Maintaining Party Unity: Analyzing the Conservative Party of Canada’s Integration of the Progressive Conservative and Canadian Alliance parties by Matthew Thompson A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Affairs in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science Carleton University Ottawa, Ontario © 2017, Matthew Thompson Federal conservative parties in Canada have long been plagued by several persistent cleavages and internal conflict. This conflict has hindered the party electorally and contributed to a splintering of right-wing votes between competing right-wing parties in the 1990s. The Conservative Party of Canada (CPC) formed from a merger of the Progressive Conservative (PC) party and the Canadian Alliance in 2003. This analysis explores how the new party was able to maintain unity and prevent the long-standing cleavages from disrupting the party. The comparative literature on party factions is utilized to guide the analysis as the new party contained faction like elements. Policy issues and personnel/patronage distribution are stressed as significant considerations by the comparative literature as well literature on the PCs internal fighting. The analysis thus focuses on how the CPC approached these areas to understand how the party maintained unity. For policy, the campaign platforms, Question Period performance and government sponsored bills of the CPC are examined followed by an analysis of their first four policy conventions. With regards to personnel and patronage, Governor in Council and Senate appointments are analyzed, followed by the new party’s candidate nomination process and Stephen Harper’s appointments to cabinet. The findings reveal a careful and concentrated effort by party leadership, particularly Harper, at managing both areas to ensure that members from each of the predecessor parties were motivated to remain in the new party. Harper’s role in maintaining party unity is substantial, and the findings indicate that the centralization of power under the Prime Minister can have a positive impact. The findings also situate the CPC relative to its predecessor parties, uncovering in detail where the new party bears resemblance and differs from its predecessors. ii Table of Contents Abstract – ii List of Tables – iv List of Abbreviations – v List of Appendices - vi Chapter One: Parties and Factions - 1 Chapter Two: The Canadian Case - 35 Chapter Three: Policy Agenda - 49 Chapter Four: Policy Conventions - 81 Chapter Five: Patronage Appointments - 112 Chapter Six: Candidate Nomination - 133 Chapter Seven: Cabinet - 164 Chapter Eight: Conclusion - 200 References – 220 Endnotes - 237 iii List of Tables Table 1.1 Chapter Outline - 21 Table 3.1 Party Platform Left-Right Index Score by Election - 61 Table 3.2 Mean Emphasis in Campaign Platforms on Decentralization - 63 Table 3.3 Questions Asked by CPC MPs in 38th Parliament sorted by Policy Area. - 65 Table 3.4 CPC Government Bills sorted by Policy Area - 66 Table 3.5 Mean Emphasis in Campaign Platforms on Populist Policy Areas - 67 Table 3.6 Mean Emphasis in Campaign Platforms on Social Tolerance Policy Areas - 70 Table 3.7 Mean Emphasis in Campaign Platforms on Positive Mentions of Law and Order - 73 Table 3.8 Mean Emphasis in Campaign Platforms on Economic Policy Areas - 74 Table 5.1 Governor in Council Appointments by Predecessor Party Association - 126 Table 5.2 CPC Senate Appointments per Parliamentary Session by Predecessor Party Association - 128 Table 6.1 2004 CPC Candidate’s Past Federal Party Affiliation by Province - 149 Table 6.2 2004 CPC Non-Incumbent Candidate’s Past Federal Party Affiliation by Province - 150 Table 6.3 2006 All CPC Candidate’s Past Federal Party Affiliation by Province - 152 Table 6.4 2004 CPC Non-Incumbent Candidate’s Past Federal Party Affiliation by Province - 153 Table 6.5 2004 and 2006 All CPC Candidate’s Past Provincial Experience - 156 Table 6.6 2004 CPC Candidate’s Past Provincial Experience by Association to one of the Predecessor Parties Federally- 157 Table 6.7 2006 CPC Candidate’s Past Provincial Experience by Association to one of the Predecessor Parties Federally - 158 Table 6.8 2004 CPC Candidate Predecessor Party Association by Riding with Transposition of Votes - 159 Table 6.9 CPC Caucus by Predecessor Party Association - 160 Table 7.1 2004 Shadow Cabinet Appointments by Predecessor Party Association - 179 Table 7.2 2004 Shadow Cabinet Appointments by Province and Predecessor Party Association - 180 Table 7.3 2006 Cabinet Appointments by Predecessor Party Association - 182 Table 7.4 2006 Cabinet Appointments by Province and Predecessor Party Association - 183 Table 7.5 2008 Cabinet Appointments by Predecessor Party Association - 185 Table 7.6 2008 Cabinet