TThhee NNAATT OO RReessppoonnssee FFoorrccee FFaacciilliittaattiinngg CCooaalliittiioonn WWaarrff aarree tthhrroouugghh TTeecchhnnoollooggyy TTrraannssffeerr aanndd IInnffoorrmmaattiioonn SShhaarriinngg Jeffrey P. Bialos and Stuart L. Koehl Report of a study conducted by the Center for Transatlantic Relations and Funded by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy Center for Technology and National Security Policy National Defense University September 2005 The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. All information and sources for this paper were drawn from unclassified materials. Jeffrey P. Bialos is the Executive Director of the Transatlantic Security and Industry Program at the Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies Center for Transatlantic Relations, and a partner in the law firm of Sutherland Asbill and Brennan. Mr. Bialos previously served in a number of senior positions in the Clinton Administration, including most recently as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Affairs. He received the Defense Department’s Distinguished Service Medal for his service. He has published numerous articles and reports on defense and security issues, and conducted studies of a variety of issues concerning the transatlantic armaments market, NATO and related subjects. He was also appointed by Governor Mark Warner of Virginia to serve on Secure Virginia, a panel overseeing Virginia’s homeland security efforts. Mr. Bialos is a graduate of Cornell University (A.B. with honors), the University of Chicago Law School (J.D.) and the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (M.P.P.) Stuart L. Koehl is a Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations, where he focuses his research activities on transatlantic security and industrial issues. A graduate of Georgetown University, Mr. Koehl has been a defense analyst for twenty-five years and has conducted a wide range of analyses for both government and industry on defense technology, strategy, and transformation issues. Acknowledgements. This study is based on a review of unclassified, open literature and interviews with selected U.S. government, NATO, and industry personnel. We acknowledge the support and assistance of these individuals, who took time out from busy schedules to talk to us. We acknowledge Johns Hopkins University’s Center on Transatlantic Relations (CTR) and National Defense University (NDU) for their support of this project. In particular, we appreciate the helpful advice and comments of Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler at NDU and Dan Hamilton at the CTR. As always, however, the responsibility for content is that of the authors, not the institutions with which they are affiliated, nor the sources on which they drew. Jeffrey P. Bialos and Stuart L. Koehl Washington, D.C. Defense & Technology Papers are published by the National Defense University Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC. CTNSP publications are available online at http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/publications.html. ii Contents Executive Summary v I. The NATO Response Force: From Conception to Operations 1 A. The NRF Concept 1 B. The Purpose and Roots of the NRF 2 C. The NRF in Operation 12 D. Relevant Issues and Uncertainties on the NRF’s Development 15 II. Identifying Critical Enabling Technologies and Information for the NRF 21 A. A Taxonomy of Technology Transfer Needs 22 B. The Phased Timeline for Technology Transfer 27 III. A Taxonomy of Technology Transfer and Information Sharing Issues 35 A. The Regulatory, Policy, and Institutional Framework for Technology Transfer 35 1. The Legal and Regulatory Basics 35 2. Entrenched Problems in the Technology Transfer Process 38 3. Limited Effectiveness of Attempted Solutions 40 4. Study Assumptions: Continued Release and Process Issues and Lack of USG Consensus for Overall System Reform 47 B. Information Sharing and Network-Centric Warfare 50 C. Capability Requirements 66 1. The Range of Capability-Related Technology Transfer Needs 67 2. Technology Transfer Policy Issues 68 IV. Conclusions and Recommendations 77 A. General Observations 77 B. NRF Recommendations 79 C. Steps to Improved Technology Transfer and Information Sharing 81 Appendix: Critical Enabling Technology and Key U.S. Programs 84 iii Tables 1.1 Force Contributions, NRF Rotation No.1 16 2.1 Taxonomy of NRF Capabilities by Implementation Phase 24 3.1 Key ISR Enabling Systems 51 3.2 Interoperability Enhancements and Technology Transfer 58 3.3 U.S. Transformational Programs and Releasability Status 60 3.4 Capabilities and Technology Transfer Requirements (Non-C4I) 66 Figures 2.1 Spectrum of Interoperability 26 3.1 National Disclosure Policy Review Process 37 3.2 Process for Review of Signature Control Technology 43 3.3 Anti-Tamper Executive Authority Decision Process 45 iv Executive Summary At the Prague Summit in 2002, NATO Heads of State announced the creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF), a relatively small expeditionary force for spearhead operations in out-of- area conflicts. The central concept was to create, over time, an advanced, primarily European force for high-intensity conflicts that would catalyze force transformation and capability acquisition in Europe, promote Transatlantic force interoperability, and provide Europe with out- of-area capabilities to match its new strategic direction and reorient NATO toward out-of-area expeditionary operations. The hope was and is that this type of operational force would, along with other steps, help to revitalize the NATO alliance and improve Transatlantic security relations in these times of tensions and drift. The NRF is intended to be a transformational force that will not only be able to meet the security needs of NATO in the 21st century but also serve as an agent of change whereby all the member nations of NATO will be able to bring new technology, capabilities, and concepts of operations into their national forces. While the NRF is still a work in progress, the threats and missions that the Force is intended to address will undoubtedly require, and encourage the acquisition of, strategic mobility and deployability, battlefield agility, and high lethality. Unlike previous joint forces, which tended to fight in a segregated fashion (by virtue of either roles or geographical boundaries), the NRF is intended to be fully integrated, i.e., units will be able to fight within the same battle space without regard to national origins and unconstrained by geographical boundaries. Significantly, this coalition warfighting construct implies the need to fully share information within the Force at the tactical and operational level, something that can only be done if there is a significant level of technical, tactical, and operational inter-operability—to say nothing of a common doctrine and concept of operations. Undoubtedly, the sharing of U.S. technology and technical information would facilitate, and in some cases be essential to, the development and fielding of a highly capable and interoperable NRF. Unfortunately, however, the history of recent Transatlantic armaments initiatives suggests that the complex problems associated with such technology and information sharing with the United States could be a significant limiting factor in standing up the NRF, and that new or special approaches should be considered to address these issues. If the NRF is to succeed, both in its primary mission as NATO’s fast reaction, cutting-edge force, and as an instrument of military transformation within the Alliance, then information-sharing and technology transfer issues must be identified, addressed and resolved expeditiously. Hence, this study is primarily an examination of the issues associated with transferring U.S. technology and information needed for standing up such an advanced force for early entry into high-intensity conflicts. In the course of evaluating these issues and making recommendations on ways forward, this essay also makes a number of additional, and broader observations about the nature of 21st century coalition warfighting, the centrality of network-centric warfare to coalition operations, and the importance and complexity of improving force interoperability in an increasingly network-centric environment. In this regard, the NRF is really a microcosm of broader crosscutting issues and challenges inherent in developing an effective coalition warfighting capability and cohesive alliance for the 21st century. Undoubtedly, the NRF will not provide a basis for solving all of these complex challenges. But it does offer an opportunity for experimentation and testing—the essence of military transformation—and the forging of creative solutions. Specifically, in organizing this analysis: • Section I sets forth an understanding of the purposes, operational realities and developmental path of the NRF—which is critical to establishing a conceptual baseline for identifying and assessing the technology transfer needs associated with the Force. • Section II seeks to identify and prioritize the technology transfer and information sharing needs associated with standing up the NRF, including those related to Force operational and doctrinal needs, ensuring force interoperability, and incentivizing the acquisition of enhanced capabilities. As the NRF is still a work in progress, we have, of necessity,