooted “habits of national self-understanding” 9 that are “prior to and independent of the [modern] state.” 10 According to Brubaker, in modern states these habits of national self-understanding are the main source of citizenship laws, and the fac- tor explaining cross-national divergence.11 If we try to apply Brubaker’s theory to the Ukrainian case, however, we will imme- diately run into problem. Brubaker’s argument implies that each modern state has one historically-formed national identity (a particular “habit of national self-understanding”). This assumption is however an empirical matter. A “dominant habit of national self- understanding” may form historically in some states but not in others. In states such as Ukraine, that emerge suddenly from the rubble of multinational empires, there may be no dominant habit of national self-understanding. Indeed, virtually all studies of the post- Soviet Ukraine make a point that the past rule of territories of today’s Ukraine by differ- ent empires and states, and resulting cultural, ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity across today’s Ukraine, has prevented the emergence of a cohesive national identity at either the elite or the societal level. Instead of one dominant “habit of national self- understanding,” competing “images” of the nation and myths of national origin and civ- ilization are propagated by different political forces and find resonance with different segments of the society. In the absence of the dominant national identity in Ukraine, where can the sources of Ukrainian citizenship policy located? Analysis of the politics of Ukrainian cit- izenship policy to which I will now turn will show how Ukraine’s citizenship policy was in a large measure shaped by the politics of national identity, but not in the manner Brubaker’s theory posits.