MatzSweden, the United States, and Raoul Wallenberg’s Mission to Hungary in 1944 Sweden, the United States, and Raoul Wallenberg’s Mission to Hungary in 1944 ✣ Johan Matz Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/14/3/97/698041/jcws_a_00249.pdf by guest on 25 September 2021 Introduction Some have argued that Sweden, by commissioning Raoul Wallenberg to Bu- dapest, was the only one of the ªve neutral states in Europe to heed the U.S. request of 25 May 1944 for an increased diplomatic and consular presence in Hungary. Such a claim, however, fails to account for the particular nature of Sweden’s acceptance. The Swedish response to the request was not altogether negative, but neither was it wholly favorable. In fact, Sweden did not agree to increase the number of ofªcial government personnel at its legation in Buda- pest. What Sweden did offer was a sui generis solution with important reser- vations attached. Sweden was not alone in wanting to keep the mission at arm’s length. The United States—the initiator of the project—turned out to be even more hesitant than the Swedes about implementing it. The U.S. government was tardy in issuing instructions for the mission because the 25 May 1944 request, which was made by the United States War Refugee Board (WRB), ran coun- ter to the ofªcial policy of isolating Hungary. That the mission began at all must primarily be ascribed to the U.S. min- ister to Sweden, Herschel V. Johnson, who strove to achieve a solution accept- able to all parties. The result, however, was a half-hearted compromise agree- ment that failed to take into account the practical aspects of the mission, including issues pertaining to Wallenberg’s personal safety. The two states’ distant attitude prior to the mission adumbrated their handling of Wallen- berg’s disappearance in January 1945. Journal of Cold War Studies Vol. 14, No. 3, Summer 2012, pp. 97–148 © 2012 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 97 Matz Dekanozov’s Message On 16 January 1945 the Swedish minister to Moscow, Staffan Söderblom, was notiªed by Soviet Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs Vladimir G. Dekanozov that, according to Soviet military authorities in Budapest, the sec- retary to the Swedish legation in Hungary, Raoul Wallenberg, “of whom you informed me in your letter of 31 December,” had been found and that mea- sures had been taken to protect him.1 Referring to Wallenberg, Dekanozov Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/14/3/97/698041/jcws_a_00249.pdf by guest on 25 September 2021 said the Swedish legation’s staff was in the western part of the city. These com- ments were important not only in conªrming that Wallenberg had been lo- cated but also in forwarding a message from him, thereby signaling that the Soviet authorities could provide a channel for communication.2 Despite these unambiguous references to Wallenberg, what followed in subsequent months was a remarkable chain of events that transformed Dek- anozov’s original message into a new “truth”—that Soviet forces had located Wallenberg but he had then left in a car for an unknown destination and died somewhere in Hungary under uncertain circumstances. The Eliasson Com- mission into the Swedish government’s handling of the Wallenberg case, which presented its report, A Failure of Diplomacy, in 2003, provides an in- depth analysis of this tragic story, which need not be recounted in full detail here.3 Three factors stand out as particularly important. First, Swedish For- 1. The Soviet siege of Budapest began at the end of 1944. On 31 December Söderblom had told Dekanozov that the staff of the Swedish legation in Budapest was in need of protection from the Red Army once the city had fallen. (The eastern part of the city, Pest, fell under Soviet control on 15 Janu- ary 1945, the western part, Buda, on 11 February). Söderblom also said that approximately 15,000 Jews were under the protection of the legation. See the memorandum, dated 31 December 1944, in the Swedish National Archive (Riksarkivet, RA), HP 80 Ea. All U.S. State Department telegrams in the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA], 840.48 Refugees, referred to in this arti- cle are stored at NARA II in College Park, Maryland, and are available on microªlm (rolls 37–70) of the “Records of the Department of State Relating to the Problems of Relief and Refugees in Europe Arising from World War II and Its Aftermath 1938–1949.” Other State Department telegrams re- ferred to can be found in decimal ªles: for 1940–1944, NARA, 701.5864 (250/31/30/2, box 1856); for 1945–1949, NARA, 701.5864 (250/36/6/5, box 2977). Documents referred to with labels such as RA,HP80Ea,RA,HP1Er,RA,HP21Eu,RA,andP2Euarestored in the archive of the Swedish Foreign Ministry in the Riksarkivet. References are also made to documents in the Russian Foreign Ministry archive (Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii, or AVPRF) and The National Ar- chives of the United Kingdom (TNAUK). 