Pandora’s Box in Syria Anticipating negative externalities of a re-entrenching regime CRU Report Samar Batrawi Pandora’s Box in Syria Anticipating negative externalities of a re-entrenching regime Samar Batrawi CRU Report May 2020 May 2020 Cover photo: Al Assad family © Wikimedia Commons Unauthorized use of any materials violates copyright, trademark and / or other laws. Should a user download material from the website or any other source related to the Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, or the Clingendael Institute, for personal or non-commercial use, the user must retain all copyright, trademark or other similar notices contained in the original material or on any copies of this material. Material on the website of the Clingendael Institute may be reproduced or publicly displayed, distributed or used for any public and non-commercial purposes, but only by mentioning the Clingendael Institute as its source. 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Box 93080 2509 AB The Hague The Netherlands Follow us on social media @clingendaelorg The Clingendael Institute The Clingendael Institute clingendael_institute Email: [email protected] Website: www.clingendael.org/cru Table of contents Executive summary 1 Acknowledgement 3 Introduction 4 1 The nature of the Syrian regime 6 Security practices: state autonomy and networks of influence 8 Civil practices: exclusion and persecution 14 Economic practices: neoliberal resurgence and new cronyism 17 Zooming in on the political economy 20 2 Assessing six key negative externalities 25 Risk of conflict relapse due to economic pressures 25 The politics of refugees 26 Risks and instrumentalisation of terrorism 30 Regional instability 33 Humanitarian culpability 34 Deterioration of the international legal order 36 3 Identifying mitigating policy options 37 Executive summary During 2019, the original Syrian conflict entered its closing phases, except for the battlefields of Idlib and in the north east. As a result, conflict dynamics have become somewhat easier to read, as the regime and its key allies have shifted towards a triumphalist ‘post-war’ narrative and corresponding governance styles, deal-making and decision making. These developments can be witnessed in three interlinked spheres: security, civil, and political economic practices. Together, they largely form the Assad regime’s political economy, which – although poorly understood due to limited access – is crucial to understand to assess the negative externalities likely to result from its wartime survival. The current security, civil and political economic practices of the Syrian regime are not informed by any serious consideration of international law, diplomatic pressure from countries other than its close allies, or human rights norms. Instead, survival, securitisation and coercive operating styles dominate. Hard power remains the regime’s key currency. As a result, soft power – whether it be diplomatic, financial or economic – is largely ineffective in influencing the regime’s calculations, incentives or intensity preferences. This paper analyses six negative externalities that are likely to result from the re- entrenchment of the Syrian regime: 1) risk of conflict relapse due to economic pressures; 2) the politics of refugees; 3) risks and instrumentalisation of terrorism; 4) regional instability; 5) humanitarian culpability; and 6) deterioration of the international legal order. These externalities are interconnected and emerge from the political economy of the regime – the accumulation of its security, civil and political economic practices. It is these externalities that will have an impact on EU policy priorities and interests – mostly via Turkey, which has evolved from buffer into conflict party. The EU’s irrelevance in the realm of hard power presents it – and its member states – with the uncomfortable reality that it lacks leverage to influence the short- to medium-term future of the Syrian conflict. Without a willingness to mobilise political, military and financial pressure in a synchronised manner – based on a strategy of confrontation or, indirectly, through dialogue with and influence over those actors who have a significant degree of hard power capital and capabilities vis-à-vis the regime (primarily Russia and Iran) – the EU has few levers to pull. At present, the EU only has such tools available in the economic sphere – and only uses them to a limited extent. 1 Pandora’s Box in Syria | CRU Report, May 2020 However, even if the EU were to belatedly pursue a form of hard power strategy, it no longer offers a remedy for addressing the negative externalities mentioned above. This is because the positive alternatives to the Assad regime have been eliminated during the civil war. The regime’s divide-and-conquer strategies, as well as the fragmentation and radicalisation of the opposition, have silenced the original, overwhelmingly progressive, demands of the protestors who took to Syria’s streets in early 2011. No major remaining armed or political opposition group with significant influence in Syria represents these demands any longer. Nevertheless, the EU is not without policy options to address the negative externalities discussed in this paper. In terms of interventions that directly influence regime interest, it could: expand its targeted sanctions by adjusting these more quickly to include new entities and individuals that spring up in the ‘whack-a-mole’ game of sanction evasion; demand much more stringent application of humanitarian principles in the provision of such aid (especially if it is further increased), thereby reducing resource flows to the regime; and creatively develop an accountability mechanism that can operate in a way that is linked with, but independent of, the United Nations (given Russia’s veto). In addition, it could provide much more support to Syrian refugees in the region, focused on providing them with greater rights and better protection. It could also engage in the long overdue repatriation of European ‘foreign fighters’ from the region in a controlled manner – so that they can face criminal justice in their home countries, rather than becoming a blackmail and fear factor that local actors can exploit. 2 Acknowledgement The research for, and production of, this paper has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the author and does not constitute, nor should be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence. In addition to this formal disclaimer, I would like to offer a warm thank you to those individuals who kindly agreed to be interviewed for this report and to share both their time and their insights with me. Moreover, I acknowledge with gratitude the helpful peer review by Karin Wester (Dutch Foreign Ministry), Lina Khatib (Chatham House), Julien Barnes-Dacey (ECFR) and Erwin van Veen (Clingendael). Finally, the 10 participants in our March policy-expert workshop offered useful insights and critical discussion that further improved the clarity and argument of the paper. Thank you. The paper reflects developments in Syria until March 2020. 3 Introduction More than eight years since the Syrian regime’s infamous slogan ‘Assad, or we burn the country’ was first heard during the initial months of protest in 2011, Syrians now find themselves left with both Bashar al-Assad’s regime and a burnt country – in the collective psychological, physical and institutional sense.1 In particular, Russia’s military intervention on behalf of the Syrian regime in 2015 helped to bring this reality about by boosting the chances of a regime victory. Since then, the EU and its member states have been working to craft a suitable policy response. This soul-searching journey is far from over, although it has found a temporary landing stage in the form of ‘no reconstruction support without a meaningful [and imagined, author’s edit] political transition’. During the past year, the dynamics of the Syrian conflict have slowed and become easier to read as the regime and its key allies have shifted into a kind of ‘post- war’ decision-making modus infused with a ‘totally and utterly triumphalist’ mindset.2 This presents a tremendous challenge to the EU and its member states as their already limited leverage is further reduced. And, as an otherwise helpful recent Crisis Group report failed to clarify, leverage to do what and why?3 Beyond the policy rhetoric surrounding reconstruction, this paper provides an analysis of key negative externalities likely to increasingly manifest themselves as a result of the re-entrenchment of the Syrian regime. Such analysis is essential