The Cognitive Underpinnings of Essentialist Nationalism: Exploring the Role of Identity Fusion and Heuristic Thinking Metodi Siromahov A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of Royal Holloway, University of London. Department of Psychology Royal Holloway, University of London February 11, 2020 2 3 I, Metodi Siromahov, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the work. Abstract This thesis represents an attempt to apply cognitive and social psychological the- ories to the study of two key aspects of nationalism: essentialist thinking and per- ceived collective continuity. It has two general aims: first, to determine whether socio-cognitive theories of group identity and information processing can ac- count for some people’s tendency to perceive national groups as distinct biologi- cal “kinds”, a tendency which contributes to out-group stereotyping and prejudice. The second goal is to integrate identity fusion theory, a promising but still rela- tively under-researched model of group alignment, into already established socio- cognitive theories, specifically psychological essentialism and perceived collective continuity. The thesis contains 9 empirical studies divided into 3 parts. Part I ex- plores the relationships between identity fusion, essentialist thinking, and perceived collective continuity, in a series of correlational and experimental studies. Part II takes a more cognitive approach and tests for an effect of information processing style (intuitive as opposed to analytical) and working memory load on social and na- tional essentialism. Finally, Part III integrates rhetorical and discursive theories of social identity and attempts to bridge the gap with the earlier cognitive approaches. In a final experimental study, the attempt is made to redefine the boundaries of na- tional identity through the use of high-continuity rhetoric. The main conclusion of this thesis is that purely cognitive theories of social alignment cannot, on their own, account for the intuitive appeal of essentialist nationalism, but can still offer important insights in this area when combined with less mechanistic theories of meaning-making and narrative identity. Acknowledgements I would like to thank my supervisor, Prof. Ryan McKay, for his continuing support and encouragement over the last four years, as well as Prof. Hanna Zagefka, for all her help and contributions. I am also very grateful to Dr. Michael Buhrmester for his support and advice on the first two empirical studies in Chapters 4 and 5. Special thanks go to my fellow PhD researches at the Department of Psy- chology, and specifically to Ben Tappin, Katherine O’Lone, Zsuzsanna Dobrontei, Amanda Sjoblom and Nicky Dawson, for all the helpful conversations we have had over the past four years. Finally, this thesis and the entire research project it is based on would not have been possible without Emilia’s unwavering support, for which I am truly grateful. Contents 1 Introduction 19 1.1 Why nationalism? . 19 1.2 Why a psychological approach? . 22 1.3 Aims and structure of the thesis . 24 1.4 Psychological research in the context of the replication crisis . 28 2 Nationalism: A historical perspective 31 2.1 From the Enlightenment to Romanticism . 35 2.2 Early 20th century: Modern sociological theories . 38 2.3 The Marxist tradition . 39 2.4 Primordialism, Perennialism, and Modernism . 41 2.5 Ethnosymbolism . 50 2.6 Common themes . 52 2.7 Conclusion . 54 3 Implicit nationalism: Psychological perspectives 57 3.1 Psychological approaches to the study of nationalism . 57 3.1.1 Nationalism as a social bias . 58 3.1.2 Implicit nationalism as system justification . 60 3.1.3 Imagining the nation . 61 3.1.4 Alignment with social groups: The Social Identity Perspective 79 3.2 Social approaches to the psychology of nationalism . 90 3.2.1 Everyday nationalism . 91 10 Contents 3.2.2 Talking (about) the nation: the rhetorical and discursive ap- proaches . 94 3.2.3 Identity as ideology: a critical sociological approach . 