2. V. Dekanozov to S. Söderblom, 16 January 1945, in AVPRF, Fond (F.) 0140, Opis’ (Op.) 30, Delo (D.) 10, Portfel’ (P.) 120, List (L.) 1. 3. Eliasson Commission, Ett diplomatiskt misslyckande: Fallet Raoul Wallenberg och den svenska utrikesledningen Statens offentliga utredningar (SOU) No. 18 (2003), pp. 187–307. Aside from the Eliasson Commission’s report, the Swedish handling of the case has been analyzed in several reports and articles over the years. See for example Rudolph Philipp, Raoul Wallenberg: Diplomat, kämpe, samarit (Stockholm: Fredborgs förlag, 1946); Elsa and Hans Villius, Fallet Raoul Wallenberg (Stock- holm: Geber, 1966); Susanne Berger, “Swedish Aspects of the Raoul Wallenberg Case,” unpublished report, 2001; Susanne Berger, “Stuck in Neutral: The Reasons Behind Sweden’s Passivity in the Raoul 98 Sweden, the United States, and Raoul Wallenberg’s Mission to Hungary in 1944 eign Minister Christian Günther failed to convey to his staff a message he re- ceived in February 1945 from the Soviet ambassador to Sweden, Aleksandra Kollontai, regarding Wallenberg’s whereabouts. Second, the Swedish minister in Moscow, Söderblom, was consistently unwilling to pursue the question of Wallenberg—a potential serious bone of contention with Moscow—and wanted to have the issue removed altogether from the agenda of his legation and transferred to a new Swedish diplomatic mission in Hungary. Third, the Swedish Foreign Ministry was indefensibly uncritical when it received incor- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/14/3/97/698041/jcws_a_00249.pdf by guest on 25 September 2021 rect information claiming that Wallenberg had died in Hungary. This disin- formation may have been part of a deliberate Soviet campaign to mislead Swe- den (though conªrmation of such a claim is not yet available). Kollontai’s message, indicating that Wallenberg was under Soviet protec- tion, was probably given to Foreign Minister Günther’s wife, Ingrid, some- time before 18 February 1945. Because of the foreign minister’s neglect, how- ever, this important piece of news, which conªrmed Dekanozov’s earlier comments, was not conveyed to the staff of the Foreign Ministry until three years later, in December 1948.4 Söderblom’s unwillingness to deal with the case, especially after he re- ceived word on 7 March 1945 from the Swedish legation in Romania that “Wallenberg disappeared on 17 January after declaring his intention to leave by car,” was in line with his general avoidance of all issues that could possibly endanger his efforts to improve diplomatic relations with the USSR.5 When instructed by Stockholm on 8 March to ask Soviet ofªcials when Wallenberg could return to Sweden, Söderblom simply redirected this instruction to the Swedish legation in Bucharest and failed to bring it up when he met with a Wallenberg Case,” unpublished report, 2004, http://www.raoul-wallenberg.eu/wp-content/uploads/ 2005/08/Stuck_25Oct05.pdf; Göran Rydeberg, Raoul Wallenberg—Historik och nya forskningsfält (Stockholm: UD, 2003); and Helene Carlbäck-Isotalo, “Glasnost and the Opening up of Soviet Ar- chives: Time to Conclude the Raoul Wallenberg Case?” Scandinavian Journal of History, No. 17 (1992), pp. 175–207. The Swedish Foreign Ministry’s internal memorandum of 1986 on the history of the Wallenberg case, written by Ambassador Rune Nyström (RA, P2 EuI), provides a thorough examination of the Swedish government’s handling of the case. The report issued by the Swedish- Russian Working Group on the Raoul Wallenberg case, Raoul Wallenberg: Redovisning från den svensk- ryska arbetsgruppen (Stockholm: Aktstycken utgivna av Utrikesdepartementet, Ny serie II:52, Elanders Gotab AB, 2000), although primarily aimed at clarifying what happened to Wallenberg after his incar- ceration in the USSR, also deals with the Swedish government’s handling of the matter. Paul A. Le- vine’s book Raoul Wallenberg in Budapest: Myth, History and Holocaust (London: Valentine Mitchell, 2010) analyzes the recruitment of Wallenberg and how he was perceived within the Swedish diplo- matic establishment. 4. Letter from Ingrid Günther to Raoul Wallenberg’s sister, Nina Lagergren, 29 October 1949, in Raoul Wallenbergarkivet 1:2, Brev och utredningsmaterial 1944–74, Brev från Christian Günther, Östen Undéns arkiv, Kungliga biblioteket; and Swedish Foreign Ministry to former Foreign Minister Christian Günther (envoy to Rome), 3 December 1948, in RA, P 2 EuI, 1107. 5. Swedish legation in Bucharest to Söderblom, 7 March 1945, in RA, P 57. 99 Matz Soviet