Cognition 217 (2021) 104886 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Cognition journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/cognit Original Articles What we would (but shouldn’t) do for those we love: Universalism versus partiality in responding to others’ moral transgressions Laura K. Soter a,b,*, Martha K. Berg a, Susan A. Gelman a,1, Ethan Kross a,1 a Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, 1004 East Hall, 530 Church Street, Ann Arbor, MI, 48109, USA b Department of Philosophy, University of Michigan, 2215 Angell Hall, 435 S State Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48109, USA ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT Keywords: Recent work indicates that people are more likely to protect a close (vs. distant) other who commits a crime. But Close relationships do people think it is morally right to treat close others differently? On the one hand, universalist moral principles Moral psychology dictate that people should be treated equally. On the other hand, close relationships are the source of special Moral universalism moral obligations, which may lead people to believe they ought to preferentially protect close others. Here we Moral partiality attempt to adjudicate between these competing considerations by examining what people think they would and Inconsistency should do when a close (vs. distant) other behaves immorally. Across four experiments (N = 2002), we show that people believe they morally should protect close others more than distant others. However, we also document a striking discrepancy: participants reported that they would protect close others far more than they should protect them. These findings demonstrate that people believe close relationships influence what they morally ought to do—but also that moral decisions about close others may be a context in which people are particularly likely to fail to do what they think is morally right. The moral standpoint is characterized by an attitude of impartiality, strangers (e.g., Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001, a refusal to see the life, projects, good, or interests of any particular Greene et al., 2009; Haidt, 2001). Yet psychologists now recognize the person (oneself included) as having a greater or lesser value than importance of studying how relationships affect moral cognition, as a those of another. (Archard, 1995, p. 129). growing body of research reveals that people report dramatically [I]t is absurd to suggest that morality requires one to care, or act as if different choices in decisions involving friends and loved ones from one cares, no more about one’s own child than a stranger. (Wolf, those involving strangers. One striking context in which this trend 1992, p. 244). emerges is in deciding how to respond to the moral transgressions of others. Weidman, Sowden, Berg, and Kross (2020) asked participants to imagine witnessing either a close other (e.g., sister, best friend) or a 1. Introduction distant other (e.g., dentist, mail carrier) committing a crime. Partici­ pants then had to decide whether they would report the perpetrator or The quotes above reflecta deep philosophical tension regarding how lie to protect them when confronted by a police officer. Across several to make moral decisions involving those closest to us. On the one hand, studies, a robust effect emerged: people were much more likely to pro­ treating all people equally is a key tenet of philosophical ethical the­ tect a close (vs. distant) other, and this discrepancy increased with the ories. On the other hand, close relationships are deeply important in severity of the crime people observed (also see Waytz, Dungan, & people’s lives, and may produce special moral obligations. These Young, 2013). competing considerations can give rise to wrenching moral decisions But do people think it is morally right to behave this way? Against the when loved ones are involved. background of Weidman et al. (2020), we take up the currently under­ For decades, the vast majority of empirical research in moral psy­ explored question of whether people believe that relationships should chology primarily studied people’s judgments regarding anonymous influence how they respond to others’ transgressions. If people think * Corresponding author at: Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, 1004 East Hall, 530 Church Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48109, USA. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (L.K. Soter), [email protected] (M.K. Berg), [email protected] (S.A. Gelman), [email protected] (E. Kross). 1 Denotes equal contribution. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104886 Received 11 January 2021; Received in revised form 11 August 2021; Accepted 16 August 2021 Available online 21 August 2021 0010-0277/© 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. L.K. Soter et al. Cognition 217 (2021) 104886 they should treat close and distant others differently, it suggests that psychological role. However, none directly examines people’s commit- people believe moral rules are sensitive to context—an idea that would ment to moral universalism in the context of high-stakes moral de- challenge a common philosophical conception of morality as applying cisions, as the philosophical ethical theories considered above would invariantly across people. If, on the other hand, people think they should prescribe. Although these philosophical theories are normative and not treat everyone the same regardless of relationship, then this implies a psychologically descriptive, it would be striking if their core universalist discrepancy between what people think is right and how they would tenet were not expressed in folk moral judgments to some degree. Yet behave. In addition to posing a major challenge to psychological and this result is far from guaranteed; rather, we will now discuss compelling philosophical theories that rely on consistency, this would demonstrate evidence for a competing hypothesis. the striking result that difficult moral decisions about close others may be a domain in which people are particularly likely to fail to do what 1.2. The moral partiality hypothesis they think is right. Here we address these questions across four experi- ments, in the context of decisions about whether to report moral The alternative possibility is that people believe they should protect transgressions of a close or distant other. close others who have committed a moral transgression more than distant others (i.e., the Moral Partiality Hypothesis). In the philosophical 1.1. The moral universalism hypothesis literature, defenses of moral partiality consist of arguing that people are morally justified in treating the people closest to them with special One possibility is that people think that they morally should make moral concern. This idea is not new. It can be traced back as far as the same decision regardless of whether the transgressor is a close or Confucius’s account of filialpiety, which emphasized the special moral distant other (i.e., the Moral Universalism Hypothesis). This idea that duties owed to family members (Confucius, 2005; Csikszentmihalyi, moral rules apply equally across people is a widely accepted philo- 2020), and the Ten Commandments, which tell people to “honor thy sophical principle. All three major philosophical ethical theo- father and thy mother” (King James Bible, 1769/, 2017). ries—utilitarianism, Kantian deontology, and virtue ethics—incorporate More recently, philosopher Susan Wolf has commented that it would a tenet of impartiality or universalism. Utilitarianism (Mill, 1895) claims be “absurd to suggest that morality requires one to care, or act as if one that the morally right action is that which maximizes overall happiness, cares, no more about one’s own child than a stranger” (Wolf, 1992, p. and clearly states that the interests of all people matter equally, 244). She motivates this claim with a dramatic example: consider a regardless of the particular relationships we have with them (see Singer, woman in a boating accident who finds herself nearby two drowning 1972 for a particularly strong version of this view). Kantian deontology children—one is her own child, and one is a stranger—and the ability to posits that certain acts are always morally impermissible (Kant, 1785). save only one (Wolf, 1992; see also Williams, 1981). Such cases have Strict deontological constraints forbid someone from breaking a moral compelled a number of philosophers to argue that close relationships rule even for someone they love. Finally, Aristotle’s twelve basic virtues often give rise to distinctive moral obligations to display preferences include justice—an important component of which is treating others towards close others (Archard, 1995; Baron, 1991; Lord, 2016; Scheffler, equally and fairly (Aristotle, 2009, Book V; Kraut, 2018). 2010; Williams, 1981). Despite universalism’s status as the dominant moral framework in The Moral Partiality Hypothesis has more direct empirical support philosophical ethics (Archard, 1995; Wolf, 1992), very little empirical than the Moral Universalism hypothesis. Loyalty is, for instance, a basic work has directly explored whether universalism guides laypeople’s dimension in Moral Foundations Theory, which has received extensive moral judgments. However, several lines of research indirectly shed support (Haidt & Graham, 2007). More specifically,people judge others light on the role universalism might play in various kinds of moral de- who fail to help kin more negatively than those who fail to help strangers cisions. For instance, both adults (Dawes, Fowler, Johnson, McElreath, (Hughes, 2017;