Biosemiotics (2013) 6:323–336 DOI 10.1007/s12304-013-9170-z ORIGINAL PAPER Perception and Conception: Shaping Human Minds Otávio Bueno Received: 21 September 2012 /Accepted: 15 November 2012 /Published online: 26 February 2013 # Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013 Abstract Perceptual experiences provide an important source of information about the world. It is clear that having the capacity of undergoing such experiences yields an evolutionary advantage. But why should humans have developed not only the ability of simply seeing, but also of seeing that something is thus and so? In this paper, I explore the significance of distinguishing perception from conception for the development of the kind of minds that creatures such as humans typically have. As will become clear, it is crucial to pay careful attention to the different kinds of information that are involved in perceiving and conceiving (including the way such information is gathered and transmitted). By identifying such kinds of information and the role they play, we can then understand an important feature of why creatures like us have the kind of consciousness and mental processes we do. Keywords Perception . Conception . Empiricism . Conceptualism . Nonconceptualism Introduction Perceptual experiences provide an important source of information about the world. It is clear that having the capacity of undergoing such experiences yields an evolution- ary advantage. But why should humans have developed not only the ability of simply seeing, but also of seeing that something is thus and so? The former is a basic (non- epistemic) form of seeing, whereas the latter is conceptual in nature. I can see an okapi without realizing that it is an okapi that I see. This would be the case if, for Special Issue “Origins of Mind” edited by Liz Stillwaggon Swan and Andrew M. Winters My thanks go to Rami El Ali and Colin McGinn for many discussions about the issues examined in this paper. Liz Swan and Andrew Winters gave me very helpful comments on earlier versions of the work. I am very grateful to them. O. Bueno (*) Department of Philosophy, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL 33124, USA e-mail: [email protected] 324 O. Bueno example, I do not have the concept of okapi, but there is an okapi in front of me and I look at it.1 In this paper, I explore the significance of distinguishing these two kinds of perception—or, rather, distinguishing perception from conception—for the develop- ment of the kind of minds that creatures such as humans typically have. As will become clear, it is crucial to pay careful attention to the different kinds of information that are involved in perceiving and conceiving (including the way such information is gathered and transmitted). By identifying such kinds of information and the role they play, we can then understand an important feature of why creatures like us have the kind of consciousness and mental processes we do. Perception and Conception There is a substantial literature on the distinction between conception and perception (see, e.g., Smith 2002 and Dretske 2000, and the references therein). My goal, in this work, is simply to explore the significance of this divide to the issue of the kind of minds that creatures like us have. The central idea is that it is because we are able to have certain perceptual experiences, in response to external features of the environ- ment, that we developed conceptual capacities (including the capacities to reflect and conceptualize relevant features of such perceptual experiences). The relevant con- ceptual capacities, in turn, allow us to assess the nature of these experiences (includ- ing their scope and reliability). The result is an intricate, entangled relation between perceiving something and conceiving it. Underlying the account favored here there is an empiricism that gives priority to the perceptual over the conceptual. Perception provides information about the envi- ronment around us, and such information emerges from the counterfactual depen- dence between the environment and the corresponding perceptual experiences. In particular, we have: (C1) Had the environment been different (within the sensitivity range of our perceptual apparatus), the resulting perceptual experiences would have been correspondingly different. (C2) Had the environment been the same (within the sensitivity range of our perceptual apparatus), the resulting perceptual experiences would have been correspondingly the same.2 These conditions provide a way of tracking the environment, by determining how changes in it correspond to changes in the perceptual experiences. Moreover, perceptual experiences have content, in the sense that (a) they represent the environment as being a certain way, and (b) that representation has a particular form. For example, a subway map has content, since it represents the environment by 1 This distinction has been forcefully presented and defended by Fred Dretske (see, e.g., Dretske 2000). 2 For a discussion of the role played by counterfactual conditions of this sort in visual experiences, see Lewis (1980). Lewis focuses on (C1), formulated in terms of the counterfactual dependence between the scene before us and the corresponding visual experiences. But (C2) is also needed, since it does not follow from (C1), and information about stable features of the environment is required in order for us to be able to track the objects around us properly. Perception and Conception: Shaping Human Minds 325 depicting the spatial relations among the various stations of the subway, and that representation is formulated via a suitable diagram, which conveys the relevant features of the subway. Similarly, a photograph of a subway station also has content, since it represents the way the subway looks (from the angle in which the photograph was taken), and that representation is also formulated via similarity relations (visually salient traits) between the subway station and image that characterizes the surface of the photograph. Perceptual experiences have content in exactly the same way. The environment is represented as being a certain way (for instance, the visual experience of a snowy mountain represents the environment as including such a mountain), and that representation has a certain form (it is formulated by preserving the visually salient features of the environment). But the priority of the perceptual over the conceptual should be understood carefully. We are perfectly aware of how limited perception is. There are contexts in which it may fail (for instance, when one is sleep deprived or has taken certain drugs); there are conditions under which the information perception provides can be misleading (e.g. when the environment is not properly illuminated), and in many situations it is unclear how to interpret the contents of the perceptual experiences (for example, in the case of visual illusions). Information generated from perceptual experiences can be, and often is, revised: perception is, of course, a fallible sense modality. And its fallibility emerges, in part and in certain contexts, from the conceptual component. If while strolling on the beach I mistake a rock for a crab, it is my interpretation of the sensory information I received—in other words, my conception—that was ultimately responsible for the mistake. That I received some sensory information through my eyes is undeniable. In that case, the problem was the way I conceptualized the relevant information. However, this does not entail that my sensory information cannot be mistaken. When a cloud is blocking the sunlight, the color of the sand may appear to be a different shade than it actually is. And such an appearance holds independently of the way I conceptualize the shade. But it may be argued that the shade of the sand’s color was precisely the way it appeared to be, given the conditions of the sky at that moment. After all, depending on the conditions of the environment, the sand’s color will appear differently. In the end, the shade appeared just the way it was under the conditions the sand was exposed to. In response, this suggestion introduces a substantial level of infallibility. It as- sumes that the content of a visual experience cannot be mistaken. Any mistakes can only be introduced when conceptualizations are advanced, since it is in virtue of these conceptualizations that the adequacy (or lack thereof) between the information conveyed in the perceptual experience and what is going on in the scene before one’s eyes can be adjudicated. However, there are ways in which the content alone of visual experiences can be mistaken. Perceptual illusions provide clear illustrations of this possibility. The straw inside a glass with water seems to be bent when in fact it remains straight. It is an artifact of the way light behaves that the straw will appear the way it does, even though it is not bent at all. There is here a clear mismatch between what appears to the subject (a bent straw inside a glass with water) and what is actually going on (a perfectly straight straw inside the glass). It may be objected that in this case there is a conceptual issue involved: the perception of the straw as bent. Such a perception can only occur after the acquisition 326 O. Bueno and mastery of the concept bent, since it is only by invoking this concept that the corresponding experience is possible. That is, in order to perceive the straw as bent (rather than, say, as straight), the content of the experience needs to be such that the sensory features are interpreted as involving a bent straw. So, once again, the problem has to do with the conceptual components rather than with the sensory traits. I am not unsympathetic with this response. And it is plausible to consider that conceptual traits play a role in this instance. Clearly to perceive the straw as bent, one needs the relevant concepts.