Correspondence Public Process and State-Court Rulemaking To the Editors: Professor Hazard, in his review of Judge Jack Weinstein's Reform of Court Rule-Making Procedures,' finds the judge's proposed reforms of federal rulemaking procedure to be "restrained to the point of being 2 exiguous." Yet, Professor Hazard fails to mention Judge Weinstein's attack on unfettered judicial rulemaking in the state courts, that is, state-court rulemaking free from subsequent legislative intervention. 3 This failure is noteworthy. Whatever the virtues of the status quo in the federal context, the sweeping scope of judicial autonomy in many state-court rulemaking procedures renders Judge Weinstein's call for more "public process" 4 espe- cially apt in the state context. The frequent insulation of state-court rule- makers from both the legislature and the electorate underscores the need for new modes of public participation in state rulemaking, particularly when state courts exercise quasi-legislative authority, as, for example, in regulating the practice of law. Before proceeding to explore this topic, it should be noted that Judge Weinstein's description of state rulemaking suffers from several factual in- accuracies. In one instance, the autonomy of a judiciary's rulemaking power is exaggerated. Florida is said to be "one of four states whose constitution does not seem to subject judicial rule-making power to legislative control."5 Yet a 1972 revision of the Florida constitution now permits procedural rules adopted by the Florida Supreme Court to be repealed by a two-thirds vote in both houses of the state legislature. 6 More often, however, Judge Wein- stein understates the extent of judicial autonomy in state rulemaking. For example, Judge Weinstein fails to note that many more than four state constitutions expressly grant state high courts at least some rulemaking 1. J. WEINSTEIN, REFoRM oF COURT RuLE-MAKING PROCEDUMS (1977). 2. Hazard, Book Review, 87 YALE L.J. 1284, 1287 (1978). 3. See J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 1, at 82-83. 4. Id. at 87. Judge Weinstein's treatment of the federal apparatus may also raise questions. For example, although he recognizes that the Judicial Conference engages in some quasi-rulemaking, see id. at 137, the stronger claim could be made that Congress has delegated some unfettered rulemaking authority to the Conference, see 28 U.S.C. § 604 (1976) (mandating that Judicial Conference supervise all administrative matters relating to Article III courts). Further, Judge Weinstein suggests that Congress's ultimate authority over federal rulemaking power is complete and unproblematic. See J. NVEIN- STEIN, supra note 1, at 90. But query whether the Supreme Court could not question a congressional exercise of rulemaking power where the Court possesses original jurisdiction under Article III, § 2, since such jurisdiction is compelled explicitly by the Constitution rather than left to Congress's discretion. 5. J. WEINSTEIN, suPra note 1, at 82. 6. FLA. CONST. art. 5, § 2(a) (adopted Mar. 4, 1972). The Florida Supreme Court exercises exclusive rulemaking authority over admission to the practice of law. Id. § 15. 1319 The Yale Law Journal Vol. 88: 1319, 1979 powers that lie beyond final legislative control. 7 In addition, the trend over the past two decades has been toward placing more final rulemaking authority in state judiciariess and not, as Judge Weinstein suggests,9 toward vesting ultimate responsibility for rulemaking in state legislatures. These factual inaccuracies might be unimportant were it not that Judge Weinstein also miscalculates the significance of autonomous judicial control of rulemaking procedures in the states. When Judge Weinstein examines a state in which the judiciary exercises absolute rulemaking authority, he finds "the same practical balance in rule-making as [in] other American jurisdictions."'10 In his view, the practical need to bridge the formal separa- tion of powers in state governments has made talk of unfettered judicial rulemaking authority "illusory."" This position has some basis, for one study suggests that even where state judiciaries exercise rulemaking author- ity that is immune from legislative veto, legislatures still retain some ability to affect judicial rules. 12 Nevertheless, the ability to affect judicial rules falls well short of the ultimate power to determine judicial rules.' 3 Recent 7. Such powers involving rules of procedure can be found, for example, in ARIz. CoNsr. art. 6, § 21 (effective 1965); Ky. CONST. § 116 (effective 1976). Powers involving rules regulating the practice of law can be found, for example, in ARK. CONST. amend. 28 (effective 1938); IND. CoNsr. art. 7, § 4 (effective 1970). And, such powers involving super- intendence or administrative control can be found, for example, in COLO. CONsT. art. 6, § 21 (effective 1965); MICH. CONsT. art. 4, § 4 (effective 1963). Other state constitutions have been read to grant unfettered rulemaking authority to the state's highest court. See, e.g., State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 486 P.2d 247 (1971) (interpreting IDAHO CONST. art. 5, § 13); Southwest Underwriters v. Montoya, 80 N.M. 107, 452 P.2d 176 (1969) (interpreting N.M. CONsT. art. 3, § 1). 