Ian S. Wood. Britain, Ireland, and the Second World War. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010. ix + 238 pp. $95.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-7486-2327-3. Reviewed by Daniel C. Williamson Published on H-Albion (August, 2011) Commissioned by Thomas Hajkowski (Misericordia University) Ian S. Wood’s Britain, Ireland, and the Second Irish Free State was now known, cut many of the World War provides a valuable survey of the im‐ symbolic ties that had bound it to the United King‐ pact that the war had on Ireland and how it af‐ dom. Even before war broke out, de Valera was fected relations among the governments of Eire, preparing for Irish neutrality by insisting on the Northern Ireland, and Great Britain. The author return of the Treaty Ports to Eire, a policy that covers a number of major topics including the Wood characterizes as “an affirmation of full neutrality of Eire, the impact that the war had on sovereignty” (p. 26). Northern Ireland, the response of the IRA to the Historians have long understood that Irish conflict, and Britain’s relations with the Irish gov‐ neutrality, or more accurately, nonbelligerence, ernments on both sides of the border. tilted strongly in favor of the Allies. Dublin coop‐ Eamon de Valera’s determination to keep Eire erated with Britain on intelligence matters, sup‐ officially neutral is given a central place in Wood’s plied the Allies with valuable weather informa‐ study. “With our history, with our experience of tion, and made secret military plans to coordinate the last war and with part of our country still un‐ with British forces in case of a German invasion justly severed from us, we felt that no other deci‐ of Ireland. Irish cooperation with Britain reflected sion and no other policy was possible,” de Valera not just a policy of practical self-preservation but, announced to the Irish people on 3 September as Wood points out, a genuine desire by de Valera 1939 (quoted, p. 1). Wood provides the context of and the majority of the population of Eire to see this quote with a clear review of the events lead‐ the Allies defeat Nazi Germany, albeit not at the ing up to the creation of the Irish Free State, the cost of Irish neutrality. Indeed the formal neutrali‐ partition of the island, and de Valera’s own rise to ty of Eire was almost universally supported by the power which culminated in the new Irish consti‐ Irish people. Wood concludes that Eire’s informal tution of 1937. Under this constitution, Eire, as the help, in particular intelligence cooperation, “was H-Net Reviews of no small importance to Britain and her allies, that conscription would face from the nationalist and was indeed the hidden side of the Irish state’s community made the move counterproductive. In neutrality” (p. 58). Irish citizens, with no interfer‐ fact, Wood claims that sectarian divisions re‐ ence from their own government, served the Al‐ mained at the heart of life in Northern Ireland, lied cause directly as workers in war-related despite the province’s active participation in the British industries or as volunteers in the British Second World War. British and American service‐ forces. Wood accepts the estimate that over 50,000 men stationed in Northern Ireland were often Irish citizens served with the British. Irish sol‐ shocked by the pervasiveness of sectarian ten‐ diers were numerous enough for the British army sions. Wood provides a telling incident regarding to organize an Irish Brigade. Wood expresses a BBC programming during the war. When a radio great deal of admiration for these Irish volunteers broadcast called the Irish Half Hour was intro‐ whom he sees as having overlooked narrow Irish duced for the benefit of Irish nationalists serving nationalist concerns to confront the evil of in the British military, Northern Ireland’s prime Nazism. minister, Sir Basil Brooke, pushed for an Ulster At home, the Irish state did its best to limit the Half Hour as a counterweight. When the new impact of the war which was euphemistically re‐ unionist-centered program played a traditional ferred to as the “Emergency.” While wartime nationalist song the prime minister publicly shortages and the need for an expanded defense protested. “In the midst of a global conflict con‐ force could not be ignored in Eire, official censor‐ suming thousands of lives,” Wood writes, “these ship kept news of the conflict to a bare minimum. exchanges vividly capture all of Northern Ire‐ Aside from the mistaken but deadly German land’s unresolved cultural and sectarian divi‐ bombing of Dublin in May 1941, and the bodies of sions” (p. 81). dead sailors and airmen that washed up on Ire‐ Northern Ireland was not untouched by the land’s coast, the violence of the Second World War war as Belfast was bombed by the Luftwaffe, war- bypassed Eire. Dublin’s studious