Bifurcated Ethnicities: Identity Perception among Young Uzbeks in Osh1 Abstract After the demise of the Soviet Union, the mainstream of ethnic conflicts sprang out of people’s perception of dissolution by political borders as a principal hazard to their cultural unity and ethnic identity. This study illuminates how the detached ethnicities determine, formulate and transform their collective identities, drawing on the case of young Uzbeks in Osh, Kyrgyzstan. The case is unique because all of the separatism elements of the conflict; the region did not experience strong self-determination statements by the Uzbeks in Osh and irredentism policy by Uzbekistan. Qualitative method – semi-structured in-depth interviews were employed as a research tool. Interviews enclosed twenty Uzbek people living in Osh city. Paper reveals that divided ethnic minorities could not be an integral part of the nation-building process due to reciprocal threat perception of state and ethnic minority, uprising religious identity, the state’s antagonistic policy approach towards ethno-symbolic elements and political participation. Keywords: Uzbeks, Osh, Kyrgyz, ethnicity, nationalism, religion, identity, irredentism Introduction The Fergana Valley is the most densely populated, ethnically diverse and culturally complex region of Central Asia. This region presents a unique case regarding research where the Kyrgyz, Tajiks, and Uzbeks live under harsh economic conditions, suffering from scarce water and land resources, political and institutional disorder, in addition to excessive ethnic and religious identity clashes, extremism, and border insecurities. Following the dismemberment of the Soviet Union, the landscape of this massive empire saw an abrupt rise in ethnic conflicts, which mainly stemmed from people’s perception of the separation by political borders and resilient will of irredentism, like Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh had passed through. The case of Osh is ominously peculiar as, despite the existence of all the momentous triggers of secessionism in this tumultuous region, Uzbeks did not purposefully seek independence or attempted to unite with Uzbekistan through distinct acts in territorializing the Uzbek identity. By the early 1960s, Osh had already become one of the newly industrialized cities in the region, and to uphold this progress, many young Kyrgyzs were being encouraged to relocate from rural areas to the urban setting of this city in order to provide for the much- needed labor capital for manufacturing2. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the production chain disrupted, and this inadvertently caused a major economic recession in industrial centers of this country, Osh not being an exception. The unemployment rate soared in the region, which resulted in a harsh competition between Uzbeks and Kyrgyzs that quickly transformed into an ethnic-based confrontation 3 . The limited land and economic resources of Osh city were not enough for both sides, which unwittingly left the young (for 79% of protestors were young), homeless and unemployed Uzbeks and the Kyrgyz amid of this heightened tension4. Hence, when the very first protests erupted with the declaration of the Kyrgyz language as the official language of the state, the rift between the peoples (Kyrgyz and Uzbeks) of the region that was already under a massive pressure 1 This article was written in the framework of the collective project launched by the George Washington University’s Central Asia Program, Nazarbayev University and National Analytical Center on National Identity and Youth in Central Asia. 2 Olzak, Susan. “Does Globalization Breed Ethnic Discontent”, Journal of Conflict Resolution 55, no 1 (2011): 7-9. 3 Razakov, Talant. Osh Koogalani (Osh Conflict), (Bishkek: Neo Print, 2011): 12. 4 Tishkov, Valery. “Don’t kill me, I’m a Kyrgyz”, Journal of Peace Research 32, no. 2(1995): 133-49 1 and the widespread ideas of local nationalism, the right to self-determination of minorities had finally reached the breaking point5. One of the voiced demands that the Uzbek communities addressed with the Kyrgyz government was the state regulation about the ethnic composition of officials in city administration and public service. On the other hand, the Uzbek communities in Kyrgyzstan were not only petitioning for official recognition of Uzbek language as a state language, but also a greater autonomy status in Uzbek-inhabited regions6. The first incidents in Osh based on economic motives rather than any cases of cultural or ethnic segregation against the Uzbek population. This situation, however, did not persist once the newly established Uzbek and Kyrgyz political organizations (Adolat and Osh Aimagi) managed to successfully shift the scope of the conflict from an economic landscape to an ethnic platform. The involvement