View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by AUC Knowledge Fountain (American Univ. in Cairo) American University in Cairo AUC Knowledge Fountain Theses and Dissertations 6-1-2012 Private military companies: assisting the transnational capitalist class in accumulation by dispossession Tori Aarseth Follow this and additional works at: https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds Recommended Citation APA Citation Aarseth, T. (2012).Private military companies: assisting the transnational capitalist class in accumulation by dispossession [Master’s thesis, the American University in Cairo]. AUC Knowledge Fountain. https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/1052 MLA Citation Aarseth, Tori. Private military companies: assisting the transnational capitalist class in accumulation by dispossession. 2012. American University in Cairo, Master's thesis. 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The American University in Cairo School of Humanities and Social Sciences Private Military Companies: Assisting the Transnational Capitalist Class in Accumulation by Dispossession A Thesis Submitted to The Department of Political Science In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of Master of Arts By Tori Aarseth Under the supervision of Dr. Sean McMahon January/ 2012 The American University in Cairo Private Military Companies: Assisting the Transnational Capitalist Class in Accumulation by Dispossession A Thesis Submitted by Tori Aarseth To the Department of Political Science January/2012 In partial fulfillment of the requirements for The degree of Master of Arts Has been approved by Dr. Sean McMahon Thesis Committee Advisor____________________________________________ Affiliation_________________________________________________________ Dr. Dan Tschirgi Thesis Committee Reader____________________________________________ Affiliation_________________________________________________________ Dr. Sandra Rein Thesis Committee Reader____________________________________________ Affiliation_________________________________________________________ __________________ __________ __________________ ____________ Dept. 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CA! &=-$:92#?# 55! ?"#&*)&+3'(*)'# 55! ?"/#49$*+(:(&(C-:(*)# 5B! ?"6#'9&32()1#<=-:># B6! ?"7#()&29-'()1#()'9&32(:D# B;! ?"!#E2*):(92#&-$(:-+('%#-)4#%*)9DF+-3)492()1# B5! ?";#&*)&+3'(*)G#-#:**+#*E#:=9#:2-)')-:(*)-+#&-$(:-+(':#&+-''# /@/! ."#,(,+(*12-$=D# /@7! iv ABSTRACT The topic of this thesis is the privatization of security and military services, and how the emergence of a private military industry should be understood. The argument I put forward has two integrated components. The first has to do with the ways in which privately provided security differs from publicly provided security, and the second with how privatization of security affects the distribution of power between social classes. I argue that privately provided security differs from publicly provided security in three main ways. First, the provision of security is depoliticized and turned into a technical issue that should be dealt with by experts only. Second, the objects to be secured are VIPs and selected areas controlled by those who have the means to pay for security, rather than national territories as a whole. Third, the implication of this shift from collective to individual security is that there will be more insecurity over all. These systematic differences in security provision mean that privatization of security is a trend which benefits the transnational capitalist class (TCC) exclusively. In order to substantiate my argument, I examine the activities of private military companies (PMCs) in Colombia and Iraq. In both countries, PMCs have been used by their national governments, foreign governments carrying out military interventions there, and transnational corporations. I found that PMCs constitute a uniquely suited tool to further capitalist interests through military means while keeping their activity and its purpose behind a veil of secrecy. They also provide a mechanism through which money can be transferred from public coffers to private hands, and through which states at the receiving end of military intervention can be made to pay for their own subjugation. PMCs should thus be understood as a tool for assisting the TCC in accumulation by dispossession abroad, rather than as a technical or cost-saving improvement as neoliberal ideology purports. v !"#$%&'()( 1. INTRODUCTION During the last three decades the privatization drive set in motion by the neoliberal approach to economic policy, which has been in fashion since the early 1980s, has been extended to include military, security, and intelligence services. The argument underpinning this shift from public to private in the military and security sectors is a familiar one: the dynamics of the market will lead to improved services and lower prices. This shift has taken place virtually without any public debate and, given how difficult it is to obtain reliable information on the extent of outsourcing in these sectors, one could even say without the public’s knowledge. The United Kingdom and, later on, the United States, have been at the forefront of this development among the industrialized countries. But private military companies (PMCs) are also present in most developing countries at the behest of either their governments, foreign governments, private businesses, or international organizations. Proponents of this privatization drive implicitly argue that this shift is merely technical or managerial in nature, a way to improve efficiency and reduce costs (eg. Carafano 2008). Privatization of the military is, according to this view, merely an alternative way of handling the military’s tasks for optimal performance. On the contrary, I argue that the shift from public to private in the military and security sectors is inherently political. Private firms in this business do not only change the way wars are fought or security measures implemented, their presence changes policy, the goals of war, and the conception of security itself. The move from public to private in the sectors ! "! dealing with physical coercion also expresses an expansion of the capitalist class’ coercive options vis-à-vis the working class. 1.1 Research Question Two main questions guide this thesis: 1) how does security provided by private firms differ from security provided by public institutions?; and 2) how does the privatization of security reflect the balance of power between different social classes? The answers to these two questions are interrelated and together make up the argument I present