adherence to the related industrial production almost eliminated forms of neutrality, most famously displayed by unemployment, and nearly 50,000 volunteers de Valera’s public trip to the German embassy to served in the armed forces, but it remained fun‐ pay his respects on the death of Hitler, seem un‐ damentally unchanged. Wood views the war and necessary to the author. Wood believes that the the postwar creation of the British welfare state crimes of the Nazi regime warranted official con‐ as a missed opportunity to change the trajectory demnation even from a neutral state. of the history of Northern Ireland. Wood criticizes Wood also examines the impact of the war on Stormont for failing to push for some fundamen‐ the northern side of the border. Unlike Eire, tal changes during this period. He characterizes Northern Ireland was formally at war along with the Unionist governments as “simply coasting the rest of the United Kingdom. However, as along, averting their gaze from the chasm of mis‐ Wood ably demonstrates, the experience of the understanding and prejudice which partition, de‐ Second World War in Northern Ireland was dis‐ volved government, and world war had failed to tinct from that of the rest of the United Kingdom. close” (p. 192). One major difference was that Northern Ireland Unlike Dublin’s desire to avoid and ignore the was exempt from military conscription. Despite war as much as possible, the Irish Republican attempts by Stormont’s Unionist government to Army welcomed the conflict as yet another have the province included in the draft, London episode of an English difficulty that could be decided at the start of the war that the resistance made Ireland’s opportunity. Although prewar di‐ 2 H-Net Reviews visions in the republican movement along left- lations with Dublin and had agreed to return the right lines continued, the IRA officially opened its Treaty Ports to full Irish control in order to end war against Britain in January 1939, months be‐ the Economic War. Many British government and fore the invasion of Poland by Germany. The IRA military officials, such as British representative to of this period was focused on ending partition, Dublin Sir John Maffey, continued to have a basi‐ not overthrowing Dublin's government. In a vain cally positive attitude toward Eire even after attempt to force the British to withdraw from Dublin refused to enter the war. On the other Northern Ireland the IRA launched a bombing hand, Prime Minister Winston Churchill was very campaign in Britain. The attacks quickly sput‐ bitter regarding Irish neutrality. Churchill’s offers tered out, but republicans were encouraged by to Dublin to work for Irish unification if Eire de‐ the actual outbreak of the war in September to clared war on Germany came to naught as de seek aid from Germany. Nazi aid never amounted Valera recognized that Churchill did not have the to much, in large part because of informal but ef‐ backing of Stormont for his plans. In fact Anglo- fective cooperation among the Royal Ulster Con‐ Irish relations were so strained that the Irish mili‐ stabulary, the Garda Siochana, and British intelli‐ tary took the threat of British invasion every bit gence. In addition, the policy of interning known as seriously as that of German invasion. While republicans that was introduced in both parts of Churchill was as aware as anyone about the se‐ Ireland reduced the effectiveness of the IRA. De‐ cret cooperation that Dublin offered to the Allies, spite the high degree of cooperation, Wood points Wood suggests that the prime minister, ever a out that dealing with the IRA remained a point of staunch imperialist, had never come to terms contention in public between Eire and the United with the desire of Irish nationalists to leave the Kingdom. While de Valera’s government saw no British Empire. Churchill also did not trust de problem with its own execution of two IRA mem‐ Valera. This mistrust must be linked to Churchill’s bers convicted of murdering an Irish detective, direct involvement in the events of the Irish Revo‐ Dublin loudly protested the hanging of two IRA lution. Churchill’s anger at Irish neutrality was men convicted of playing a role in a fatal bombing not even assuaged by the Allied victory over Ger‐ in Britain and the execution of IRA volunteer Tom many. He singled out Eire for criticism in his vic‐ Williams for the killing of a member of the Royal tory speech of May 13, 1945. In his response a few Ulster Constabulary. days later de Valera told his radio audience that if Wood examines in some detail the German Britain had invaded Eire for its own purposes, as sojourns of Sean Russell, the traditionalist IRA Churchill suggested it could have rightfully done chief of staff, and Frank Ryan, a champion of the during the war, than British policy would be no republican Left.