ALL QUIET ON THE ISIS FRONT? British secret warfare in an information age Emily Knowles and Abigail Watson This report has been written by Remote Control, a project of the Network for Social Change hosted by Oxford Research Group. The project examines changes in military engagement, with a focus on remote control warfare. This form of intervention takes place behind the scenes or at a distance rather than on a traditional battlefield, often through drone strikes and air strikes from above, with Special Forces, intelligence agencies, private contractors, and military training teams on the ground. Emily Knowles is Remote Control’s project manager. Abigail Watson is a Research Officer with Remote Control. We would like to extend our heartfelt thanks to the many people who have given up time and shared their knowledge with us for this report. Some of them, often still in serving or official positions, have preferred to remain anonymous and are not named here. None of them bear responsibility for any of the opinions (or errors) in this report, which are the authors’ own. In alphabetical order: Dapo Akande, Richard Aldrich, Malcolm Chalmers, Lindsay Clarke, Chris Cole, Rory Cormac, Ian Davis, Joseph Devanny, Anthony Dworkin, Frank Foley, Ulrike Franke, Chris Fuller, Jennifer Gibson, Anthony Glees, Michael Goodman, Jim Killock, Ewan Lawson, Peter Lee, Elizabeth Minor, Jon Moran, Michael Pryce, Julian Richards, Peter Roberts, Paul Rogers, Javier Ruiz Diaz, Paul Schulte, Namir Shabibi, Adam Svendsen, Jack Watling, Nicholas Wheeler, and Chris Woods. We would also like to acknowledge the expertise that was shared with us by the Institute for Conflict, Cooperation and Security at the University of Birmingham and the University of Oxford, which has been truly invaluable. Published by Remote Control, March 2017 Remote Control Oxford Research Group Development House 56-64 Leonard Street London EC2A 4LT United Kingdom +44 (0)207 549 0298 [email protected] http://remotecontrolproject.org The text of this report is made available under a Creative Commons license. Photographs remain the copyright of original holders. All citations must be credited to Remote Control. This report does not necessarily reflect the views of the experts consulted as part of the research process, and any mistakes that remain are categorically the authors’ own. Cover image: markusspiske Pixabay/ Creative Commons Contents Introduction 1 A golden age of remote warfare? 2 Secret warfare in an information age 4 The accountability gap 6 Case 1: the use of armed drones 8 Introduction 8 Faltering government transparency 9 Confusion over government policies 11 Conclusions 15 Case 2: the use of Special Forces 16 Introduction 16 The golden age of Special Forces 18 - Libya 19 - Somalia 19 - Yemen 20 - Afghanistan 20 - Syria 20 - Iraq 20 The blanket opacity policy 21 Lack of legislative oversight 22 Culture of no comment 24 Conclusions 27 Case 3: sharing capabilities with allies 28 Introduction 28 Providing capabilities outside areas of declared hostilities 28 - Syria 30 - Somalia 31 - Pakistan 32 - Yemen 32 - The UK’s role in aiding the Saudi-led coalition 33 Patchy government transparency 35 - Scrutiny of embedded troops 35 - Oversight of intelligence-sharing 36 - The role of the ISC 38 - Neither confirm nor deny 39 Conclusions 39 Conclusion: greater secrecy is not always good strategy 40 Policy recommendations 41 Armed drones 41 Special Forces 41 Embedded troops 42 Intelligence-sharing 42 Endnotes 43 Introduction armed drone fleet, intelligence agencies, and military advisers and trainers also In May 2016, the Secretary of State for playing important roles. This is light-footprint Defence, Michael Fallon, appeared to put remote warfare, which can take place on to bed rumours of a pending British troop the front lines or with the UK in a supporting deployment to Libya1 with the statement role. Consistently, however, there is only that: “we do not intend to deploy ground a low level of official public disclosure or forces in any combat role. Before engaging parliamentary scrutiny, even in the face of in any military operation in Libya, we would information leaks and media speculation. of course have to seek an invitation from This deniability may bring flexibility, which the Libyan Government, and would also creates opportunities when it comes to have to involve this Parliament.”2 dealing with fluid and complex security Unfortunately, this came three months threats. But our research suggests that after claims had begun to surface in the this is not a simple relationship whereby British media that Special Forces were more secrecy automatically brings greater spearheading a “secret war” against ISIS strategic advantages. Indeed, in an age in Libya, with British troops operating when leaks of information are seemingly alongside their US and French counterparts inevitable, demand for political accountability 7 on the ground.3 It was also two months after is high, and trust in politicians and the wider expert