PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES OF THE ALLIANCE OF SYRIZA1 Haris Golemis, Nicos Poulantzas Institute (This is a draft. Not to be quoted without permission) 1. SYRIZA (Coalition of the Radical Left) is an alliance of parties, political groups and independent activists, presently represented in the Greek Parliament with 9 deputies (out of 300), after scoring 4,3% at the 2009 elections2. It was established, shortly before the legislative elections of 2004, on the initiative of SYNASPISMOS (Coalition of the Left of Movements and Ecology). Besides Synaspismos, which is by far the largest component, the alliance includes also various small groups (one post Left Eurocommunist, various Trotskyist, one post-Maoist, one ex-PASOK Socialist, one ex-KKE and pro-all Left unity, one Movementist and Human Rights) and independent left personalities and activists, the most prominent of which is Manolis Glezos, the symbol of Greek resistance against Nazi occupation. 2. One could say that SYRIZA has its origins in a process started since the establishment of the Forum of Dialogue and Common Action, in 2001. Almost all political forces now being in SYRIZA participated in this Forum, while activists from some of them (including those who had already worked together in the Euromarches of 1997, the alliance of International Action, the WSF, the ESF and the Greek Social Forum. However, few doubt that the alliance would not have been formed if Synaspismos had not taken the decision to make this important step, which was strange taking into account its identity since its establishment. An understanding of the reasons why a parliamentary party, with a rather moderate majority at that time, decided to coalesce with minor groups of the so-called extreme left is necessary in order to understand both the development of the alliance, but also its problems and perspectives3. 1 SYRIZA is the acronym in Greek of the Coalition of the Radical Left (Synaspismos Rizospastikis Aristeras). 2 Actually, the list of SYRIZA elected 13 deputies. However, after the split of Synaspismos, 4 of them withdrew from the alliance and stand as independents, having joined the Democratic Left. 3 The reasons why the small groups had also decided to participate in an alliance of a reformist party are also important for the understanding of their present behavior, but it is beyond the scope of this presentation. 3. For some of Synaspismos’ cadres and members, mainly coming from its small, movementist tendency of Red Green Network and, gradually, from the much bigger Left Current, the establishment of SYRIZA was part of the strategic aim of the “unity of the Left”. However, it is an open question whether the small core around the then President Nicos Konstantopoulos were also really sharing this view and that they would have decided to take the initiative to establish this alliance, if Synaspismos was not in danger of being excluded from the Greek Parliament. In the March 2004 elections, SYRIZA managed to marginally pass the 3% parliamentary threshold (3, 2%) and in that sense one could say it was a successful choice, although without any real dynamism as some people had expected. However, the annoyance of the smaller groups for the fact that all elected deputies belonged to Synaspismos and the subsequent inability of SYRIZA to form a list for the European Parliament’s elections in June of the same year, following a disagreement on the person who will be first in this list, resulted to an actual “freezing” of the alliance for several months. 4. SYRIZA was put in motion again after Synaspismos’ 4th Congress (December 2004) and the election of Alecos Alavanos as leader of the party. The reactivation and upgrading of the alliance by the new leader inspired a big number of disappointed and “retired” old activists belonging to all historically defeated currents of the Left, as well as the new generation following the prominent role of its members during the 2006-2007 students’ mobilizations against the privatization of higher education. As a result, in the 2007 elections SYRIZA increased its votes by 120.000, gaining 5% and 14 deputies, while in the 2006 local elections its list in Athens, having Alexis Tsipras as candidate mayor scored an astonishing 10,5%, well ahead of the KKE candidate . 5. The alliance’s momentum was boosted by Alavanos resignation from the post of Synaspismos’ President and supported the 33 year old Tsipras as the new leader of the party. In the 5th Congress, held in February, Tsipras was elected President with a convincing two thirds majority against the “renovator” Fotis Kouvelis, who is now the leader of the new party of Democratic Left (DIMAR). The co-habitation of respected Alavanos as head of the Parliamentary Group of SYRIZA and young Tsipras as President of Synaspismos , together with the acute leadership crisis in PASOK and, mainly, the active presence of SYRIZA both in the Parliament and in the movements, led to the “spring” of the alliance, with its power in the polls raising up to an amazing 18%! However, instead of “summer” it was “autumn” which came after “spring”. One of the main reasons for this was the frontal attack from all political forces and media of the establishment (with KKE participating in this “holy alliance”) against Synaspismos and SYRIZA for their participation in the December 2008 revolt. However, apart from the attack of the system, Synaspismos itself faced serious internal problems, with the “Renovators” abhorred by the fact that the dissent party they established in the 1990s has given its place to the extreme leftist SYRIZA. 