99 3.2.4 McCrone and Bechhofer’s Understanding National Identity . 101 3.2.5 A holistic psychological theory: Identity Process Theory and social representations . 104 3.2.6 Theoretical debates and summary . 108 3.3 A critical re-examinaton of PCC . 111 3.3.1 Social Representations: A Critique of PCC . 115 3.3.2 The problem of valence . 116 3.3.3 The problem of power relations . 117 3.3.4 Continuity/discontinuity – a false dichotomy . 118 3.3.5 Continuity with potential future selves . 120 3.3.6 Summary . 121 I Social Psychological Perspectives 123 4 PCC: Connections with identity fusion and social essentialism 125 4.1 Introduction . 125 4.1.1 PCC and Social Essentialism . 127 4.1.2 PCC and Identity Fusion . 128 4.2 Study 1 . 130 4.2.1 Methods . 130 4.2.2 Results . 132 4.2.3 Discussion . 136 4.3 General discussion . 137 5 Link between fusion and PCC: Mediation analysis 139 5.1 Introduction . 139 5.2 Study 2 . 141 5.2.1 Methods . 141 Contents 11 5.2.2 Results . 143 5.2.3 Discussion . 147 6 Does social essentialism contribute to PCC? 151 6.1 Introduction . 151 6.1.1 Testing for a moderating effect of identity fusion . 152 6.1.2 Manipulating social essentialism . 153 6.2 Study 3: Priming genetic essentialism with an American sample . 154 6.2.1 Methods . 154 6.2.2 Results . 157 6.2.3 Discussion . 159 6.3 Study 4. Priming genetic essentialism with an Indian sample . 160 6.3.1 Methods . 161 6.3.2 Results . 161 6.3.3 Discussion . 163 6.4 General discussion . 164 7 Does PCC foster identity fusion? 165 7.1 Introduction . 165 7.1.1 Neglecting narratives in the study of national continuity . 166 7.1.2 Continuity as a feature of national narratives . 169 7.1.3 Essentialism and collective continuity in national narratives 171 7.1.4 From collective continuity to identity fusion: a moderation model . 173 7.2 Study 5 . 174 7.2.1 Methods . 175 7.2.2 Results . 177 7.2.3 Discussion . 178 12 Contents II Cognitive Perspectives 183 8 Does a heuristic cognitive style predict social essentialism? 185 8.1 Introduction . 185 8.1.1 Dual-process theories of human cognition . 186 8.1.2 From cognitive processes to dispositional thinking styles . 189 8.1.3 The role of cognitive style in essentialist thinking . 190 8.2 Study 6. Cognitive style and essentialism: Experimental study . 191 8.2.1 Methods . 192 8.2.2 Results . 194 8.2.3 Discussion . 194 8.3 Study 7 . 197 8.3.1 Methods . 200 8.3.2 Results . 201 8.3.3 Discussion . 203 8.4 General discussion . 203 9 Does high cognitive load promote national essentialism? 205 9.1 Introduction . 205 9.2 Study 8 . 207 9.2.1 Methods . 207 9.2.2 Results . 210 9.2.3 Discussion . 212 III Narrative Perspectives 215 10 Notes on a narrative approach to nationalism 217 10.1 Structuring identity through narrative . 217 10.1.1 Nuclear episodes and metanarratives . 218 10.1.2 Creative use of the national repertoire . 219 10.1.3 Attributing agency, emotion and cognition . 221 Contents 13 10.1.4 Future directions . 223 11 High-continuity rhetoric in national identity 225 11.1 Introduction . 225 11.1.1 Narratives and the construction of identity . 226 11.1.2 PCC and Social Essentialism . 227 11.1.3 Essentialism in High-Continuity Language . 229 11.1.4 The present study . 230 11.2 Study 9 . 231 11.2.1 Methods . 231 11.2.2 Analysis plan . 237 11.2.3 Results . 240 11.2.4 Discussion . 245 12 General Discussion 249 12.1 Summary of the aims, rationale, and findings . 249 12.2 Findings . 251 12.2.1 Study 1 . 251 12.2.2 Study 2 . 254 12.2.3 Studies 3 and 4 . 257 12.2.4 Study 5 . 259 12.2.5 Studies 6-8 . 263 12.2.6 Study 9 . 265 12.3 Contributions and Limitations . 269 12.3.1 On the peculiarities of British national identity . 272 12.4 Conclusions . 275 12.4.1 Conceptualising essentialism . 276 12.4.2 The role of rhetoric . 277 12.4.3 Precis´ of rhetorical social psychology . 278 12.4.4 Final comments . 280 Appendices 282 14 Contents A Studies 3 and 4: Vignettes 283 A.1 Essentialism condition . 283 A.2 Control condition . 284 B Study 5: Vignettes 287 C Study 9: Vignettes 289 C.1 High continuity rhetoric . 289.