https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ Theses Digitisation: https://www.gla.ac.uk/myglasgow/research/enlighten/theses/digitisation/ This is a digitised version of the original print thesis. Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the author The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the author When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given Enlighten: Theses https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ [email protected] SOME NECESSARY MODIFICATIONS IN THE APPLICATION OF THE HUSSERLIAN METHOD IN THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF RELIGION BARNABAS AHUNA OGUGUO, DIP (Phil.); BD; M.Th. A DISSERTATION PRESENTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE FACULTY OF ARTS UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW MARCH 1990 ProQuest Number: 10983504 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com plete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. uest ProQuest 10983504 Published by ProQuest LLC(2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am extremely grateful to my supervisor Dr. A. A. Kee whose patience and encouragement made it possible for me to continue the work in difficult circumstances. To my wife Justina and the children I owe thanks and gratitude for their patience and understanding. Without the assistance of Marie and Hughes Falconer this dissertation could not have been produced in its required form. CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS i ABSTRACTS iv INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER 1: FOUNDATIONS AND THE METHOD OF 10 PHENOMENOLOGY. Edmund Husserl and the Beginnings of phenomenology 11 Martin Heidegger’s understanding of phenomenology. 46 Maurice Merleau-Ponty and the phenomenological 63 Method. CHAPTER 2: WORKS HITHERTO TAKEN TO REPRESENT THE 90 PHENOMENOLOGY OF RELIGION. Rudolf Otto: The Numinous experience as the basis 91 for religion. Brede Kristensen: The believer’s point of view as 126 a prerequisite for the phenomenology of religion. Geradus van der Leeuw: Religion as Power. 147 Mircea Eliade: Religions as Hieraphonies. 170 Excursus: The Dilemma of the Phenomenology of Religion. 204 CHAPTER 3: RELIGION BEYOND THE FIELD OF THE GENERAL 229 HISTORY OF RELIGION. Ludwig Feuerbach: Man’s Self consciousness as 230 religious. Thomas Luckmann: Religion as transcendence of 242 the biological. Peter Berger: The Persistence of transcendence. 252 CHAPTER 4: UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPT OF RELIGION. 267 Wilfred Cantwell Smith: The history of a concept. 268 CHAPTER 5: TRANSCENDENCE AND RELIGION. 298 Karl Jaspers: Being as all Encompassing and its 299 relationship to transcendence. Karl Jaspers and Religion. 332 CHAPTER 6: SOME MODIFICATIONS IN THE APPLICATION OF THE 350 HUSSERLIAN METHOD IN THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF RELIGION. Modifications in the application of the Method 351 of Phenomenology in the phenomenology of religion. CONCLUSION 362 SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 365 iii ABSTRACT The method of phenomenology has been applied successfully in many research fields, but not in the case of the investigation of religion. The application in this field has been inconsistent and inconclusive. This dissertation investigates the reason for this and seeks to discover how the method might be more fruitfully applied. Chapter One deals with the principles of phenomenology through an exposition of the works of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. In the early stages, differences emerge in their approaches to phenomenology, but there is a fundamental agreement amongst them on the need to establish the ground in knowledge which is certain. It is here that the phenomenon appears without prejudice. Phenomenology aims to describe this phenomenon which appears prior to its being clouded by our natural standpoint and prejudices. For Husserl, this phenomenon is a state of pure consciousness, which is arrived at by the process of transcendental epoche. Heidegger however, sees phenomenology as a method whose usefulness lies in our way of getting access to the phenomenon. The point of departure of this access to the phenomenon is in the interpretation of man in his historical existence. Merleau-Ponty on the other hand, sees perceptual consciousness as the starting point of phenomenology. Chapter two deals with what is hitherto known as the phenomenology of religion to discover the way it has appropriated the method of phenomenology as advocated by Husserl or as understood by his successors. Critical expositions of the works of Rudolf Otto, Brede Kristensen, Gerardus van de Leeuw, and Mircea Eliade are undertaken. It emerges that the phenomenology of religion has completely ignored the method of phenomenology. The excursus is a prolepsis of the reason behind the failure of the phenomenology of religion to appropriate the phenomenological method. Chapter Three leaves the field of the general history of religion to examine other fields that will suggest a better understanding of the nature of religion. Here the works of Ludwig Feuerbach, Thomas Luckmann and Peter Berger are examined. Though the investigation is suggestive, it does not pinpoint the phenomenon of religion nor is it able to describe it. Having failed to discover the nature of religion, chapter Four takes us back to the field of the general history of religion in which the works of Wilfred Cantwell Smith are examined. What emerges from this is that religion has been misconceived. The history of the word ’religion’ reveals a misconception which could be said to be responsible for the apparent inconsistency in the study of religion. Smith begins to address the way in which religion can be understood if the phenomenological method is to be applied. The misconception of religion is corrected and redirected ready for the phenomenology of religion. Chapter Five examines the works of Karl Jaspers for an understanding of transcendence and its relationship to man. Here the way transcendence which is not objectifiable is made real is discussed with the aim of assisting the phenomenology of religion. Chapter Six examines the modifications that are necessary in order to apply the phenomenological method to the phenomenology of religion. A modification is suggested from Husserl’s understanding of the phenomenological method to that of his successors in the persons of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. A further modification is suggested by relating the concept of Dasein in Heidegger and the ’Encompassing we are’ in Karl Jaspers. What emerges is the fact that religion seen correctly is similar to Jaspers’ cipher of transcendence. The conclusion is that for the phenomenology of religion that applies the Husserlian method to be, it is necessary that these modifications are made. That taken care of the phenomenology of religion will be the phenomenology of a community’s cipher of transcendence. INTRODUCTION Phenomenology as a method of research has been successful in many fields. In the field of religion, however, the application has been inconsistent and inconclusive. This dissertation aims to investigate the reasons behind the apparent failure of the phenomenological method when it comes to religion, and to suggest some modifications both in the understanding of religion and the phenomenological method to enable the phenomenology of religion to take its place among other disciplines. At first, the dissertation sets out to understand the terms phenomenology and religion. In phenomenology, the works of Edmund Husserl, who brought phenomenology to prominence, are examined for an understanding of the phenomenological method. Following that, the works of two of his successors, Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, are discussed. Opinions vary as to whether these phenomenologists represent a true development of the works of Husserl. Though they all aim to get to the phenomenon without prejudice, it soon becomes clear from the early stages that there are differences among the phenomenologists as to the way to get to the phenomenon. That not withstanding, it must be taken for granted that any field wishing to appropriate the phenomenological method as an instrument of research must either hold to the phenomenological method as seen by Husserl or as modified by his successors. The first chapter sets out what is expected of phenomenology in any field. This in chapter two leads to our investigation of the field that is hitherto known as the phenomenology of religion to see in what way the discipline has been true to the phenomenological method. The works of Rudolf Otto, Brede Kristensen, ■i Geradus van der Leeuw and Mircea Eliade are critically examined. Though Otto does not regard himself as a phenomenologist, our reason for including him in the list is that Husserl indicated that his work is the beginning of the phenomenology of religion. Though he did not remain faithful to the phenomenological principle, the indication of Husserl to that fact is enough justification for including him among the phenomenologists. Even if Otto is excused because he did not set out to work on the phenomenology of religion, there are others however, who set out to do the phenomenology of religion. The phenomenology of religion as known can be said to be divided into two main branches with different emphasis which in a way overlap. One distinguishes itself by its focus on the classification of various types and structures that arise from the examination of the data, and the other by an attempt to bring to light the essence of the meaning residing tacitly within the situation of the phenomenon.