China, Britain and France: A geopolitical comparative analysis of the East and West's leading imperial powers 1644-1911 Painting of Qing Matchlock Banner soldiers battling against British Line Infantry, Battle of Chinkiang (Author unknown, Image sourced from Wikipedia) By Samuel Jardine 4 March 2020 Citation advice: Samuel Jardine, ‘China, Britain and France: A geopolitical comparative analysis of the East and West’s leading imperial powers 1644-1911’, Extreme Empire Project [Online], (Available at: https://www.samueljardine.co.uk/), 1-23 Based on an article I wrote in 2017 for the Helios History Magazine 1 Introduction: The following is a short academic article providing an introductory look at the differences and similarities between the Chinese (particularly Qing) and British and French empires through a geopolitical lens, this is where the geography of a state is considered the informant of how that state develops historically and why, affecting everything from its culture, politics and religion to how it wages war, why it does so and how its economy develops. In a world where the globe's centre of power is shifting back towards the Pacific, understanding China and its historical interactions with the 'West' is of ever-increasing importance to gauge what might inform the current trajectory of political relations and discern what states are really up to. For instance when Xi Jinping states that China is seeking to simply regain its former world status, or re-engage with China's 'traditional sphere of influence' (as opposed to undertaking a neo-imperialist power-grab in Africa and Asia as some commentators would argue) what does this mean exactly? On what is this idea based? I am writing of course from a western (and particularly British) perspective and the historical analysis here will alas reflect that through the sources i have used, though i have done my best to center the discussion on China. This article is by no means a comprehensive history of China's historical relationships with Western powers, there is a huge amount of scholarly work dedicated to exploring that. It will though provide a snapshot that will help, in lay-terms, create a better understanding of our shared global connections, entwined history and the baggage and advantages that comes with it. In particular, I hope to highlight the merits of an outward, active looking power versus one that turns in on itself which perhaps is I would hazard is politically relevant today, though with the West becoming the latter. The premise: This article will put forward the argument that the Chinese empire's underlying cultural ideology of Confucianism directed its social, cultural and political self-conception towards a 2 universal ruler exercising a 'Mandate of Heaven', which legitimized the ruler (and their court) as the only font of power with the right to rule over all of China. This promoted the centralization of power in their hands but also meant that China's ills were solely laid at the door of the Emperor and their court. It also meant that Confucianisms strict social hierarchy, with the Emperor at the pinnacle and different orders of society below, could easily be adapted and exploited by the court to ensure stability over the populace. The Chinese empire's large-scale and continuous geographic context was the key element in driving the Chinese state to support, promote and extend this ideology as it was one that would unite their extensive lands and peoples and point them towards obedience of a single ruler and their court. This resulted in the creation of an inward-looking Confucian state obsessed pragmatically and ideologically with the creation and maintenance of its own stability and unity above all else, lest the Emperor be toppled. Thus, China, while sharing similarities with imperial Britain and France, as will be discussed, was set apart because this underlying ideology created a system at odds with the two 'western' powers' own outward-looking and aggressive ideology of global economic-cultural enforcement through free trade and the so- called 'mission to civilize'. The more outward looking and aggressive political-cultural outlook of the European powers was informed by their shared geographical context which provided the forced competition and impetus necessary for them to seek resources, land and dominion globally as they attempted to out-compete one another. This is in stark contrast to the Chinese empire's geographic dominance and lack of equivalent external rivals which informed its turn to an inwards facing political-ideological stance to counter its main perceived threat, that being itself, in the form of the potential inner turmoil from revolts that may blight such a large, populous and geographically continuous entity whose rulers court centralized power, and thus blame for things that went wrong in China. Thus, governing what they had effectively, was always far more paramount for the Chinese court as opposed to the drive for global expansion that Britain and France's geographic contexts assured. This article will argue this through an analysis of cultural, economic and political differences through, and by showing how, cultural ideology and geographical context created and 3 sustained these differences. A lack of time and word-count alongside the source constraints of the Anglo-sphere will center the analysis on the Qing era (1644-1911) of China. This period has been singled out due to the Qing's increased interactivity with the world, particularly with Britain and France, which can thus more succinctly and openly highlight their differences and similarities. Britain and France in this time period too went through a transition of unprecedented globalization in their mimicking of Spain's earlier (and first) global maritime empire as they sought to 'cash in' on the rewards. Where does the tea come into play? These two systems would after decades of tension come directly into conflict with one another. The final catalyst would be Britain's love of tea, for which it was forking out precious bullion to China, gold and silver which it could ill-afford, particularly in the context that an empires global resources were supposed to be marshalled for the benefit of the motherland, to sure it up against its other European imperial rivals. So a solution was found, instead of trading precious metals for tea, the British would sell opium to China produced in their nearby Indian possessions, in return for said bullion and tea. China's government with its focus on internal stability noticed the widespread drug issues cropping up among its formally productive peasantry, with a noticeable economic downturn resulting and so outlawed (or at least regulated) the Opium trade. This frustrated British merchants like William Jardine, who had been turning a rather large profit from the arrangement, and so William Jardine and his partner James Matheson wrote to the British state, complaining about the closed, inward-looking nature of China and how it mistreated the 'proper' interests of global business. They quickly got the support of Lord Palmerston and the British government who were worried about losing the highly taxable revenues, and soon the Royal Navy and British army was packed off to 'Open China' to foreign trade (i.e. mainly opium). All for the love of a cup of tea (Well, the revenues from this at least). This historical story is vastly expanded upon by an article i wrote in 2019 as part of my MA Modern History at King's College London. I'll be sure to make it Open Access at some point in the near future so you can get the full story, with all its sordid details. 4 Toppling thrones, protecting rulers and making peasants Emperor- the role of geography and ideology Qing China was a vast continuous land-centric empire. Its early unification in the third century BCE and imposition of Han culture over China (Waites, 2009, p.123) created the ideological concept that it was a single geographic entity. Britain and France in contrast were global maritime empires, whose geographical background, despite the example of Rome was one of a patchwork of vying coexisting sovereign states in Europe. The competition of the area drove its main powers to actively, or re-actively seek access to resources beyond the continent to try and gain an upper-hand against their rivals, or to make sure the status-quo was upheld by mirroring the action of other states (Such as England copying the Portuguese, Spanish and Dutch in going out to establish an empire). Chinese imperial unity relied on the permanency of Confucianism within the state apparatus. Confucianism advocated a strict social hierarchy with responsibilities to both social superiors and inferiors (Weiming, 2016). Conquest Dynasties like the Qing (Who came from the steppe to overthrow and replace the Ming dynasty) assimilated Confucian doctrine and its perceptions of the 'Mandate of Heaven', instead of overturning local beliefs as the British and French tended to do in Africa and to a lesser extent in India. This was perhaps a pragmatic step given that Lord Macartney notes during his embassy to China in 1793 that the Qing rulers were still aware of their foreign origins, seen through their 'precautions' (Macartney, 1962, p.2) of favouring their own Manchu countrymen for higher offices, and so keeping control out of the hands of their Han Chinese subjects. While Macartney's revelations here were only an outsiders perspective of the empire as foreigners were carefully handled by the Qing and allowed only mere 'snapshots' of (Waites, 2009, p.129) China, Macartney as an ambassador experienced the emperor's court first- hand and so must have gleaned some of its practical workings and moods and thus can be seen as relatively reliable source of information in this regard at least.