community is low,8 the leak of an official memo documenting today’s uneasy a conversation between US lawmakers coexistence of official opacity and sporadic and King Abdullah of Jordan, which leaks of information to the media may be indicated that British Special Forces had creating a host of unintended consequences. been operating in Libya since at least the The analysis in this report will argue that 4 beginning of 2016. the prevailing tendency towards secrecy These media revelations generated is creating an accountability gap that parliamentary rumblings about secret wars,5 challenges the UK’s democratic controls with the Chairman of the Commons Foreign over the use of force. In addition, it does Affairs Committee calling government not always appear to make strategic sense. responses to parliamentary requests In today’s information age, opacity both for more information: “so narrow as to restricts the government’s ability to set be wholly and deliberately misleading its own narrative for British military action to the uninformed reader.”6 They also overseas, while potentially fuelling popular feelings of distrust in government war- serve to illustrate the fact that today’s world of interconnectivity poses a distinct making when information about the UK’s challenge to the idea of secret warfare, secretive involvement in these conflicts with governments fast losing the ability to invariably surfaces. Our research shows that guarantee blanket opacity, even for the the UK is currently performing worse than special operators that are most prized for many of its allies when it comes to publicly their subtlety. commenting on its actions, or opening up its policies to scrutiny. In doing so, the While this is just one example, our research government is neglecting the strategic suggests that this is indicative of a rising advantages that greater transparency can trend in British defence and security policy – bring, in favour of narrowly looking at greater secretive yet growing military commitments access to information as a security concern. in areas where the UK is not generally considered to be at war, but where the There is of course a balance that needs to UK faces threats from groups like ISIS be struck between the need for secrecy to in Iraq, Syria and Libya, al-Shabaab in provide security and the need to open up Somalia, or AQAP (al-Qaeda in the Arabian the choices of government to the scrutiny Peninsula) in Yemen. Instead of deploying and debate that is so pivotal for a healthy regular British troops to the front lines, democracy. However, those who decide increasingly it is British Special Forces who that balance need to take into account the fact that, in today’s information age, building can be found on the ground, with the UK’s policies on the assumption of complete 1 | All quiet on the ISIS front? secrecy is increasingly untenable – and On 21st of September 2001, then-President government control over the timelines for of the United States, George W. Bush, stood increased access to information about the in front of a joint session of Congress and UK’s secretive military engagements is declared that America would “direct every slipping. resource at our command – every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, This creates a need for change, whether every instrument of law enforcement, every it is the lack of oversight or the lack of financial influence, and every necessary control that alarms you the most. Warfare is weapon of war – to the disruption and to the changing, and the way that people access defeat of the global terror network.”10 information about warfare is changing. Government policy needs to keep pace. Declaring that “Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen”, Bush ushered A golden age of remote warfare? in an era of war in Iraq and Afghanistan,11 “Western nations engage in which then broadened into the pursuit of “al 12 counterinsurgency for limited stakes, which Qaeda and its affiliates” in Yemen, Somalia, leads to inevitable tensions between what Libya, and now in Syria and Iraq against 13 the military thinks is required on the ground, ISIS. in terms of methods or resources, and In evidence given to a 2016 Joint Committee what the population is ready to accept back on Human Rights (JCHR) investigation, home.” UK government testimony confirmed that - Etienne de Durand, analyst at the Britain is “not in a generalised state of 14 French Institute of International Relations9 conflict with ISIL, except in Iraq and Syria.” Nevertheless, mapping reports of UK military ISIS Fighter (image credit: Voice of America/ Wikimedia Commons) Remote Control Project | 2 action over the last three years generates against Yemen,18 and the presence of UK a list of countries and activities with striking troops embedded in the US military at Camp similarities to those that the US has justified Lemonnier,19 none of the events on the map under its own war on terror.15 below have been officially acknowledged or independently verified.