March 2011 GPPi Research Paper No. 14 Saudi Arabia as a Humanitarian Donor: High Potential, Little Institutionalization Khalid Al-Yahya • Nathalie Fustier Imprint Disclaimer The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Global Public Policy Institute. Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) Reinhardtstr. 15 10117 Berlin Phone: + 49 (0) 30 275 959 75-0 Fax: + 49 (0) 30 690 88 200 [email protected] · www.gppi.net Authors: Khalid Al-Yahya and Nathalie Fustier Editors: Nicolas Kumanoff, Claudia Meier and Oliver Read Published: Berlin, March 2011 Table of Contents About the authors . 2 Abbreviations and acronyms. 3 1 Introduction. 4 2 Saudi Arabia’s humanitarian assistance at a glance. 7 3 The Saudi humanitarian aid structure: Decision-makers, implementers, strengths and weaknesses . 11 4 Saudi Arabia and the international humanitarian system . 21 5 Explaining aid motives . 24 6 How to achieve better cooperation: the way forward. 29 Bibliography . 32 Funders Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) The Humanitarian Assistance: Truly Universal? project is financed through a research grant from the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida). Sida has not contributed to this paper and does not vouch for the content of the project publications. Islamic Relief Germany Islamic Relief Germany e.V. has contributed to the project by translating the present study into Arabic. The Arabic translation of the paper is available at: http://www.gppi.net/approach/research/truly_universal/ Saudi Arabia as a Humanitarian Donor: High Potential, Little Institutionalization About the authors 2 Khalid Al-Yahya, PhD, is an assistant professor and the director of the governance and public management research program at the Dubai School of Government. He has also been an associate at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government since 2008. He was an assistant professor of public policy and management at Arizona State University (2005-2008), where he taught courses on governance and globalization, political economy, comparative public management and policy analysis, organization development and reform. Previously he was a post-doctoral fellow at Harvard’s Center for Middle Eastern Studies (2004-2005) and a visiting scholar at the Department of Political Science and Public Management at the University of Southern Denmark (2007). His work is comparative and focuses broadly on the dimensions, antecedents and consequences of governance and the gap between human capital development and institutional change. He has recently collaborated with the Ash Institute for Democratic Governance and Innovation at Harvard and the World Bank in writing a series of studies on governance reform, innovation and government performance in the Middle East. He has lectured and made presentations in the US, Germany, Denmark, England, the Netherlands, Ukraine, Indonesia, Singapore, Tunis, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and the GCC countries. Nathalie Fustier is currently senior consultant with the European Company for Strategic Intelligence (CEIS) in Paris. She holds a degree from the Institute of Political Studies in Aix-en-Provence. She joined the information and public relations services in the Armed Forces (SIRPA) as a political analyst on the Middle East (1990-1992), then the Strategic Affairs Commission as official representative and then head of the office for the Arab, Turkish and Persian Region (1992- 1999). She was also visiting fellow with the Rand Corporation (1998-1999), and an associate researcher with the International Peace Academy (1999-2000). Fustier joined the UN as a political analyst with the Office for the Iraq Program (2000- 2002). From November 2002 to August 2004 she was a specialist on political issues with the Iraq Team in the Political Affairs Department. This led her to return to the front line from June to August 2003 with the special representative of the secretary general in Iraq, Sergio Vieira de Mello. From 2004 to 2006, Fustier was part of the team at the French Embassy in Doha, where she held the positions of cultural advisor and director of the French Cultural Centre. From 2006 to 2008 she was director of the Paris office of ID-International Decision. The authors would like to thank Don Babai at Harvard University’s Center for Middle Eastern Studies, and Claudia Meier at the Global Public Policy Institute, for their valuable comments on previous versions of this paper. Saudi Arabia as a Humanitarian Donor: High Potential, Little Institutionalization Abbreviations and acronyms 3 AGFUND. Arab Gulf Program for Development CERF. Central Emergency Response Fund DAC. Development Assistance Committee DI. Development Initiatives DPA . UN Department of Political Affairs ECOSOC. Economic and Social Council FAO . Food and Agricultural Organization FTS. .OCHA Financial Tracking Service G77. .Group of 77 GA. United Nations General Assembly GAO . .Government Accountability Office (US) GHD. Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative ICRC. International Committee of the Red Cross IDP. .Internally Displaced People IFRC. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies IIROSA. International Islamic Relief Organisation MOF. Ministry of Finance NGO. Non-governmental organization OCHA . UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs ODA. Official Development Assistance OECD. .Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development SFD. .Saudi Fund for Development SR. Saudi Riyal UN . .United Nations UNHCR. .Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNRWA. .UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East WAMY. World Assembly for Muslim Youth WFP. World Food Program $. .United States Dollar Saudi Arabia as a Humanitarian Donor: High Potential, Little Institutionalization 4 1 Introduction Saudi Arabia has emerged as the world’s largest donor of humanitarian assistance outside the Western states, traditionally the members of OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). In many recent natural disasters, the country’s contributions far exceeded those of any traditional donors. In 2007, in response to Cyclone Sidr in Bangladesh, which killed more than 3,000 people and left millions homeless, Saudi Arabia gave Bangladesh $158 million for humanitarian purposes, compared to $20 million from the United States and less from the United Kingdom (Smith 2010). Following the Haiti earthquake in 2010, the Saudi Kingdom made $50 million available to the Emergency Response Fund, a pooled funding mechanism set up by the United Nations. Saudi pledges for the ongoing response to the floods that ravaged huge swathes of Pakistan in 2010 amount to $220 million - surpassing the pledges of all European donors taken together ($209 million) (Saudi Ministry of Interior 2010 and Smith 2010). In 2008, Saudi Arabia provided $500 million in cash to the World Food Program, the largest contribution in the Program’s history. For development and humanitarian aid to the Arab and Muslim world, Saudi Arabia is the undisputed leader. Between 1975 and 2005, total Saudi aid to developing countries amounted to $90 billion or 3.7% of its annual gross domestic product (GDP), far higher than the UN 0.7% of GDP target for development assistance and four times the average achieved by OECD-DAC countries. Saudi Arabia also helps finance many key regional development funds and instruments.1 The Kingdom’s munificence notwithstanding, Saudi Arabia’s record in international humanitarian assistance leaves much to be desired. The country’s actual capacities hardly match its growing roles and commitments. It lacks a coherent and organized humanitarian aid framework and there is no central agency to coordinate and supervise relief operations. Instead, we find a multiplicity of actors often working chaotically and at times at cross-purposes. There is a dearth of permanent and professional staff able to respond swiftly and effectively to natural or man- made disasters. The modalities for monitoring and evaluation remain nascent. Moreover, cooperation and coordination with other actors in the international humanitarian assistance network – other donor governments, global bodies, and non-governmental organizations – is weak. Saudi Arabia has yet to put its stamp on this network. Aside from its financial contributions and assistance in kind, it is widely seen by many of these actors as a laggard, not a leader. Saudi Arabia has yet to develop a clear policy or strategy for humanitarian assistance. Saudi conceptions of and motivations for humanitarian aid remain 1 For example, Saudi Arabia provides 27% of the budget of the Islamic Development Bank, 15% of the Arab Monetary Fund, 30% of the OPEC Fund for International Development and 25% of the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa. (Saudi Fund for Development 2009). Saudi Arabia as a Humanitarian Donor: High Potential, Little Institutionalization 5 poorly understood – in no small part because little effort has been made to communicate them to the outside world. The country has hesitated to seize numerous opportunities to enhance its international reputation by publicizing its efforts to succor the world’s afflicted. Whether intended as such or not, Saudi humanitarian assistance is a formidable source of “soft power” – a means of winning hearts and minds – that would be the envy of any other country. Yet, ironically, for the numerous reasons underscored in this study, it is a power that the Kingdom has not adequately comprehended, let alone fully exploited.