6. The situation in Synaspismos and SYRIZA worsened even further, following Alavanos’ change of attitude towards Tsipras which resulted to the former’s abstention from the legislative elections of 2009 and his subsequent resignation from the party and the alliance. During this period of internal fighting, some of the SYRIZA components actively supported Alavanos, with the rest taking a neutral position. This was a real SYRIZA “winter”, which included the split of Synaspismos and the establishment of DIMAR. At the same time, Alavanos, two trotskyist and the post-maoist components of SYRIZA created the alliance of the Front of Solidarity and Overthrow. The Metopo (Front) had its own list in Attica in the 2010 regional elections, with Alavanos as candidate head of the region. As a result, SYRIZA almost stopped functioning, until its new “restart” some months ago. Nobody knows if this new peaceful period of the alliance dictated, according to some analysts, by the fear that next elections will be disastrous to both Synaspismos and the other political forces, will be a lasting one. 7. This brief history of SYRIZA is useful in order to better understand its present problems and perspectives. A typical question of all radical left parties coming into a broader alliance (not forming a new party, as it happened with Synaspismos, the Portuguese Left Block and Die Linke in 1991, 1999 and 2007 respectively) is whether it helps or at least does not contradict the strategic political plans of partners. Since its 2003 Programmatic Congress, Synaspismos has supported the need of the “unity of the Left”, which gradually was considered as a strategic aim in itself (stated explicitly in 2004 in the political decision of its 4th Congress). SYRIZA is considered the first step towards this “unity”, that includes also KKE, which until now rejects with indignation not only an alliance with “reformists”, but even the participation in common demonstrations. 8. There are people who claim that the recent “restart” of SYRIZA, as well as the aim of an all-Left unity is not really Synaspismos’ strategy, but a tactical move necessary for its survival and the change in the balance of forces within the Greek Left. Either way, this choice might be one of the reasons for the political paradox of a parliamentary party taking the initiative for the establishment of an alliance with smaller extra-parliamentary forces which are to its “left” (see, on the contrary, the old “popular fronts” of communists and social democrats, the Spanish United Left where the PCE has allied with more moderate forces and the Unitary Democratic Left-EDA, a Greek party which flourished during the 50s and 60 with the then illegal KKE as its major component). 9. During this period of extreme austerity in Greece, following the agreement between the socialist government of PASOK and the “troika” of the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the IMF, the “unity of the Left” appears as a very reasonable aim. However, my personal view is that a sincere, trustworthy and lasting political unity of the Greek renewing and radical Left within SYRIZA or in an even broader alliance with other forces of the radical Left (especially if this includes KKE) is presently very difficult. There are two main, inter-related, reasons for this. The first is the fact that whatever confidence and solidarity existed before the serious internal SYRIZA conflicts of 2009 (which lasted until the recent “restart”) cannot easily be restored. The second more serious reason is that the crisis, being mainly responsible for the split of Synaspismos, exposed the serious strategic divergences of the different SYRIZA components which are behind equally serious programmatic disagreements. 10. At the good days of SYRIZA, most of its components had more or less integrated the consensual spirit of the Greek, European and World Social Forum into their political behavior, respecting different ideologies and political strategies (i.e. the “democratic” versus the “revolutionary” road to socialism, “socialism with democracy and freedom” versus “socialism of the workers’ councils”, “struggle against the imperialist EU” versus “the Refoundation of Europe”, “feminism and ecology” versus “workerism”, “patriotism or nationalism” versus “friendly relations with all neighbours”, “the Greeks first” versus “open borders and solidarity with all immigrants and refugees” etc) and tried to find the common ground for actions and initiatives, with frictions being contained for lack of persuasive unilateral alternative strategies.