Order Code RL33153 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities — Background and Issues for Congress Updated July 20, 2007 Ronald O’Rourke Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities — Background and Issues for Congress Summary Concern has grown in Congress and elsewhere about China’s military modernization. The topic is an increasing factor in discussions over future required U.S. Navy capabilities. The issue for Congress addressed in this report is: How should China’s military modernization be factored into decisions about U.S. Navy programs? Several elements of China’s military modernization have potential implications for future required U.S. Navy capabilities. These include theater-range ballistic missiles (TBMs), land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), land-based aircraft, submarines, surface combatants, amphibious ships, naval mines, nuclear weapons, and possibly high- power microwave (HPM) devices. China’s naval limitations or weaknesses include capabilities for operating in waters more distant from China, joint operations, C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), long-range surveillance and targeting systems, anti-air warfare (AAW), antisubmarine warfare (ASW), mine countermeasures (MCM), and logistics. Observers believe a near-term focus of China’s military modernization is to field a force that can succeed in a short-duration conflict with Taiwan and act as an anti- access force to deter U.S. intervention or delay the arrival of U.S. forces, particularly naval and air forces, in such a conflict. Some analysts speculate that China may attain (or believe that it has attained) a capable maritime anti-access force, or elements of it, by about 2010. Other observers believe this will happen later. Potential broader or longer-term goals of China’s naval modernization include asserting China’s regional military leadership and protecting China’s maritime territorial, economic, and energy interests. China’s naval modernization has potential implications for required U.S. Navy capabilities in terms of preparing for a conflict in the Taiwan Strait area, maintaining U.S. Navy presence and military influence in the Western Pacific, and countering Chinese ballistic missile submarines. Preparing for a conflict in the Taiwan Strait area could place a premium on the following: on-station or early-arriving Navy forces, capabilities for defeating China’s maritime anti-access forces, and capabilities for operating in an environment that could be characterized by information warfare and possibly electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and the use of nuclear weapons. Certain options are available for improving U.S. Navy capabilities by 2010; additional options, particularly in shipbuilding, can improve U.S. Navy capabilities in subsequent years. China’s naval modernization raises potential issues for Congress concerning the role of China in Department of Defense (DOD) and Navy planning; the size of the Navy; the Pacific Fleet’s share of the Navy; forward homeporting of Navy ships in the Western Pacific; the number of aircraft carriers, submarines, and ASW-capable platforms; Navy missile defense, air-warfare, AAW, ASW, and mine warfare programs; Navy computer network security; and EMP hardening of Navy systems. This report will be updated as events warrant. Contents Introduction ......................................................1 Congressional And Navy Concern.................................1 Issue for Congress .............................................2 Scope of Report...............................................3 Terminology..................................................3 Sources......................................................3 Background ......................................................5 China’s Naval Modernization ....................................5 Maritime-Relevant Elements of China’s Military Modernization .....5 China’s Naval Limitations and Weaknesses ....................22 Goals or Significance of China’s Naval Modernization ...........29 Potential Implications for Required U.S. Navy Capabilities ............42 Capabilities for Taiwan Strait Crisis or Conflict .................42 Capabilities for Maintaining Regional Presence and Influence ......50 Capabilities for Tracking and Countering PLA SSBNs ............51 Potential Oversight Issues for Congress ...............................51 China as a Defense-Planning Priority .............................51 DOD Planning ...........................................51 Navy Planning...........................................52 Navy Force Structure and Basing Arrangements.....................53 Size of the Fleet..........................................53 Division of Fleet Between Atlantic and Pacific..................53 Forward Homeporting in the Western Pacific...................54 Number of Aircraft Carriers.................................55 Number of Attack Submarines (SSNs) ........................55 ASW-Capable Ships and Aircraft ............................57 Navy Warfare Areas and Programs...............................58 Missile Defense..........................................58 Air Warfare .............................................61 Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) ..................................63 Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW)..............................65 Mine Warfare............................................69 Computer Network Security ................................69 EMP Hardening..........................................70 Legislative Activity For FY2008 .....................................73 FY2008 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 1585) ....................73 House..................................................73 Appendix. Additional Details on China’s Naval Modernization Efforts......74 List of Tables Table 1. PLA Navy Submarine Commissionings........................10 Table 2. Chinese Submarine Patrols Per Year, 1981-2006 .................12 Table 3. New PLA Navy Destroyer Classes............................15 Table 4. New PLA Navy Frigate Classes..............................16 Table 5. Potential Ship Travel Times to Taiwan Strait Area ...............44 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities — Background and Issues for Congress Introduction Congressional And Navy Concern Concern has grown in Congress and elsewhere since the 1990s about China’s military modernization and its potential implications for required U.S. military capabilities. China’s military modernization is an increasing element in discussions of future U.S. Navy requirements. A May 2005 press report, for example, stated that: China is one of the central issues, along with terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, in the U.S. military’s 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review, a congressionally directed study of military plans.... [W]hen the [then-]chief of naval operations, Adm. Vern Clark, held a classified briefing for congressional defense committees earlier this month about threats, his focus was “mainly” on China, about which he is “gravely concerned,” recalled John W. Warner, the Virginia Republican who chairs the Senate Armed Services Committee.... China has come up repeatedly in congressional debate over the size of the Navy. The 288-ship fleet of today is half the size it was three decades ago. “You never want to broadcast to the world that something’s insufficient,” Warner says, “but clearly China poses a challenge to the sizing of the U.S. Navy.”1 In an address delivered on February 7, 2007, Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter stated: Naval forces must be ready, above all, to conduct major combat operations should the need arise. We cannot ignore events and trends that reinforce that belief. A recent White Paper prepared by the Chinese military outlined a three-step strategy for modernizing its defense, to include its blue-water ambitions. The third step in their strategy states as a strategic goal “building modernized armed forces and being capable of winning modern, net-centric wars by the mid-21st century.” This document implicitly suggests that China hopes to be in a position to successfully challenge the United States, a challenge that would certainly entail blue-water operations. 1 John M. Donnelly, “China On Course To Be Pentagon’s Next Worry,” CQ Weekly, May 2, 2005, p. 1126. CRS-2 Public declarations such as this statement and many others serve as reminders that we must be prepared for a world that does not always follow our preferences. Of course, we hope that China will choose a peaceful path. But hope is not a strategy, so we must be prepared. Those who might be tempted to dismiss or discount the need to be prepared for major combat operations ought to keep in mind that their goodwill and optimism towards totalitarian regimes may not be reciprocated.2 A press article reporting on an April 3, 2007, address by Admiral Michael Mullen, the current Chief of Naval Operations, stated that in addition to other topics, The admiral also commented on the threats that drive military spending needs. For example, he noted, China is building a new, modernized navy. “The Chinese are shifting from land-centric” forces as their main focus “to air-centric and naval-centric” buildups. China is acquiring cutting-edge aircraft, new destroyers, four new classes of submarines, and hundreds of radar-guided missiles.