FRANCISCO J. GONZALEZ | 31 Plato’s Perspectivism Francisco J. Gonzalez University of Ottawa [email protected] ABSTRACT This paper defends a ‘perspectivist’ reading extreme of turning them into literary games with of Plato’s dialogues. According to this reading, no positive philosophical content. To say that each dialogue presents a particular and limited Plato’s dialogues are ‘perspectivist’ is not to perspective on the truth, conditioned by the say that they contain no ‘doctrines’ on the soul, specific context, aim and characters, where for example, but, on the contrary, to stress the this perspective, not claiming to represent the plurality of doctrines, with the observation that whole truth on a topic, is not incompatible with each is true within the limits of the argumenta- the possibly very different perspectives found tive function it is introduced to serve and of the in other dialogues nor, on the other hand, can specific dialogical context. be subordinated or assimilated to one of these other perspectives. This model is contrasted to Keywords: perspectivism, developmentalism, the other models that have been proposed, i.e., soul, Forms, truth, division, phantasma, eikôn, Unitarianism, Developmentalism, and ‘Prolepti- Neoplatonism. cism’, and is shown to address and overcome the limitations of each. One major advantage of ‘perspectivism’ against the other interpreta- tive models is that, unlike them, it can do full justice to the literary and dramatic character of the dialogues without falling into the opposite https://doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_16_3 32 | Plato’s Perspectivism In this paper I will defend a ‘perspectivist’ through his reading of Plato. In a text on the Sym- reading of Plato’s dialogues, though with some posium written when he was only nineteen years trepidation. The first cause of trepidation is old (August 1864),1 Nietzsche rejects categorically my skepticism regarding the value of general the interpretation according to which the first five debates about how to read Plato’s dialogues. discourses are false accounts of love to be cor- The problem with such debates is precisely their rected by Socrates’ discourse as the only true ac- generality: they tend to degenerate into end- count; instead, he insists that all the speeches are less quarrels about whether or not Plato had true, presenting different perspectives that are not doctrines or whether or not the philosophical rejected, but rather incorporated by Socrates into arguments can be understood independently a broader perspective (420). This reading is one of the dramatic context, where these ques- he continues to defend in the notes for lectures on tions mean little or nothing addressed in the Plato dating approximately a decade later. There abstract. Interpreting a particular dialogue he maintains that the Symposium presupposes and having the aptness of one’s methodol- the Phaedrus in that all of its speeches put into ogy assessed by its specific results is probably practice the philosophical rhetoric defended in a much more fruitful way of contributing to that dialogue; he furthermore sees as evidence the debate on how to read Plato than publish- of the fecundity of such rhetoric that the Sympo- ing books proclaiming a ‘new paradigm’ or a sium offers seven instead of only three speeches ‘third way’ in Platonic studies. This paper will, on eros.2 He concludes that ‘It is completely false like other papers of its type, suffer from the to believe that Plato had wanted in this way to defects of being schematic and of discussing present different misdirected approaches: they passages from several dialogues in isolation are all philosophical λόγοι and all true, present- from their context. On the other hand, it will ing always new sides of the one truth’ (106).3 be seen that an advantage of the ‘perspectivist’ This perspectivism is nonetheless, of course, model is precisely its emphasis on the irreduc- quite different from the one Nietzsche himself ible diversity of the dialogues and its refusal to will defend once he develops the notion of ‘will assimilate them to one narrative, whether it be to power’: according to that view, and counter a developmentalist or unitarian one. The other to the Platonic view, there is no one truth onto cause of trepidation is the misunderstanding which all the perspectives are perspectives. The to which the term ‘perspectivism’ is subject. perspectivism attributed here to Plato is the one So it is necessary to clarify right away how this the early Nietzsche attributes to him: not the view term is to be understood in relation to Plato. that there exists no Truth, but rather the view that we can obtain no more than multiple and partial perspectives onto that Truth. WHAT IS ‘PERSPECTIVISM’? The term ‘perspectivism’ is today so closely THE ‘PERSPECTIVIST’ associated with the name of Nietzsche that to MODEL VERSUS OTHER speak of Plato’s perspectivism cannot help but INTERPRETATIVE MODELS seem guilty of an absurd