Appointments by Province and Predecessor Party Association - 186 Table 7.7 2011 Cabinet Appointments by Predecessor Party Association - 187 Table 7.8 2011 Cabinet Appointments by Province and Predecessor Party Association - 188 Table 7.9 2006 Cabinet Appointments by Level of Prestige and Predecessor Party Association - 191 Table 7.10 2008 Cabinet Appointments by Level of Prestige and Predecessor Party Association - 192 Table 7.11 2011 Cabinet Appointments by Level of Prestige and Predecessor Party Association - 193 iv List of Abbreviations ALP – Australian Labor Party CD - Christian Democratic Party (Italy) CDU - Christian Democratic Union (Germany) CPC – Conservative Party of Canada DPJ - Democratic Party of Japan DRC - Democratic Representative Caucus FDP - Free Democrats Party FEA - Federation of Ecologists Alternatives GIC - Governor in Council JSP - Japan Socialist Party LDP - Liberal Democratic Party MP – Member of Parliament PC – Progressive Conservative PCI - Italian Communist Party PRI - Institutional Revolutionary Party PSDI - Italian Socialist Democratic Party SDP - Social Democratic Party UA - United Alternative v List of Appendices APPENDIX A: Platform Page Count – 219 vi CHAPTER ONE – PARTIES AND FACTIONS The presence of internal groups competing for power and influence within political parties is not a new development in the political party literature. Known as factions, the literature contains extensive discussion on the presence of factions in parties (see Boucek, 2012; Karamichas and Botetzagias, 2003; Kollner, 2004). Most of this literature focuses on parties where factions are deeply institutionalized such as Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) (Kollner, 2004; Tomita et al., 1981) and the Australian Labor Party (ALP) (Leigh, 2000). While the literature addresses many relevant topics regarding factions, there are significant questions that have not been adequately addressed regarding the management of factions. There is agreement that the presence of factions can put a party’s future in jeopardy (Boucek, 2012: 2; Karamichas and Botetzagias, 2003: 65). Yet there is not substantial analysis of how a party can successfully manage its factions (Lees et al., 2010: 1300; Boucek, 2012: 35). How can party leadership manage factional tensions in the party? What steps can be taken and what benefits can be distributed by party leadership to mitigate factional conflict in a party? This project will explore this by using the literature on factionalized parties to analyze the Conservative Party of Canada (CPC) to determine how it effectively managed its competing internal cleavages following its creation in 2003. The CPC serves as a compelling case study when accounting for the long history of conflict in Canadian federal conservative politics. For much of the twentieth century, conservatives in Canada were represented federally by the Progressive Conservative (PC) party. There is a wealth of literature that explores the problems experienced by the PC party with internal fighting and intraparty disunity (see Courtney, 1981; Perlin, 1980). In the 1993 election the PC party suffered massive losses in their seat count as two new political parties enjoyed 1 significant electoral breakthroughs. The Bloc Quebecois formed because of disillusionment with the PCs attempts to attain Quebec's endorsement of the constitution. Several prominent PCs left the party as it became clear that the Meech Lake Accord, which would have brought Quebec's support of the constitution, would not pass. These Members of Parliament (MP) formed the Bloc Quebecois which openly endorsed Quebec separatism. Following the 1993 election, the Bloc formed the Official Opposition in Parliament (Carty et al., 2000:12, 39-42). In Western Canada, feelings that the PCs were too sympathetic to Quebec combined with feelings of alienation from government fueled the formation of the Reform party. The Reform party came out of the 1993 election with only two fewer seats than the Bloc. Numerous works have examined the emergence of the Reform party, battles between them and the PC party, the similarities and differences between the two parties and the attempts made to reunite them (see Ellis, 2005; Laycock, 2002; Nevitte et al., 2000; Patten, 1999; Harrison, 1995; Lusztig and Wilson, 2005). Following multiple failed attempts at uniting the right-wing parties, in 2003 reconciliation was achieved and the PC party and the Canadian Alliance party (which replaced the Reform party) merged into the CPC. After reducing the Liberals to a minority government in 2004, the new party would win minority governments in the next two elections followed by a majority government in 2011. The Canadian party literature has placed its attention on