Recovering the Cynic Legacy: Divine Friendship in the Cosmopolitan Thought of Diogenes of Sinope Patrick Anderson PHIL 611 – Fall 2014 Dr. Scott Austin December 19, 2014 Recovering the Cynic Legacy: Divine Friendship in the Cosmopolitan Thought of Diogenes of Sinope BUYER: Do you practice any craft? DIOGENES: I’m a liberator of humanity.1 In his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel belittles the Cynic movement of antiquity, saying, “There is nothing particular to say about the Cynics, for they possess but little philosophy, and they did not bring what they had into a scientific system.”2 Luckily, his dismissal has not lasted. Recent scholarship on the Cynics has expanded well beyond the scope of Donald A. Dudley’s seminal work A History of Cynicism. Luis Navia3 and William Desmond4 have led the way with major works on the Cynics, and some recent trends have looked at Diogenes of Sinope and Cynic movement through the lens of poststructuralism, analyzing their rhetoric as discursive interventions or their actions as performative resistance.5 Others have taken a more historical approach, connecting the Cynics to early Christian Church6 and to early modern 1 Unless otherwise noted, all Diogenes quotes and apophthegms will come from the Robin Hard translation in Diogenes the Cynic: Sayings and, with Other Popular Moralists, trans. Robin Hard (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) followed by the listed original source. This passage comes from page 4; Lucian, Philosophies for Sale 7-12. 2 Hegel qtd. in Louisa Shea, The Cynic Enlightenment: Diogenes in the Salon (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 133. 3 See his The Philosophy of Cynicism: An Annotated Bibliography (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995), Classical Cynicism: A Critical Study (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), and Diogenes of Sinope: The Man in the Tub (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998). 4 See his The Greek Praise of Poverty: Origins of Ancient Cynicism (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006) and Cynics (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2008). 5 R. Bracht Branhan, “Defacing the Currency: Diogenes’ Rhetoric and the Invention of Cynicism,” in The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy, ed. R. Bracht Branham and Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1996), 81-104; Kristen Kennedy, “Hipparchia the Cynic: Feminist Rhetoric and the Ethics of Embodiment,” Hypatia 14.2 (1999): 48-71; Kristen Kennedy, “Cynic Rhetoric: The Ethics and Tactics of Resistance,” Rhetoric Review 18.1 (1999): 26-45; Philip Bosman, “Selling Cynicism: The Pragmatics of Diogenes’ Comic Performance,” The Classical Quarterly 56.1 (2006): 93-104; M. D. Usher, “Diogenes’ Doggerel: Chreia and Quotation in Cynic Performance,” The Classical Journal 104.3 (2009): 207-223. 6 Derek Kruger, “Diogenes the Cynic Among the Fourth Century Fathers,” Vigiliae Christianae 47.1 (1993): 29-49. 1 England and France.7 The works of most interest for this essay are those that comment of Cynic political thought, especially the politics of the most famous Cynic, Diogenes of Sinope. Many accept the traditional view that Cynicism is a Socratic school of ancient Greek philosophy,8 but there is some disagreement regarding the founder of Cynicism, whether it was Heracles,9 Antisthenes,10 or Diogenes. However, there is almost no disagreement that Diogenes is the most important Cynic, which is why it is necessary to interrogate his political views in order to render an image of Cynic political thought. As Robin Hard argues, “Diogenes had nothing but contempt for any sort of political engagement,”11 but given the Cynic emphasis on ethics, his thought has clear political implications. The primary question at issue is this: Does Diogenes have a positive political program? And this question requires an answer to another question: Was Diogenes a cosmopolitan thinker, and if so, in what way? There is disagreement among those who have looked at Diogenes’ political philosophy as to whether he has a positive politics, and here I will defend the view that he does in fact have such views. But even among those who agree that he does have a positive political program, no one has attempted to explain how relations between individuals should work in that aspect of his thought. In this essay, I will argue that Diogenes’ political philosophy is both negative and positive. On the negative side is his famous critique of society, and on the positive side is a cosmopolitical social order in which individuals relate authentically to nature and to each other through a divine friendship. In the first section of the essay, I offer a doxographical overview of 7 David Mazella, The Making of Modern Cynicism (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2007). 8 See Eduard Zeller, Socrates and the Socratic Schools, trans. Oswald J. Reichel, revised 3rd ed. (New York: Russell & Russell, Inc., 1962), 285-337. 