2013 UNSCEAR Report on Fukushima: a critical appraisal＊1 Keith Baverstock Department of Environmental Science, University of Eastern Finland, Kuopio Campus, Finland The 2013 UNSCEAR report（ herein after the re- Introduction port） on TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant Accident（ herein after Fukushima accident） on 11 From its inception on 3 December 1955 the remit March 2011, is published more than three years af- of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the ter the accident. Part of this delay has been due to Effects of Atomic Radiations（ UNSCEAR） has been disputes between members of the committee and to report to UN Member States and the UN General part due, according to committee member Dr Wolf- Assembly, on the levels, effects and risks of radiation gang Weiss, the need for the report to be worded in the environment＊2. Its scientific expertise has correctly because communication has been a major been provided initially by 15 Member States and to- problem in generating misconceptions＊3. The re- day by 27, predominantly states with nuclear power port sets out to evaluate the levels of exposure and programmes. In the late 1950s the principle con- health effects arising from the accident. It concludes cern was radioactive fallout from nuclear weapons there will be no “discernable increase” in risk testing, but subsequent treaties banning atmospher- among the exposed populations. This evaluation is ic testing have reduced this threat to public health made on the basis of estimates of the doses（ effec- considerably and since 1986 nuclear accidents（ in tive doses and absorbed doses to the thyroid） to dif- particular the Chernobyl accident） have consumed ferent categories of the population in the first year much of the Committee’s attention. of the accident and extended to those accumulated in 10 years and 80 years by the use of scaling fac- The Chernobyl accident, where there was wide- tors. The report acknowledges, but does not em- spread environmental contamination, led to the phasise the fact that the accident is not complete, as adoption of two international conventions: Conven- radioactivity is still leaking into the Pacific Ocean tion on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and and into the air（ as reported by TEPCO on 14 May the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nu- 2014）, albeit at a much lower rate than previously. clear Accident of Radiological Emergency overseen At present there are no established technologies to by the International Atomic Energy Agency（ IAEA）, stop these releases, or apparently to remove radioac- which maintains a 24/7/365 coordinating centre for tive strontium from vast quantities of stored waste national emergency response centres, in Vienna. cooling water that is still accumulating in makeshift tanks on the site of the accident. Also the retrieval of spent fuel held in fuel ponds on the reactors is not complete. ＊1―The “first draft” of this assessment was sent to UNSCEAR （Mr Crick, Scientific Secretary and Dr Weiss, Chair of working group for the 2013 UNSCEAR report）. They made several com- What should the reader expect from this report? ments, the most important of which will be addressed in foot- notes herein using italic script I am assuming that they re- . The reader should expect solid estimates of aver- sponded on behalf of UNSCEAR. ＊2―UNSCEAR claim that in the report they have adhered age committed doses to all potentially exposed pop- strictly to this mandate and that some of the criticism below is ulations appropriately sub-divided, from the day on more appropriately directed to other organisations. In my view which the accident occurred, together with esti- UNSCEAR cannot disassociate itself entirely from the way its mates of the uncertainties and ranges applicable to statements can be (mis) interpreted and that it should demon- strate much greater awareness of the contexts within which its reports will be viewed by other than the UN General Assembly and its Member States. ＊3―Personal communication 2013 UNSCEAR Report on Fukushima : a critical appraisal 科学 e0001 average values. The information would ideally be in tabular form prominently in the main body of the The failure of the international emergency response report and easily accessible to the less than fully system committed reader. The report should also extract the lessons of the accident for the future of nuclear A factor（ not mentioned in the report） is that energy generation globally and, therefore, the future the international emergency response system, led impacts on health and environment of the nuclear by the IAEA, apparently did not start functioning un- industry＊4. Additionally, a more timely report（ with- til around 14 March（ according to my observations in, for example, 6 months of the Fukushima acci- of the IAEA website at the time）, three days after dent） might