Psychological Bulletin Copyright 1993 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 1993, Vol. 113, No. 3, 533-552 0033-2909/93/S3.00 Beyond Fiasco: A Reappraisal of the Groupthink Phenomenon and a New Model of Group Decision Processes Ramon J. Aldag and Sally Riggs Fuller In the past two decades, there has been a substantial increase the groupthink theory and related research were problematic, in emphasis on groups in organizations in general (e.g., Leavitt, Janis's (1971) original conceptualization has not been altered, 1975; Ouchi, 1981; Zander, 1982) and on group problem solving and groupthink continues to be viewed as a defective process in particular (e.g., Brandstatter, Davis, & Schuler, 1978; Del- that should be guarded against. Articles discussing the dangers becq, Van de Ven, & Gustafson, 1975). However, surprisingly of groupthink and suggesting remedies have regularly appeared little attention has been paid to the development of comprehen- in periodicals aimed at managers, lawyers, medical profes- sive models of group problem solving. Models are available to sionals, and the general public (e.g., Cerami, 1972; Culbertson, suggest when groups, rather than individuals, should be used 1977; Henderson, 1987; Ludwig, 1973; Rosenblum, 1982; for problem solving (Vroom & Yetton, 1973) and the appro- Sanders, 1980; Von Bergen & Kirk, 1978). The Social Sciences priate composition and functioning options of problem-solving Citation Index showed more than 700 citations of Janis's work groups (Stumpf, Zand, & Freedman, 1979), and several specific from January 1989 through June 1992. group problem-solving techniques have been presented (e.g., Janis chose the term groupthink because of its frankly Orwel- Rohrbaugh, 1979; Turoff, 1971; Van de Ven & Delbecq, 1971). lian connotation, similar to "doublethink" and "crimethink." Furthermore, generic models of group functioning are also Janis (1982) wrote that "the invidiousness is intentional" (p. 9). available but do not lend themselves to application specifically This view of groupthink as an undesirable phenomenon con- to group problem solving (e.g., Romans, 1950). However, popu- tinues to be evidenced in Janis's most recent work. For instance, lar, comprehensive, general models of group problem solving Janis (1989) wrote that are lacking. whenever a policymaking or crisis management group is function- The groupthink model (Janis, 1971,1972,1982) is the most ing as a compatible team with a fair or high degree of esprit de prominent attempt to fill this void. In recent years, acceptance corps, take steps to counteract tendencies toward concurrence- of the groupthink phenomenon has become almost universal, seeking or "groupthink." If a leader does this, the decision-mak- and the term groupthink has entered the popular vocabulary. It ing process will tend to be of higher quality, (p. 247)' has been blamed for such decision-making fiascoes as the Bay of Pigs invasion, the escalation of the Vietnam conflict, the He then presented a listing of remedies for groupthink. Watergate cover-up, and the Challenger disaster, as well as for The widespread acceptance of the groupthink model sug- flawed group problem solving in business and other organiza- gests that it has had considerable heuristic value. In this sense, it tions. Despite Longley and Pruitt's (1980) warning that both has served similar roles to models such as those presented by Maslow (1943) and Piaget (1932,1972). In each case, a relatively precise model stimulated further research that ultimately chal- Ramon J. Aldag, Graduate School of Business Administration, Uni- lenged its validity. For instance, Maslow's hypothesized need versity of Wisconsin—Madison; Sally Riggs Fuller, School of Busi- hierarchy, based primarily on clinical studies of neurotic indi- ness, University of Washington. viduals, met with widespread acceptance and research interest We would like to thank the Graduate School of the University of but failed to gain substantial empirical support (e.g., Alderfer, Wisconsin—Madison for providing funding to support this article. Ramon J. Aldag and Sally Riggs Fuller made equal contributions to this article. Names are presented alphabetically. 