9 James Romm, “Dog Heads and Noble Savages: Cynicism Before the Cynics?,” in The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy, ed. R. Bracht Branham and Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1996), 121-135. 10 H. D. Rankin, Sophists, Socratics, and Cynics (Totowa, NJ: Barnes & Noble Books, 1983), especially chapter 12. 11 Hard, 212. 2 Diogenes’ philosophy as a whole. In the second section, I demonstrate the existence of his positive political philosophy. In the third section, I explain what I take to be his theory of divine friendship. And in the final section, I examine his views on law and interpersonal interactions. Diogenes, Cynicism, and Social Critique As a native of Sinope, Diogenes – his name meaning “of the gods” or “born of Zeus” – is said to have arrived in Athens after having been exiled from his home for defacing the currency of the local ruler. While the details are disputed – some say he left willingly, while other say that his father actually defaced the currency – it remains true that exile constitutes an important aspect of Diogenes’ philosophy, especially his epistemology and ethics (or more precisely, his politics). Because Diogenes inherited the Socratic tradition, knowledge occupies a central role in his philosophy, and while he considered himself epistemologically privileged, he did so only because he believed he had a special understanding of the world based on his status as an exile, an outsider. According to one report, “Someone [once] said that Diogenes was out of his mind. ‘It’s not that I’m not out of my mind,’ he replied. ‘It’s that I don’t have the same mind as you.’”12 His special orientation to the world allowed him to avoid falling into the comfortable trap of agreeable falsehoods, unlike many of his contemporaries who, in his mind, could not handle the discomforts of the harsh truth.13 In fact, the false happiness achieved by turning away from the truth could never compare to the true happiness attained by proper thought. As Anthony A. Long explains, for Diogenes, the “Prime impediments to happiness are false judgments of value, together with the emotional disturbances and vicious character that arise from these false 12 Hard translation, 22; Stobaeus 3.3.51. 13 Hard translation, 65; Excerpts from Manuscripts of Florilegia of John Damascene 2.31, 22. 3 judgments.”14 Those who become caught up in falsehoods become trapped in an endless cycle of emotional and affective distress that makes truth increasingly difficult to access. The epistemological impediments to happiness are not merely psychological for Diogenes; materialism also impedes an individual’s self-cultivation. When a person focuses on accumulating wealth, possessing fine objects, obtaining luxuries, or achieving fame, their energy has been diverted away from cultivating virtue and toward false symbols of happiness, which is why, for Diogenes, wealth and virtue are mutually exclusive.15 He found it contradictory for a person to praise those who overcome the desire for wealth but harbor envy for the rich.16 And Diogenes criticized those who, relying on arguments to access truth or virtue, claiming to be philosophers, because they preferred to avoid the necessity of virtue by maintaining comfortable lifestyles. According to one ancient source, “Diogenes said that poverty aids us to philosophy of its own accord, for what philosophy attempts to persuade us by means of arguments, poverty compels us to in very deed.”17 One must learn virtue through the necessities of life, he thought, rather than from the comfortable reflections of one’s living in ease. In addition to being an epistemic exile, Diogenes also understood himself to be a political exile, claiming to be a citizen of the world or a citizen of the cosmos (kosmopolites).18 Given his disdain for social conventions, and given that he lived a nomadic lifestyle – his house was a ceramic jar that he carried with him19 – it is easy to understand why he would reject allegiance to a particular polis. However, the exact meaning of Diogenes’ cosmopolitanism has been controversial. Some insist that his cosmopolitanism is purely negative, a rejection of belonging. 14 Anthony. A. Long, “The Socratic Tradition: Diogenes, Crates, and Hellenistic Ethics,” in The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy, ed. R. Bracht Branham and Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1996), 30. 15 Hard translation, 36-38. 16 Hard translation, 36; DL 6.28. 17 Hard translation, 13; Stobaeus 4.32.11. 18 Hard translation, 4, 12; Lucian, Philosophies for Sale 7-12, DL 6.63. 19 Hard translation, 10; Jerome, Against Jovinian 2.14. 4 For example, W. W. Tarn argues that Diogenes’ cosmopolitanism “has nothing to do with any belief in the unity of mankind or human brotherhood, but means someone not attached to any community.”20 Others, however, believe that his dismissal of the polis is accompanied by an affirmation of nature.