Un Poète Maudit: Stanley Cavell and the Environmental Debate TOMA! GRU"OVNIK ! ! ! O Lady! we receive but what we give, And in our life alone does the nature live: Ours is her wedding-garment, ours her shroud! And would we aught behold, of higher worth, Than that inanimate cold world allowed To the poor loveless ever-anxious crowd, Ah! from the soul itself must issue forth, A light, a glory, a fair luminous cloud Enveloping the Earth — And from the soul itself must there be sent A sweet and potent voice, of its own birth, Of all sweet sounds the life the element! SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE, Dejection: An Ode Images of landscapes and encounters with the natural world feature prominently throughout Stanley Cavell’s texts — so much so that Coleridge’s romantic visions of the natural environment (the cold, icy region through which the Mariner’s ship drifts) represent one of the cornerstones of Cavell’s understanding of “romanticism as work- ing out a crisis of knowledge,”1 and “skepticism [as] what romantic writers are locked in struggle against.”2 Indeed, skepticism as an interpretation of “metaphysical fini- tude” as “an intellectual lack”3 is seen by Cavell as something that has to be overcome !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 1. Cavell, In Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of Skepticism and Romanticism (Chicago, IL: Chi- cago University Press, 1988), 52. 2. Cavell, Disowning Knowledge In Seven Plays of Shakespeare (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- versity Press, 2003), 8. 3. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?: A Book of Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- sity Press, 1976), 263. CONVERSATIONS 1 86! (and not, say, refuted); and this overcoming, at least when it comes to the external world skepticism, is envisioned as the “acceptance” of the world, or even as “the idea of a romance with the world.”4 The “world” romantic writers have in mind is, of course, the natural world, for we should “Let Nature be [our] teacher”.5 It seems, then, that overcoming of skepticism is inextricably bound up with accepting the natu- ral world and its “gift of life.”6 However, if accepting the world could be a right step towards the overcoming of skepticism, then failing to do so may mean something close to Othello’s killing of Desdemona, or the Mariner’s killing of the albatross: by refusing to accept the world, we might find this world dead at our hands, and the consequences of skeptical doubts could lead to “the death of nature.”7 This point, explored in the first part of present essay, might seem obvious to readers of Cavell; however, as I try to show in the last part of the paper, the idea that the human attitude towards the natural world is char- acterized by the human condition, by the fact that the modern subject may avoid ac- knowledging, or accepting, the other (be it other human being, or other forms of life, or nature, or external world as such), is largely obnubilated in contemporary litera- ture on environmental ethics. The reason for this negligence might be seen in some- thing Cora Diamond, following Cavell, calls “deflection”, a specific intellectual ma- neuver often present in academic mode of philosophical discussion, where encoun- tered difficulty of reality is transformed into discussion of a moral issue,8 where “phi- losophy in the academic mode […] avoids what is really at issue in its engagements with skepticism.”9 One of the most important consequences for environmental ethical debate that follows from this analysis is its undermining of the idea largely present in environ- mental philosophy: the idea that humans should try to merge with the natural world in the sense of Arne Naess’s concept of Self-realization which is understood “as a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 4. Russell Brian Goodman, American Philosophy and the American Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 5. 5. And “quit [y]our books,” as Wordsworth advises us in The Tables Turned, for they are “dull and endless strife.” 6. Cavell, Quest, 61. 7. Ibid., 60. 8. Cora Diamond, “The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy,” in Philosophy and Animal Life, ed. Cary Wolfe (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 59. 