1 From Crucial Decisions: Leadership in Policymaking and Crisis Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Ra- Management (p. 247) by Irving L. Janis, 1989, New York: The Free mon J. Aldag, Graduate School of Business, University of Wisconsin, Press. Copyright 1989 by The Free Press. Reprinted by permission of 1155 Observatory Drive, Madison, Wisconsin 53706. The Free Press, a Division of Macmillan, Inc. 533 534 RAMON 1 ALDAG AND SALLY RIGGS FULLER 1972; Hall & Nougaim, 1967; Wahba & Bridwell, 1976). Simi- Groupthink is seen as the group analogue of defensive avoid- larly, Piaget's theory, originally based on an in-depth study of a ance, or "a collective pattern of defensive avoidance" (Janis & small number of children, served as a seminal stage theory of Mann, 1977, p. 129). According to Janis (1972), cognitive development, but additional research has suggested needed revisions (T. G. R. Bower, 1976; Horn, 1976). We argue I use the term "groupthink" as a quick and easy way to refer to a that groupthink has played a similar role to these theories. Like mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members' strivings for them, the groupthink model (a) was based on a small and rela- unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise al- tively restricted sample but has been widely generalized; (b) ternative courses of action.. Groupthink refers to a deteriora- posits a precise and deterministic sequence of stages; (c) has had tion of mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment that substantial intuitive appeal; and (d) has not received consistent results from in-group pressures, (p. 9) empirical support, as we demonstrate. Concerns about the validity of the models notwithstanding, Janis (1982) explicitly defined the context in which group- each has proved to be extremely valuable. Specifically, the think is thought to occur and divided these antecedent condi- groupthink model has stimulated research on group dysfunc- tions into three categories. First, a moderate to high level of tions and encouraged viewing outcomes in problem-solving group cohesion is a necessary but not sufficient condition for terms; shown how decision processes may be relevant to a wide groupthink. Secondary antecedents that are said to predict situ- range of situations; provided links to other types of literature, ations in which groupthink is likely to occur are structural such as stress and vigilance; and identified potentially impor- faults and a provocative situational context. In the structural tant variables in group problem solving. Also, like the Maslow fault category are insulation of the group, lack of tradition of (1943) and Piaget (1932, 1972) models, it has provided a rich impartial leadership, lack of norms requiring methodical pro- base for further development and testing. cedures, and homogeneity of members' social backgrounds and However, two directions seem necessary to preserve the ideology. The provocative situational context antecedents focus model's continued viability. First, the groupthink model has a on the role of stress as a situational factor. The first stress factor relatively narrow focus, primarily addressing major decision is characterized as external threats of losses combined with a fiascoes. As such, it would appear useful to provide an ex- low hope of finding a better solution than that of the leader. panded perspective applicable to a broader range of problem The internal stress antecedent stems from temporary low self- types. Second, the groupthink model has not been revised to esteem attributable to members' recent failures, perceptions incorporate the emerging literature and empirical findings. In that the task is too difficult to accomplish, and the perception this article we present a new, broader framework for examina- that there is no alternative that is morally correct. tion of group problem solving, termed the general group prob- There are several supposed symptoms of groupthink (cf. Janis & Mann, 1977, pp. 130-131), including an illusion of lem-solving (GGPS) model. It captures and recasts some ele- ments of the groupthink model. Additionally, the GGPS model invulnerability, rationalization to discount warnings and other negative feedback, belief in the inherent morality of the group, integrates findings of a groupthink literature review, material stereotyped views of members of opposing groups, pressure on from a variety of other literature suggested by a general prob- dissenters, self-censorship, illusion of unanimity, and self-ap- lem-solving perspective, and an examination of groupthink as- pointed "mindguards" acting to shield the group from adverse sumptions. information. In this article, we first discuss the basic characteristics of the According to Janis (1971,1972,1982,1989), groupthink re- groupthink model. Next, we summarize and discuss the re- sults in a number of consequences that interfere with effective search that has examined groupthink, adopt a general problem- group decision making. For instance, the group limits its dis- solving perspective and discuss other relevant literature sug- cussion to only a few alternatives. After a course of action is gested by that perspective, and question groupthink assump- initially selected, members ignore new