![No. 67: the Political Situation in Russia's Regions](https://data.docslib.org/img/3a60ab92a6e30910dab9bd827208bcff-1.webp)
russian analytical russian analytical digest 67/09 digest transitional phenomenon in the process of state and its own accord. In fact, even the possible potential lib- institution building, centralized subnational authori- eralization and democratization of the regime at the tarianism is much more stable. Its framework is based, national level does not guarantee the undermining of first of all, on a concentration of the coercive and dis- the local regimes. In addition to the historical legacy tributional capacities of the state in the hands of the of the Soviet (and pre-Soviet) period, the formation of ruling group in the Center, which is able to block ef- a new institutional legacy in the 1990s and especially forts to undermine the status quo at the local level from in the 2000s hinders the undermining of subnational above, and, second, the lack of influential actors capa- authoritarianism in Russia. ble of carrying out such an undermining from below. One can expect that in the short-term, with the From this point of view, centralized subnational party preservation of the current Russian national and lo- authoritarianism can be stable. The experience of such cal regimes, there will be a further conservation (if not regimes from southern Italy to Mexico shows that their stagnation) of subnational authoritarian regimes. Also, undermining is more likely as a result of the collapse of the chances for fully-fledged democratization of the the national regime and/or the party system, than un- Russian national political system and the chances for der the influence of their internal evolution at the local the effective state building needed to create the condi- level. Therefore one can predict that in the short-term tions for the successful development of its cities and re- there is little reason to expect that subnational author- gions depends ultimately on the overcoming of subna- itarianism in Russia will significantly weaken or fall of tional authoritarianism in Russia. About the Author Vladimir Gel’man is a Professor in the Faculty of Political Science and Sociology at the European University in St. Petersburg. analysis Who Governs? The Transformation of Sub-Regional Political Regimes in Russia (1991–2009) By D. G. Seltser, Tambov Abstract In the post-Soviet period, Russia’s city and local district leaderships were variously appointed (1991–1994/1996) and elected (4 election cycles: 1994–1996; 1998–2001; 2003–2005; 2008–2010), leading to significant chang- es in these leaderships. Based on the oblasts of Ryazan, Samara, Tambov, and Ulyanovsk and the republics of Mordovia, Udmurtia and Chuvashia, this article examines the political transformations of local govern- ment regimes through an analysis of elites. It seeks to address the following questions: What changes have occurred in the make-up of city and district mayors? What are the dynamics for removing leaders? Who are these people? Who are their support base and who are they answerable to? Summarizing this data makes it possible to address the key question: Who makes political decisions in local government? The Evolution of Local Government the president, and then as governors. Once these posi- Leadership tions were filled, he also appointed mayors. In the ab- sence of comprehensive information and reliable surveys Appointments 1991 from the local districts, Yeltsin and his team chose lead- In the initial post-Soviet period, Russia did not hold ers based on their estimates of who would be the most “founding elections.” Instead, President Yeltsin direct- loyal to the federal center and they generally succeeded ly appointed regional leaders, first as representatives of in this task as the officials indeed remained loyal. 5 russian analytical russian analytical digest 67/09 digest The appointed local government leaders in 1991 had ners of the elections were non-nomenklatura entrepre- the following career backgrounds: neurs (the newly wealthy agriculturalists, businessmen, 16.6% CPSU city or district committee 1st Secretary soldiers, policemen etc; 42.7%). 1% CPSU city or district committee 2nd Secretary The Third Electoral Cycle (2002–5) 4% Soviet Chairman/Deputy Chairman The early years of the Putin presidency were marked by 54.8% Executive Committee (Ispolkom) Chairman/ a “verticalization” of administrative reforms – aimed Deputy Chairman at returning powers to the federal center and ending 17.6% Enterprise Directors the growing trends toward regionalization in the post- 6% Other posts Soviet period. In this political situation, the number of Accordingly , around 60 percent of the sub-national former officials of the Communist Party of the Soviet leaders Yeltsin appointed came from the Soviet nomen- Union in top jobs within subnational government klatura. On the basis of these figure, it is clear that the dropped to just 6 percent. At the same time, represen- new office holders in post-Soviet Russia differed little tation of the soviet nomenklatura and Soviet-era eco- from the previous incumbents. Therefore, the aim of nomic nomenklatura fell to 10.6 percent and 9 percent these appointments was not to transform the compo- respectively. The non-nomenklatura entrepreneurs in- sition of the local government elite, nor to remove the creased their representation to 72.4 percent. After the presence of the previous party nomenklatura from the 2005 elections, party first secretaries and most other of- positions they occupied. ficials who were part of the Soviet nomenklatura had been fully cleansed from government. First Electoral Cycle (1994–1996) The first cycle of elections to local government took Local Elections in Tambov Oblast place within 5 years of the collapse of the Soviet Union. After 2004, we shifted focus from looking at numerous These elections were hotly contested, ideological, and regions to examining elections taking place in Tambov pitted the “communists” against the “democrats.” In Oblast. this context, 13.6 percent of the newly-elected heads of the city and district administrations (mayors) were The Fourth Electoral Cycle (2008–10) former Communist Party first secretaries, 38.2 percent In the first year of the current electoral cycle (2008), were former soviet leaders and 48.2 percent were repre- elections took place in 10 out of 30 local government sentatives of the former economic nomenklatura. The districts in Tambov Oblast, making it possible to draw nomenklatura’s declining fortunes did not occur simply a number of conclusions about key points in the elec- as a result of inter-group tendencies, but as part of more tions. widespread removal of previous political representatives. Incumbency – In these elections, only a third of the Overall, the population voted for the Communist Party incumbent mayors were able to hold onto to their of- of the Russian Federation and its protégés, but refused fices. We should not draw hasty conclusions about the to place its trust in the former nomenklatura of the turnover of mayors from the beginning of the fourth cy- Communist Party of the Soviet Union. cle, because the Tambov data should be double-checked against data from other oblasts and regions, or at least The Second Electoral Cycle (1998–2001) against the remaining rounds of elections in the fourth In the course of the second electoral cycle, the pragmat- cycle of Tambov oblast (due to be held in March 2010). ic political elite consolidated their positions in the face Nonetheless, it is important to understand the circum- of imminent conflict caused by the dead-end nature of stances in which the replacement of mayors in Tambov Russia’s bipolar political conflict. As a result, personal took place in 2008. relations and alliances became a key political factor. In An important aspect to note about these elections these conditions, the number of former CPSU first sec- is that only in three of the ten cases were elections held retaries who continued to serve as executives fell to 11.1 as originally scheduled. In the other seven cases, the percent. It was clear that they were no longer capable elections were held earlier than planned. In the major- of holding on to power. Indeed, the soviet nomnekla- ity of these cases, this was because criminal cases were tura also lost some of their positions (falling to 25.6%), launched against the incumbents. while the economic nomenklatura of Soviet period lost Who won the elections? Another revealing trend is even more positions (dropping to 20.6%). The big-win- that of the ten newly elected mayors – five are the rich- 6 russian analytical russian analytical digest 67/09 digest est people in their district. These candidates reached Clearing the field.The authorities actively refused to agreement with those responsible for the “electoral pro- register or annulled the registration of candidates they cess” in the district, thus ensuring themselves victory. did not support (15 cases). This was carried out in differ- The rest are municipal civil servants. These public -of ent ways. Typically, the authorities acted harshly against ficials were able to win their elections by using ties to those individuals who have a history of registering and the same business groups as the rich candidates, con- then voluntarily withdrawing their candidacy, thereby nections with the oblast administrations, and their own making a significant sum of money. In one prominent managerial experience. case, the authorities refused to register a candidate from Party membership. The significance of party-member- the pro-Kremlin party Just Russia, who had financial ship in determining local electoral outcomes should not backing from a businessmen who was the strongest crit- be overestimated. It is clear that in today’s Russia decision- ic of the governor in the region. The central party lead- making functions are no longer located within the par- ership offered this candidate the opportunity to use the ty apparatus, not even within United Russia (UR). The Just Russia party label even though Tambov party offi- UR regional executive committee typically only reveals cials had refused to give it to him.
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