anachronism. Yet what is not often enough, or perhaps not at all, noted The ‘perspectivist’ model for interpreting is that Nietzsche arrived at his ‘perspectivism’ Plato’s dialogues is the thesis that what the FRANCISCO J. GONZALEZ | 33 young Nietzsche claims about the speeches in reading of the dialogues does not make chrono- the Symposium and the Phaedrus is true of the logical assumptions,4 it still sees the so-called dialogues as a whole. Each dialogue presents a ‘Socratic’ dialogues as partial expressions of a particular and limited perspective on the truth, vision that comes to be expressed more fully in conditioned by the specific context, aim and other (later?) dialogues, most specifically, the characters, where this perspective, not claim- Republic. Therefore, this reading is committed to ing to represent the whole truth on a topic, is the assumption that Plato had only one perspec- not incompatible with the possibly very different tive on an issue, though he chose to express it perspectives found in other dialogues nor, on the gradually, hinting at it in the Socratic dialogues other hand, can be subordinated or assimilated and waiting until the Republic to express it fully. to one of these other perspectives. We can get The problem with such a reading, apart from a better idea of this model by contrasting it to the lack of clarity regarding the kind of order it the other models that have been proposed, i.e., wants to attribute to the dialogues, is the evident Unitarianism, Developmentalism, and ‘Prolep- arbitrariness of privileging one dialogue such ticism’, and seeing how it addresses the limita- as the Republic by making it the one that all the tions of each. In suggesting that the dialogues are others are merely ‘anticipating’. Indeed, when all different perspectives on one truth and that Kahn turns to the Republic itself, he must grant they do not offer any evidence of fundamental that it too does not offer the complete picture changes in Plato’s philosophy, the ‘perspectiv- but points beyond itself,5 something he would ist’ reading is Unitarian. On the other hand, in presumably say even of the ‘late’ dialogues since speaking of irreducibly different perspectives, he describes even the ‘unwritten teachings’ as it can embrace the fact that represents an ob- provisional (386-388). But if all the dialogues are jection to Unitarianism, i.e., that the dialogues ‘proleptic’, then Prolepticism becomes indistin- simply do not offer a unified and systematic body guishable from Perspectivism. of doctrines. Perspectivism has an affinity to This is presumably why Kahn’s Prolepti- Developmentalism in that the latter also recog- cism has quietly been superseded by a form of nizes different perspectives on a topic or issue Perspectivism. Already in his 1996 book, Kahn in different dialogues; the difference is that for referred to ‘Plato’s view of the perspectival con- Developmentalism each perspective is exclusive dition of human discourse and cognition’ and of the others and thus the different perspectives claimed that ‘it is surely a mistake to interpret are to be interpreted as different views Plato took these frequent shifts in dialectical perspective on a topic at different times. Only Developmen- as if they reflected fundamental changes in talism therefore requires the establishment of an Plato’s philosophical position’ (386). In a later objective, non-question-begging chronological article (2005), however, Kahn develops and de- order to the dialogues and the failure to meet fends this perspectivism independently of the this requirement is its principal weakness. Per- proleptic reading defended in the book. While spectivism might appear to have some affinity to there is for Plato only one reality, Kahn affirms Charles Kahn’s Prolepticism, to the extent that that the principle of perspectivism entails that the latter too sees the perspectives of at least some this unity cannot be captured by any unique, dialogues as limited and as pointing beyond definitive formulation. Each formulation will themselves. However, there is a major difference. be conditioned by the circumstances and spe- While Kahn has claimed that his ‘proleptic’ cific concerns of a particular dialogue (15-16). 34 | Plato’s Perspectivism While he considers it the task of the in- gross simplification, because it cannot fully terpreter to uncover the profound structure account for the complexity of human behav- of Plato’s thought that underlies the different ior (even in the Republic Socrates at one point perspectives, at the end of his essay he makes nonchalantly allows that there may be many this crucial clarification: ‘What I am calling other parts between the three: καὶ εἰ ἄλλα ἄττα the underlying unity for a set of schemata is μεταξὺ τυγχάνει ὄντα, 443d7). In yet another not itself a definitive doctrine but only a deeper context tripartition might appear an unneces- perspective for seeing things together’ (2005, sary and artificial complication that misses the 28).