The Royal United Services Institute Whitehall Report 1-08 Coalition Command in Contemporary Operations John Kiszely www.rusi.org First Published 2008 © The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or other - wise, without prior permission of the Royal United Services Institute. Whitehall Report Series ISSN 1750-9432 Series Editor: Dr Terence McNamee Most Whitehall Reports are available as part of a membership package, or individually at £10.00 plus p&p (£1.00 in the UK/£2.00 overseas). Orders should be sent to the Membership Administrator, RUSI Membership, RUSI, Whitehall, London, SW1A 2ET, UK and cheques made payable to RUSI. Orders can also be made via the website or by quoting credit card details via email to: [email protected] For more details, visit our website: www.rusi.org Printed in Great Britain by Stephen Austin & Sons Ltd. for the Royal United Services Institute, Whitehall, London, SW1A 2ET UK RUSI is a Registered Charity (No. 210639) Front cover image: Meeting of the Tripartite Commission in Afghanistan, August 2006. Pictured left to right at table are then (US) Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, the Commander of Combined Forces Command in Afghanistan; General Bismullah Khan Mohammedi, the Chief of Staff of the Aghan National Army; General Ahsan Suleem Hayat, Vice Chief of Army Staff of the Pakistan Army; and Lieutenant General David Richards, the Commander of NATO-ISAF The views expressed in this paper are personal and do not necessarily reflect UK Government policy. Comments pertaining to this report are invited, and should be forwarded to: Dr Terence McNamee, Royal United Services Institute, Whitehall, London, SW1A 2ET, United Kingdom, or via email to [email protected] iii About the Author Lieutenant General Sir John Kiszely is Director of the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom. His previous appointments have included Commander Multi-National Division (South East) in the NATO Implementation Force in Bosnia in 1996, Deputy Commander for Operations of the NATO Sustainment Force there in 2001, Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff in London during the 1999 Kosovo operation ( Allied Force ), and Deputy Commanding General of Multi-National Forces Iraq 2004-05. iv Contents Introduction 1 The Changing Operational Environment 3 Coalition Command 7 The Coalition Commander 17 The Attributes Required of a Coalition Force Commander 21 Preparation for Coalition Command 25 v vi Introduction …after four days march I found the enemy of formal agreements (i.e ., treaties) between encamped as I expected, so that I thought we two or more nations for broad, long-term should have a very glorious day. But as the objectives which further the common inter - deputies would not consent without consulting 4 their generals who were all against it except ests of the members ’, the most obvious [one], … we have been obliged to retire from the cases being the Cold War adversaries, NATO enemy, notwithstanding we were at least one and the Warsaw Pact. It is since the end of third stronger than they, which I take to be very this confrontation that the frequency of prejudicial to the common cause, and scandalous coalition operations has greatly increased, for the army…. 1 and indeed that the frequency of inter-state The Duke of Marlborough , writing in 1705 operations not involving coalitions has great - near Brussels , was not the first , nor will he be ly declined. the last, military commander to find himself These coalitions have come in all shapes venting his frustration at the vagaries of and sizes : UN-sponsored coalitions ; NATO- coalition warfare and the behaviour of his based coalitions – sometimes with a few non- multinational subordinates ; but as his NATO partners, such as the 1999 Kosovo descendant, Winston Churchill, pointed out operation (Operation Allied Force ), some - ‘There is only one thing worse than fighting times with the majority of partners coming with allies, and that is fighting without from outside NATO, such as the Gulf War of them. ’2 Overcoming the challenges inherent 1991; operations involving both the UN and in the multinational dimension of their com - NATO , such as that in Bosnia in 1995; infor - mands has always been a hallmark of suc - mal coalitions, such as the co-operation in cessful coalition commanders. So with coali - Kosovo in 1999 between NATO forces and tion operations again becoming common - those of the Kosovo Liberation Army, or in place in military affairs, it is apposite to Afghanistan in 2002-03 between the US examine the challenges of coalition com - forces and those of the Northern Alliance. mand in contemporary operations. The purpose of these coalitions has varied Although the period of the Cold War widely – from war -fighting to peacekeeping, saw a number of campaigns involving coali - from counter-insurgency to humanitarian tions, that is to say ‘groupings of nations or operations. Moreover, there are organisa - forces, usually on a temporary basis, for the tions sometimes identified as alliances or accomplishment of a stated goal ’, 3 it was a coalitions which are neither , for example period dominated, in terms of multinational ABCA (America, Britain, Canada and military structures, by alliances – ‘ the result Australia) which is, as it styles itself, a ‘collab - 1 Winston Churchill, Marlborough: His Life and Times , Volume 2 (London: Harrap, 1934), p. 590. 2 Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, War Diaries 1939-1945 , edited by Alex Danchev and Daniel Todman (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2001), p. 680. 3 UK MoD, United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definition , (Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01.1, Edition 7, June 2006). 4 ibid. 1 Coalition Command in Contemporary Operations oration program ’. 5 risk and cost; and increased military power Many of the command challenges and effectiveness. The area of biggest gap inherent in a coalition force are similar to between theory and practice is the latter – those inherent in an alliance – for example, military effectiveness – largely because the the problems of integration, interoperability, multinational dimension acts, to a great decision -making, and achieving unity of pur - extent , as Clausewitzian friction, multiplying pose. But an alliance, particularly one as the ‘countless minor incidents…that com - closely integrated and of such long-standing bine to lower the general level of perfor - as NATO, can achieve – and, in NATO ’s case, mance, so that one always falls short of the has achieved – considerably more progress in intended goal… [and representing] the only overcoming these challenges than a coalition, concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on although coalitions based on NATO ’s com - 6 mand structure, such as in the 1999 Kosovo paper. ’ This is not always evident to the operation or the International Security observer because it is never in the interest of Assistance Force (ISAF ) in Afghanistan today, coalition members to draw attention to any - start with a considerable advantage in this thing that might detract from coalition cohe - regard . Progress towards interoperability and sion. The reality is , thus , not always appar - integration takes time – in NATO ’s case , ent. But an understanding of the realities of years of painstaking and sustained work by coalition command, and in particular of the NATO staff , as well as commitment from its challenges facing coalition commanders , is constituent nations. Coalitions, particularly vital to the success of a coalition campaign. those of short duration, can only realistically This paper will begin by placing con - achieve comparatively marginal improve - temporary coalition command in context by ments in these areas. noting some significant changes in the oper - In theory, ‘the grouping of nations… ating environment of armed forces since the for the accomplishment of stated goals ’ end of the Cold War, before arguing that potentially brings three great advantages to these have, in turn, impacted significantly on any military enterprise: increased political the challenges facing coalition commanders clout , and greater perceived legitimacy in the and the attributes and skills development eyes of the international community ; shared required for success in such a role. 5 The ABCA Mission is ‘to ensure that the ABCA Armies achieve levels of standardisation necessary for two or more ABCA Armies to operate effectively together within a coalition in joint environments…now and in the future’ places unfortunate emphasis on the outdated aim of standardisation rather than the more accepted goal of interoperability. See Grant Johansen, ‘The ABCA Program. Rhetoric to Reality,’ The Occasional , No. 44 (SCSI, 2002), pp. 72-75. 6 Carl von Clausewitz, On War , translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1976), p.119 . 2 A2886 text 13/5/08 19:10 Page 3 The Changing Operational Environment Of the many changes in the environment in in 1971, and note the relative simplicity of which armed forces have been called upon to the vast majority of early UN operations. operate since the end of the Cold War are a Most involved UN troops intervening – number with particular impact on the chal - literally, standing between potential belligerents , lenges facing coalition commanders. The manning