of Kyrgyz President Akayev, whose egalitarian slogan - “Kyrgyzstan is our shared home” was a trendy gimmick in the elections and was successful in terms of pacifying the tension in Kyrgyzstan; however, years after he vacated the office, Osh once again became the crux of ethnic-based tensions between Uzbeks and the Kyrgyz following the coup of President Bakiyev. The incidents in Osh in 2010 were particularly notable concerning the forefront involvement of young Uzbeks and the Kyrgyz once again in the protests that ended in numerous deaths on both sides and thousands of Uzbek refugees fleeing to Uzbekistan7. In brief, by considering all the issues discussed above, this paper aims to study identity perception among the young Uzbeks in the Osh region in order to analyze the identity formation and its presented impediments to nation-building in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan. The quest of national identity formation is problematic in Kyrgyz case because ethnic, national and religious identity perceptions significantly contradict the Kyrgyz framework, which, in turn, shapes the society, as well as the domestic policy of this country. Literature Review and Definitions of Theoretical Pillars In examining the ethnic identity composition in Central Asia, there is academic solidarity that many of those identities constructed during the early Soviet period8. Given literature underscores the fact that modern Uzbek ethnicity ponderously based on the sedentary Persian “Sart” and nomadic Turkic identity. Morgan’s research stresses on “mahalla” idiomatic concept in the realization of Uzbek identity in Osh, not as an ethnic term, but concerning a moral community, territory, Soviet and post-Soviet existence, and Islamic discourse9. Nick Megoran’s focus group discussions reveal that for the residents of Osh, “Uzbekness” embraces kinship networks that meaningfully associate Uzbeks in Osh and Uzbekistan10. However, it does not mean that “Uzbekness” for residents of Osh only accomplice with the ethnic kinship. Fumagalli argues that Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan rejects 5 Knyazev Aleksandr. Vektori I Paradigmi Kirgizskoi Nezavisimosti (Vectors and Paradigms of Kyrgyz Independence), (Bishkek: Printhouse, 2012): 7-25. 6 Yaman, Ali, “Fergana Vadisi: Orta Asyanın Jeopolitik ve Stratejik Merkezi (Fergana Valley: Geopolitic and Strategic Center)”, Dunya Chalishmalari 1, (2010): 59 7 Razakov, Osh Conflict, 12 8 Barth, Frederick. Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1969): 14, Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities. (London: New Left Books, 1983): 44, Handler, Richard, Nationalism and Politics of Culture in Quebec. (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988): 21, Tishkov, “Don’t kill me, I’m a Kyrgyz”, 133-49 9 Morgan, Liu, “Under Solomon's Throne: Uzbek Visions of Renewal in Osh”. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2012): 105-25 10 Megoran, Nick, “The Borders of Eternal Friendship? The Politics and Pain of Nationalism and Identity along the Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan Ferghana Valley Boundary, 1999–2000”. (PhD diss., Sussex: Sussex College, Cambridge, 2002): 253-277 2 “diasporic” identity and contemplates that they are indigenous dwellers of the region and being Uzbek also means being an original resident of Osh11. Furthermore, Olcott underlines “regionalism” as a defining point in Uzbek identity in southern Kyrgyzstan. However, in all circumstances, the Kyrgyz government treated Uzbek identity as an impediment to their nation-building strategy 12 . McDowell’s observation found out that the first and the second Osh riots significantly caused “de- ethicizing” of Uzbeks in Osh through the elimination of symbolic elements of “Uzbekness,” like language teaching in Uzbek, or university entrance exams in that language, etc13. In studying ethnicity issues and nation-building politics in the Post-Soviet region, particularly, in Kyrgyzstan, it should be considered that these two concepts significantly contradict and a single explanatory theory could not rationalize it in a given case. Hale claims that ethnicity is a way of uncertainty reduction, but ethnic politics is mainly about interests14. Therefore, understanding top-down - nation-building politics in Kyrgyzstan from the Kyrgyz centric “ethnocratic” interests and reviewing the ethnic identity perception and measures, a bottom-up approach, of young Uzbeks in Osh entails two or more different theoretical approaches. Brubaker’s “Nationalizing States” theory expressively rationalizes the issues in the Post Soviet region. As Brubaker states, there are three types of states in the world: ‘civic states,’ ‘bi-national states’ and ‘nationalizing states’15. In our case study, Kyrgyzstan is considered to be within the third group. Brubaker argues