8. See note 7 supra; Dodge & Cashman, The ABA Model Judicial Article, STATE COURT J., Winter 1979, at 43. 9. J.WEINSTEIN, supra note 1, at 78-79. 10. Id. at 82. 11. Id. Notwithstanding this illusion, Judge Weinstein cites a commentator who criticized the Connecticut Supreme Court for making "extravagant claims of exclusive power over rules." Id. 79-80 (citing Kay, The Rule-Making Authority and Separation of Powers in Connecticut, 8 CONN. L. Rxv. 1 (1975)). Even if commentators were able to transform reality into illusion, the commentator in question had no such intent. See Kay, ,supra, at 41-42 ("the constitutional law of Connecticut appears to have established the final and complete authority of the supreme and superior courts to establish their own rules of procedure") (citation omitted). 12. See Ashman, Measuring the Judicial Rule-making Power, 59 Juo. 215, 219-20 (1975). 13. Judge Weinstein underplays this difference in the scope of legislative power over judicial rulemaking. He repeats the dubious observation of an earlier commentator that, among the states, the ascendant policy is one of judicial rulemaking authority limited by ultimate accountability to the legislature. J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 1, at 78-79 (quoting Kaplan 9- Green, The Legislature's Relation to Judicial Rule-Making: An Appraisal of Winberry v. Salisbury, 65 HARv. L. REV. 234, 251 (1951)). But see note 7 supra (citing constitutional provisions vesting ultimate rulemaking authority in judiciary). By overlooking the continuing vitality of unfettered judicial rulemaking, Judge Wein- stein may misinterpret Wigmore's position. See J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 1, at 79 ("[n]o serious student would today accept Wigmore's thesis that the legislature has no power to affect judicial procedure"). Wigmore did assert at one point that "all legislatively declared rules for procedure ... are void, except such as are expressly stated in the Constitution." Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure are Void Constitutionally, 23 ILL. L. REv. 276, 276 (1928) (emphasis in original). Yet in the same piece, Wigmore acknowl- edged that legislatively declared procedural rules have "such effect as the comity of the 1320 State Court Rulemaking events indicate the state judiciaries can, and will, block legislative attempts to subvert ultimate judicial authority in rulemaking.'4 In 1976, the Michigan legislature passed an Open Meetings Act 15 that provided for greater public access to governmental bodies. The Act specif- ically applied to "a court while exercising rule-making authority and while deliberating or deciding upon the issuance of administrative orders."'16 However, shortly after the Act took effect, the Michigan Supreme Court, in a direct address to the legislature, declared that the portion of the Act dealing with the judiciary constituted "an impermissible intrusion into the most basic day-to-day exercise of the constitutionally derived judicial pow- ers," which included "rule-making, supervisory and other administrative powers as well as traditional adjudicative ones."' 7 Tennessee provides a second example of a state judiciary successfully re- taining ultimate authority over the judicial rulemaking process. In March 1978, Tennessee voters rejected a judicial article that would have limited the supreme court's rulemaking power by requiring legislative concurrence before judicial rules became effective.' 8 However, even if the voters had approved the proposed article, it is not certain that they would have succeeded in constraining the absolute rulemaking authority of the Tennes- see Supreme Court. Chief Justice Henry strongly criticized the proposal on the ground that "[i]t did not lie within the power of the constitutional convention to strip any branch of government of its co-equal status nor to render its operation so ineffectual that it would cease to exist as an in- dependent branch of our state's government."' 9 The continuing vitality of unfettered judicial rulemaking in some states has an important implication for Judge Weinstein's call for greater public process in judicial rulemaking; in many instances, the power to reform state rulemaking procedures lies exclusively in the hands of state high courts. Fortunately, however, state courts may be receptive to public participation judiciary may give them in the absence of any rule made by the judiciary." Id. at 279. Thus Wigmore recognized legislative power to affect rulemaking, although this power was constrained by accountability to the judiciary. 14. What constitutes a legislative attempt to undermine a court's ultimate authority will depend on the extent to which that ultimate authority is exclusive. See Kaplan & Green, supra note 13, at 250 ("Whatever ... the precise limits on the legislature's power, to assert that it may not stop . ..rule-making by blanket legislation is different from asserting ... it cannot effectively repeal or modify particular court rules and ..