9. John McDowell, “Comment on Stanley Cavell’s ‘Companionable Thinking’,” in ibid., 138. CONVERSATIONS 1 87! term for the widening and deepening of your self so that it embraces all life forms.”10 I’m arguing that such desires can be seen as analogous to the Mariner’s, or Othello’s, desire, and that their consequences can be similarly tragic for humans as well as the natural world. I. Lost Souls When talking about Cavell and environmental thought one would, perhaps, first think of his essay that appeared as a part of Philosophy and Animal Life, a collection of papers written by various authors as a response to Cora Diamond’s text “The Diffi- culty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy,” reprinted in the collection. The rea- son why the “Companionable Thinking” essay might first spring to mind is because of its engagement with, broadly speaking, animal ethics and the question of vegetarian- ism, and thus with issues that seemingly resemble the environmental problematic. However, as John McDowell points out, “Cavell’s response does not do justice to the wonderful way Diamond has found to cast light on Cavellian themes.”11 Thus when one considers Cavell’s frequent references to nature and nature metaphors in authors like Coleridge, a somewhat different platform begins to offer itself for construction, or reconstruction, of Cavellian environmental thought, based on texts that at a first glance do not seem connected with the environmental problematic at all. I already pointed out that specific natural vistas play an important role in un- derstanding skepticism lived by a romantic hero. Indeed, Cavell starts his Berkeley lecture “Texts of Recovery”, the lecture in which he talks about The Rhyme of the An- cient Mariner in connection with Kantian philosophy at some length, with a curious interpretation of the Mariner’s excursion into the icy southern ocean: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 10. Arne Naess, “Self-Realization: An Ecological Approach to Being in the World,” in The Ecol- ogy of Wisdom. Writings by Arne Naess, ed. Alan Drengson and Bill Devall (Berkeley, CA: Counter- point, 2008), 92. 11. McDowell, “Comment,” 128. McDowell thinks that Cavell misses crucial point in Diamond’s paper: “The role of Coetzee’s Costello in Diamond’s paper is not to raise the question whether Cos- tello’s unhinging perception is a perception of how things indeed are — that is, whether meat eating is what she thinks she sees it to be […]. The role of Coetzee’s Costello for Diamond is rather to provide an analogue for the unhinging perceptions of separation and finitude that, according to Cavell himself, constitute the real point of philosophical skepticism” (137-38). I agree with McDowell on this point. CONVERSATIONS 1 88! In particular, when Coleridge’s “prose gloss” beside the poem speaks of the Mariner’s ship drifting across the line and of its being guided back toward the line, I took the line in question to be (among other things, no doubt) the line implied in the Critique “below” which or “beyond” which knowledge cannot penetrate.12 The “line,” according to Coleridge’s gloss, delineates the region of “good wind and fair weather” from “[t]he land of ice, and of fearful sounds where no living thing was to be seen,” and with this romantic move the Kantian abstract distinction becomes clothed in vivid environmental imagery. In Cavell’s interpretation, this crossing of the line is, in fact, more fundamental than the actual Mariner’s act of killing the albatross which can be seen as derivative of the transgression, a consequence of the overstepping of boundaries of sensible human knowledge. With his understanding of romantic writ- ers as authors that are “locked in struggle against skepticism,”13 and in understanding their project as stemming from dissatisfaction with philosophical (Kantian) skepti- cism,14 Cavell also claims that for Coleridge the region beyond the line can be experi- enced, but that this region has a “definite, call it a frozen, structure.”15 However, the question as of why precisely the Mariner actually pierces the albatross with the arrow persists. In tracking the motive of this “perverse” (and thus seemingly unmotivated) killing, Cavell turns to his well-explored idea of the modern subject’s effort to deny burdensome pieces of knowledge, the effort to repress the uncanny fact of one’s exis- tence. This idea, the idea that links his writings to psychoanalytic explorations, un- derlies several Cavellian interpretations of Shakespeare, Coleridge, and many other authors which Cavell finds challenging. In The Rhyme the motive is thus seen in “the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 12. Cavell, Quest, 50. 13. Cavell, Disowning, 8. 14. When it comes to Kantian “victory” over skepticism, Cavell says that “one will sometimes feel, Thanks for nothing” (Quest, 53). This is because Kantian philosophy leaves the Ding-an-sich un- known, and unknowable. Romanticism thus expresses “a disappointment with the Kantian settlement with skepticism” and tries to reclaim “a human relationship to things, things in themselves” — Joshua Wilner, “Communicating With Objects. Romanticism, Skepticism, and 'The Specter of Animism' in Cavell and Wordsworth,” in Stanley Cavell and Literary Studies, ed. Richard Eldridge and Bernard Rhie (London: