This article was downloaded by: [US Naval Academy] On: 20 April 2014, At: 12:20 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Democracy and Security Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fdas20 Divided Leaders, Critical Masses, and the Escalation of Interethnic Violence: Suicide Terrorism Among the Tamil Tigers Nikolaos Biziouras a a Department of Political Science , United States Naval Academy , Annapolis , MD Published online: 21 Feb 2014. To cite this article: Nikolaos Biziouras (2014) Divided Leaders, Critical Masses, and the Escalation of Interethnic Violence: Suicide Terrorism Among the Tamil Tigers, Democracy and Security, 10:1, 52-72, DOI: 10.1080/17419166.2013.842169 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2013.842169 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. 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Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms- and-conditions Democracy and Security, 10: 52–72, 2014 Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 1741-9166 print/1555-5860 online DOI: 10.1080/17419166.2013.842169 Divided Leaders, Critical Masses, and the Escalation of Interethnic Violence: Suicide Terrorism Among the Tamil Tigers Nikolaos Biziouras Department of Political Science, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD By focusing on the intra- and interethnic interactions in Sri Lanka, I show that the intensity of interethnic violence—namely the choice of suicide terrorism by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam—occurs only when the leadership elites of the majority ethnic group are fractionalized and the minority ethnic group relies on its ethnic leadership for its economic well-being. Put differently, the greater intraethnic fractionalization is within the leadership ranks of the majority ethnic group, the greater the willingness of majority group leaders to placate their ethnic brethren and outbid their intraethnic rivals at the expense of the minority ethnic group; and the greater the minority group members’ reliance on their ethnic group leaders for economic resources and upward mobility, the greater their willingness to participate in radical forms of violence such as suicide terrorism. Keywords: Fractionalization, Intraethnic, LTTE, Suicide Terrorism, Tamil Tigers Downloaded by [US Naval Academy] at 12:20 20 April 2014 INTRODUCTION Why did the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) use suicide terror- ism in the violent ethnic conflict that engulfed Sri Lanka between 1983 and 2009? Existing approaches have stressed the tactical advantages of suicide The author wishes to thank Michael Kellermann, Rebecca Bill Chavez, Joe Young, and Jonathan Monten for their constructive criticisms. Please note that this article contains the author’s views solely, and it should not be construed to reflect the views of the US Naval Academy, the Department of Navy, the Department of Defense, or of the United States government. Address correspondence to Nikolaos Biziouras, Department of Political Science, United States Naval Academy, 589 McNair Road Annapolis, MD 21402. E-mail: [email protected] Terrorism Among the Tamil Tigers 53 terrorism,1 the effectiveness of suicide terrorism when the target state is a democracy and the goal is secession and independence,2 its efficiency as a signaling device in increasingly intractable conflicts,3 the cultural reification of heroic sacrifice within Tamil culture,4 and, most recently, intragroup, elite-level bidding wars for the hearts and minds of the rebellious ethnic group.5 While the aforementioned arguments speak directly about the choice of suicide terrorism by the LTTE as a tactic in a violent ethnic conflict, they are derived from more abstract arguments that posit causally that the outbreak of violence in this case of ethnic conflict resulted from the Sinhalese commitment to the economic discrimination against and the institutional marginalization of the Tamils.6 However, upon closer inspection, the empirical evidence does not add up. The Sinhalese-controlled state defeated the LTTE-led insurgency, and the Sri Lankan democratic state did not succumb to the demands of the suicide ter- rorist group for secession and independence despite the use of radical forms of violence. The LTTE was not perceived as a popular representative of the Tamil ethnic group even in the beginning of the ethnic conflict, and its popu- larity increasingly declined when the use of the suicide tactic increased Tami civilian suffering. Even when the LTTE was perceived as the only viable pro- tection force for Tamil civilians,7 the civilian support did not last any longer than the conventional army attacks and the indiscriminate violence of the Sinhalese and Indian forces.8 While there were bidding wars among the Tamil elites for leadership of the ethnic group, the LTTE had violently eliminated the vast majority of its competitors, especially at the elite level, by the late 1980s, significantly earlier than the vast majority of suicide attacks. While sui- cide bombings demonstrated resolve on the part of the LTTE, the continued unwillingness of the Sinhalese elites indicated the increasing irrelevance of that bargaining approach.9 Additionally, even if one subscribes to the spoiler arguments that stress the ability of extremist groups within rebellious ethnic groups to increase the doubts of the majority ethnic group about whether mod- Downloaded by [US Naval Academy] at 12:20 20 April 2014 erates can deliver peace by engaging in extremist violence,10 the LTTE had effectively dominated internal competition for leadership of the Tamil ethnic group by the fall of 1990. In this article, by focusing on the intra- and interethnic interactions in Sri Lanka, I show that the intensity of interethnic violence—namely the choice of suicide terrorism by the LTTE—occurs only when the leadership elites of the majority ethnic group are fractionalized and the minority ethnic group relies on its ethnic leadership for its economic well-being. Put differently, the greater intraethnic fractionalization is within the leadership ranks of the majority eth- nic group, the greater the willingness of majority group leaders to placate their ethnic brethren and outbid their intraethnic rivals at the expense of the minor- ity ethnic group; and the greater the minority group members’ reliance on their ethnic group leaders for economic resources and upward mobility, the greater 54 N. Biziouras their willingness to participate in radical forms of violence such as suicide terrorism. In effect, my argument stresses a causal logic that connects intraeth- nic leader–follower dynamics with the onset of violent ethnic conflict at the interethnic group level. As such, the greater the fractionalization among the leaders of the majority ethnic group, the greater the reliance of rival intraeth- nic leaders on a critical mass of ethnic group members; the greater the reliance on a critical mass, the more rigid their demands become; the more rigid their demands, the less the chances for compromise and negotiation and, subse- quently, the greater the chances for the onset of violent ethnic conflict. Once violent ethnic conflict commences, the more reliant minority group members are on their leaders, the more they will follow them into violence. Moreover, the more consolidated the leadership of the minority ethnic group within a par- ticular organization, the fewer options minority members have and, hence, the greater their loyalty will be to minority leaders who can act increasingly with- out constraints. As such, a successful minority political entrepreneur who has minimized his competition at the elite level can opt for the radicalization of vio- lence, by using suicide terrorism, and increase his independence by generating an indiscriminate reaction by the state and further coalesce the ethnic group under his organization because of security needs. The more indiscriminate the state’s attacks on the rebellious ethnic group, the more rigid group boundaries will become and the greater the need for protection. The more often this process occurs, the greater the chances that leadership of the rebellious ethnic group will be accepted because of the needs of conflict. As such, without examining the trajectory of postcolonial ethnic