REPORT OF THE SECRETARY -GENERAL ’S INTERNAL REVIEW PANEL ON UNITED NATIONS ACTION IN SRI LANKA November 2012 Contents I. The Secretary-General’s Internal Review Panel ............................................................................. 4 II. The events and United Nations actions ………………………………………………………......... 5 A. Lead up to the final stages 2007/2008............................................................................................ 5 B. The Final stages – August 2008/May 2009 ................................................................................... 8 C. The Aftermath – May 2009 onward................................................................................................ 14 III. Assessment of United Nations action to meet its protection and humanitarian responsibilities in Sri Lanka ………………................................................................................................................. 17 A. Assessment of UN action: dilemmas and responsibilities ..………………………....................... 17 1. Relocation …………………………………………………………………………................ 17 2. Humanitarian access and obstructions to humanitarian assistance ………………................. 18 3. International human rights and humanitarian law in protection and humanitarian action ...... 18 4. Oversight, management and coordination of United Nations action and responsibilities ...... 22 5. UN political engagement and the responsibilities of Member States …….............................. 24 6. UN failure …………………………………………………………………............................ 26 B. Sri Lanka’s way forward ……………………………………....................................................... 29 IV. Recommendations regarding future United Nations action to respond effectively to similar situations of escalated conflict ........................................................................................................... 29 A. Reference points …………………………………………………………………………............. 29 B. Recommendations ……………………………………………………………………….............. 31 V. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................... 35 Annexes I. Terms of Reference of the Panel ………………………………………………………................... 36 II. Number of people in the Wanni ....................................................................................................... 37 III. Narrative of the events and United Nations actions .............…………………………………....... 40 A. Leading up to the final stages: UN early warning and preparation 2005-August 2008 ................. 40 1. Background to the conflict ………………………………………………………….............. 40 2. New political context; the east as a precursor for the north ………………………................ 41 3. UN strategy and planning for the north: human rights, development, humanitarian and political ................................................................................................................................... 42 a. UNCT and UNHQ planning ........................................................................................... 42 b. Member States – the UPR and the Co-Chairs ................................................................ 47 B. The final stages of the conflict August 2008-May 2009................................................................ 48 1. August-September 2008: The Wanni and the UN presence .................................................... 48 a. The Wanni ...................................................................................................................... 48 b. Attacks on UN premises – Government says it cannot assure staff safety .................... 48 c. Relocation ....................................................................................................................... 51 2. October 2008-February 2009: Humanitarian assistance – the convoys ................................. 53 a. Humanitarian convoys 1 to 10 ........................................................................................ 53 b. The impact of convoys far below the needs as the situation deteriorates....................... 54 c. The 11 th and last convoy, and the killing of civilians .................................................... 56 3. February-April 2009: Situation becomes catastrophic, as the UN equivocates ..................... 62 a. Fundamental disagreements in UNHQ on strategy and responsibilities ........................ 63 b. Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator advocacy to the Government and the UNCT situation briefings to diplomats fail to address the Wanni reality................. 69 2 c. The worsening situation in the Wanni ............................................................................ 74 4. January-June 2009: Screening and internment of IDPs ......................................................... 76 a. Screening ........................................................................................................................ 76 b. Internment camps ........................................................................................................... 78 5. April-May 2009: Increasing civilian deaths and the limits of UN political leverage .............. 80 a. No formal action by Member States; the Security Council’s ‘informal interactive dialogues’ ....................................................................................................................... 80 b. Desperate efforts to obtain an adequate humanitarian pause ......................................... 82 c. The killing of the LTTE leadership and UN actions ...................................................... 85 C. The aftermath - May 2009 to March 2012 ..................................................................................... 87 1. The UN continues to struggle to implement a strategy of principle ........................................ 87 a. Sharp contradictions in post-conflict strategies .............................................................. 87 i. Secretary-General’s visit, Joint Statement, and UN policy decisions.................... 87 ii. Government positioning ........................................................................................ 88 iii. Human Rights Council Special Session May 2009 ............................................... 89 b. UN provides post-conflict assistance, but with mixed success ...................................... 90 i. Pressure to release IDPs from internment ............................................................. 90 ii. Return and resettlement: UN excluded from Government planning .................... 92 iii. Planning for rehabilitation and reintegration of suspected LTTE combatants ..... 94 2. Accountability ......................................................................................................................... 95 a. The UN shows commitment to accountability................................................................ 95 b. Lessons Learned and Reconciliation Commission, and the Panel of Experts................. 97 c. Human Rights Council 2012 session and resolution on Sri Lanka ................................ 101 IV. United Nations Staff: risks, violations, and commitment ............................................................... 103 A. National Staff who remained in the Wanni .................................................................................... 103 B. Confinement of UN national staff in internment camps ................................................................ 103 C. Abduction, torture and detention of staff ....................................................................................... 104 D. Threats and intimidation ................................................................................................................ 105 E. Staff courage and commitment ...................................................................................................... 106 V. United Nations Coordination and reporting in Sri Lanka ............................................................. 107 A. Coordination: the north, the RC/HC and UNCT in Colombo, and at UNHQ ............................... 107 B. Breaches in the confidentiality of UN operations .......................................................................... 112 C. Documenting violations ................................................................................................................. 112 VI. Supporting Resident Coordinators in situations of rising political tensions and human rights abuses ................................................................................................................................................... 116 VII. Maps ..................................................................................................................................................... 121 VIII. Acronyms ............................................................................................................................................. 127 3 I. The Secretary-General’s Internal Review Panel 1. On 22 June 2010 the United Nations’ (UN) Secretary-General established a “Panel of Experts on accountability in Sri Lanka” (Panel of Experts) to advise him on accountability during the final stages of the war in Sri Lanka. In addition to its conclusions regarding the need for accountability for violations by the parties to the conflict, the Panel of Experts also concluded that there was a need