Democratic Transitions and Implicit Power: An Econometric Approach Gokce Goktepe (NYU) Shanker Satyanath (NYU) ABSTRACT Recent works of political economy have emphasized the importance of distinguishing between transfers of explicit and implicit power over economic decision making in democratic transitions. Scholars have so far provided interesting anecdotal evidence supporting their claims of potential divergence between transfers of explicit and implicit power. In this paper we apply econometric techniques to examine if a transfer of explicit power has not also been accompanied by a transfer of implicit power. We do so in the context of a major country where considerable uncertainty remains over the military’s implicit role in economic decision making long after an explicit transfer of power to elected leaders, namely Turkey. Our findings indicate a significant gap between the explicit and implicit aspects of Turkey’s democratic transition, adding support to scholars’ claims about the importance of distinguishing between these aspects of transitions. When has a democratic transition truly occurred? Standard measures of democracy consider the presence of free elections and/or turnover in government as adequate to identify the emergence of a democracy. However, these are only explicit aspects of a democratic transition. Several scholars, ranging from Schmitter and Karl (1991) to Acemoglu and Robinson (2008), have expressed concerns that countries that have made the transition to free elections and turnover in office may still be implicitly undemocratic in that elements of the previous authoritarian regime continue to exercise substantial behind the scenes (implicit) influence over economic decision making.1 Aside from purely normative concerns the distinction between transfers of explicit and implicit power is of special importance in deliberations about Turkey’s accession to the European Union, where behind the scenes military involvement in economic decision making is seen as weakening the case for allowing accession. The distinction between explicit and implicit transfers of power is thus of significance to academics as well as policy makers. The scholars cited above have provided interesting anecdotal evidence supporting their claims of potential divergence between transfers of explicit and implicit power. This paper differs by addressing this question from an econometric perspective. It does so in the context of an important country, Turkey. Our approach is to study abnormalities in stock market responses of firms connected to the Turkish military (in non-defense industries) to exogenous changes in the probability of survival of the country’s democratically elected chief executive. Our logic is as follows. Stock market investors have powerful incentives to find out if the military continues to retain significant behind the scenes influence over economic policy making following an explicit democratic transition. Consider an environment where a transfer of explicit power 1 See Levitsky and Way (2002) for concerns with a similar flavor. Levitsky and Way provide numerous other citations of related qualitative literature that we omit here for reasons of space. 2 has already occurred. Under conditions where the electoral opposition has a different set of policy preferences from the elected incumbent (which is often the case) stocks of firms should be vulnerable to concerns over whether the incumbent will retain office or be replaced by the opposition. However, if the military has ongoing implicit influence over economic policy making irrespective of which party is elected to office, stocks of firms that are connected to the military would be less vulnerable to such concerns. Military connected stocks can then serve as a refuge or a relative safe haven for investors in times of high uncertainty over government turnover. We can thus gain an idea of whether or not there is a shortfall in the transfer of implicit power based on whether or not military connected shares serve as a relative safe haven for stock market investors in times of high uncertainty over government turnover. We build on this logic to develop the following empirical criteria for identifying when a country has fallen short in terms of a transfer of implicit power. Financial econometrics provides us with the tools to identify when share movements are abnormal. If the military plays no special role in economic decision making, publically traded shares of military connected firms should not display abnormally superior returns (changes in share price) to those of firms that are unconnected to the military in times of high uncertainty over government survival. Subject to controlling for alternative explanations, such abnormally superior returns are indicative of military connected shares offering investors a relative safe haven in uncertain times because the military is expected to influence economic policies irrespective of whether the government falls or survives. Subject to surmounting numerous robustness checks we interpret these abnormal returns as indicating that military connections offer a relative safe haven from uncertainty related to government survival, which is indicative of an incomplete transfer of implicit power. The key to econometric identification in such a study is to focus on the analysis of shocks to the survival probability of a government that are genuinely exogenous. The 3 exogenous shocks that we study in this paper are those to the physical health of the democratically elected chief executive.2 (We suggest some alternative identification strategies in the conclusion of the paper.) The causal logic is that a major shock to the health of a chief executive affects the probability of his continuation in office and raises uncertainty about the future direction of policy. We examine if the shares of firms connected to the military display abnormal positive returns in the face of this political uncertainty. As mentioned we apply this approach here to a major country where considerable uncertainty remains over the military’s continued implicit role in economic decision making long after an apparent democratic transition, namely Turkey. While the Turkish constitution of 1982 provides the military with powers in the security realm via membership in the National Security Council (NSC) alongside elected officials and also provides it a special role as a defender of secularism, it offers the military no formal role in economic decision making. Neither objective (such as REG) nor subjective (such as Polity) measures of democracy see the military-related provisions in Turkey’s constitution or its role in the NSC as obstacles to giving the country extremely high democracy scores since the election of 1983. However, an exclusive focus on the usual explicit variables that are used to identify a democratic transition may mask the subtle ways in which the Turkish military can continue to influence economic decision making. The EU, for instance, raises the possibility that “the armed forces in Turkey continue to exercise influence through a series of informal mechanisms” (Commission of the European Communities 2004, 23). The leading concern is that membership on the National Security Council provides the military with influence over decision making in non-military realms, by virtue of the somewhat elastic definition of security in the constitution such that “it could, if necessary be interpreted as covering almost 2 Our identification strategy thus resembles that of Fisman (2001), who uses health shocks to estimate the value of political connections to the incumbent. 4 every policy area” (Commission of the European Communities 2004, 23). One indication that the military may define its security mandate in exceptionally broad terms comes from the fact that military members of the NSC have felt free to influence debate on a wide assortment of political and social issues via press statements and public speeches (Commission of the European Communities 2004, 23). This makes Turkey an excellent case for econometrically examining if there is a shortfall in the transfer of implicit power following a country’s explicit democratic transition. In our specific application we study the impact on stock market returns of serious ailments affecting the democratically elected Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit in 2001- 2002. We study this period because it provides us with all the elements that are essential for an assessment of whether there is a shortfall in the transfer of implicit power over economic decision making; the presence of a) exogenous shocks to the probability of government survival, b) explicit democracy, c) listed non-defense firms that are linked to the military, and d) significant policy uncertainty surrounding potential government turnover. On the first of these points, the elderly Ecevit’s health travails provide us with the exogenous shocks that are required for identification. On the second, as mentioned above, commonly used measures indicate that this is a period in which Turkey was an explicit democracy with free elections and turnover of chief executives in office. On the third, this is also a period in which the military and its business partners had a controlling interest in firms across a wide range of non-defense industries. (Details are provided later in the paper.) On the fourth, Ecevit’s potential departure raised the possibility of major movement from the policy-making status quo. Ecevit was a staunch secularist, like the military establishment.