have provided a basis for countering the accident, in spite of the fact that according to public anxiety and, therefore, have ameliorated any the report（ Table 1） the Japanese authorities（ and potential psychosocial effect. Three years on from presumably the IAEA） were well aware of the seri- the accident would be too late for this objective, ousness of the accident but failed to declare a level even if the response to the accident by the Japanese 7 emergency（ with trans-boundary implications） authorities and the international agencies had fol- until 12 April＊6, that is the highest level implying lowed the much debated and rehearsed plans for trans-boundary considerations. In fact, there is a fla- such events initiated after the Chernobyl accident. vour of history re-written in Table 1 of the report. However, in the case of the Fukushima accident For several days after the accident the media consis- even this plan was not properly implemented. tently carried reports that there had been no dam- age to the reactors and therefore no releases and I＊5 argue here that this 2013 report has not these reports were not corrected at the time by the achieved the above objectives. Further, I argue that IAEA＊7. Even later on 25 March I summarised the given the actual circumstances it is impossible to ground deposition values reported on the MEXT agree with or to contest some of the estimates of website（ Japanese Government） for the Iitate re- levels（ of dose） made in the report because the in- gion. I noted that the values for 131I were up to 3 to formation that should, through the IAEA led interna- 5 times the maximum depositions recorded after tional emergency response programme, have been Chernobyl in Belarus and 137Cs level ranged from available to make the necessary estimates has not 0.5 to 1 times Chernobyl levels. In the final sen- been made generally available. Additionally, many of tence of my note I said “What amazes me is that the supposedly authoritative（ by, for example, the there still seems to be denial that there have been Japanese authorities and IAEA） statements made at substantial releases and some of the values report- the time and shortly after the accident, have proved ed are from beyond the areas evacuated.” The in- to be palpably unreliable and therefore it is not pos- habitants of Iitate had still not been evacuated on sible to have confidence that UNSCEAR has had ac- 12 April when I met Dr. Katsumi Furitsu in Berlin. cess to reliable data, or indeed to know whether re- On 31 March 2011, twenty days after the accident, liable data even exists. in an editorial, the journal Nature says: “Despite re- assuring early reports, it is clear that significant amounts of radioisotopes have been released from the plant, and some workers there face severe ra- diation exposure as they try to cool the overheat- ed nuclear fuel.” The fact is that for at least two weeks after the 4―UNSCEAR would dispute this statement as it being out- ＊ first releases of radioactivity the position the author- side its remit, but it is hardly credible to assume that Nation States are only concerned with the “levels” outside the context ities, including the international agencies, presented of public health. It can be argued that the test ban treaty result- to the global public was that there had been no re- ed in response to knowledge about the increasing public health leases. detriment from atmospheric testing. 5―My credentials for expressing this opinion are based on ＊ Had the above Conventions functioned as envis- my professional activities from the early 1970s, firstly with the UK Medical Research Council on an examination of the Wind- scale accident and the formulation for emergency reference levels for reactor accidents, secondly, with the World Health Or- ＊6―I have evidence that the IAEA website was not active on ganisation on the follow-up to the Chernobyl accident and on 13 March in an email to my colleague Dillwyn Williams. the development of the IAEA led emergency preparedness and ＊7―On 18 March I gave a talk to the Bonn Science Café and response network, including the setting up of a WHO emergen- at that time there were no reports of released radioactivity, in- cy response centre in collaboration with the Finnish Nuclear deed there were denials of releases, but we now know that on and Radiation Safety Authority（ STUK） in 1998. 14/15 March major releases occurred. e0002 KAGAKU Oct. 2014 Vol.84 No.10 aged, UNSCEAR should have been in a position to period internal doses are important and can add provide a much more credible account of the acci- considerably to the external dose component for dent and the potential consequences for human some population groups. health and possibly in time to mitigate any psycho- social effect caused by the attempts to deny the se- Very few whole body measurements were made verity of the accident at the outset.