The UNTEA-Equilibrium A Game Theoretical Approach on Dutch Diplomatic Interactions during the Western New Guinea Dispute in Historical Comparative Analysis (1949-1962). MASTER THESIS History of Politics and Society Arjen Koomen 501644 Under the supervision of dr. M. Kuipers Faculty of Humanities June 2020. 2 The UNTEA-Equilibrium Table of Contents Abstract: ............................................................................................................................. 3 I. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 4 1.1 The Stings of Mosquitos .......................................................................................................... 4 1.2 Historiography .......................................................................................................................... 6 1.3 Methodology ............................................................................................................................... 9 1.3.1. Classical Game Theory ................................................................................................... 9 1.3.2. The Theory of Moves (TOM) ......................................................................................... 10 1.3.3. Historical Comparative Analysis ................................................................................ 13 II. Phase One: The Initial State (1946-1954) .............................................................. 15 2.1. New Guinea before 1946 ...................................................................................................... 15 2.2. The emergence of conflict .................................................................................................... 17 2.3. Rising tensions ....................................................................................................................... 19 2.4. The Round Table Conferences (RTC) ................................................................................ 20 2.5. The New Guinea Conferences ............................................................................................ 23 2.6. Phase I in the Theory of Moves .......................................................................................... 25 III. Phase Two: Action-Reaction (1953-1961) ............................................................. 28 3.1. Internationalization .............................................................................................................. 28 3.2. Economic and Administrative development .................................................................... 30 3.3. Preparations for self-determination .................................................................................. 32 3.4. Phase II in the Theory of Moves ........................................................................................ 34 IV. Phase Three: The endgame (1961-1962) ............................................................... 35 4.1. Boiling waters ........................................................................................................................ 35 4.2. Threats of self-determination ............................................................................................. 36 4.3. The UNTEA Equilibrium .................................................................................................... 38 4.4. Phase III in the Theory of Moves ....................................................................................... 39 V. Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 41 Bibliography .................................................................................................................... 43 Word count: 13.321 A. Koomen Master Thesis History of Politics and Society 3 The UNTEA-Equilibrium Abstract: This research aims to provide an answer to why the Dutch government held on to New Guinea from 1949 until 1962 in negotiations with Indonesia. In todays historiography this Dutch clasp on New Guinea is mostly perceived as traumatization after the Dutch lost its holding in the Dutch East Indies. This research opposes the paradigm by stating that the Dutch response was based on rational choices as preferred outcomes were calculated. A game theoretical analysis is used in this research by using the Theory of Moves. This case study argues that the Dutch government took initiative by changing its strategy in providing self-determination for the native population of New Guinea by calculating preferred outcomes and anticipations. In turn the Indonesian government responded to this change of strategy, resulting in international pressure. This pressure led towards a move towards an equilibrium situation as the territory is handed over to the United Nations in 1962. Keywords: Game theory, Theory of Moves, New Guinea Dispute, self-determination, Western Papua, New Guinea, rational diplomacy. A. Koomen Master Thesis History of Politics and Society 4 The UNTEA-Equilibrium I. Introduction 1.1 The Stings of Mosquitos On the 27th of December 1961 the voice of Dutch governor Pieter Platteel could be heard on the radios of the Dutch New-Guinea: 1 You can imagine the situation of the man around whose head the mosquitoes buzz and who is doomed to sit still. In my opinion, this image best describes the feelings of many of you, living in the political tumult around this area. Such a man wants to do something, he wants to go around, but the very first thing he looks for is the mosquito net to put his head around. If one has become irritated enough by all the hum and all those stings, then one will not even see the mosquito net anymore. The events in and around Dutch New Guinea, which we like to call West Papua, are developing quickly and not always pleasant. Especially not because of the ominous and threatening sounds that reach us from the Indonesian side. This metaphor of stinging Indonesian mosquitos summarizes the Dutch paradigm from 1949 until 1962 on its foreign relations with Indonesia: a constant threat, which had to be pacified by different measures and strategies. This paradigm was the result of deteriorating diplomatic relations due to a dispute about a territory called Western New Guinea. This territory was habited by its native Papuan population consisting of tribes as well as an educated urban population, but also Eurasians (Indian Dutchmen). New Guinea used to be part of the colonial Dutch East Indies (1816-1949). Already since its colonization in the 17th century the territory received a special status from the rest of the Indies despite its low economic activity since it was primarily used as a strategic barrier until 1945. This status became more important when from 1945 until 1949, a diplomatic and armed struggle emerged between the newly proclaimed Republic of Indonesia and the Dutch Empire, resulting in both independence for Indonesia and a long-lasting dispute between both nations on the legitimacy of Western New Guinea. 1 Drooglever and Schouten, “Betrekkingen.” A. Koomen Master Thesis History of Politics and Society 5 The UNTEA-Equilibrium While negotiations between Indonesia and the Netherlands started as early as 1946, the issue of New Guinea became more important during the so-called Dutch- Indonesian Round Table Conferences. During these negotiations a agreement on the transfer of sovereignty is agreed as international pressure and armed struggle called for a solution. However, the conference and a failure to find a compromise on the territory of New Guinea increasingly contributed to rising tensions between Dutch and Indonesian diplomats. This was caused by different interpretations and holding on to own outlooks of both parties on the matter of the ownership of the territory. The strategies on legitimizing the territory as part of its nation primarily stayed the same in the Indonesian case: the nation demanded the handover of the territory on the arguments of geography, nationalism and its historic grounds. This would be achieved by diplomatic pressure if not later by force. The hold on to this strategy was the result of its Indonesian president reign spanning from the early 50s until the late 60s. The Dutch stance on the legitimization of the territory however was subject to a transformation in the late 1950s as governments changed. The Dutch government took initiative to change its strategy in handling the Indonesian hostile pressure. During the early 1950s, a colonial-type administration was preferred, in which Eurasians would be stimulated to develop and administrate the territory, while incorporating the territory in the Kingdom of the Netherlands. During the late 1950s, when tensions were on its peak, this policy would slowly transform into a policy of developing the territory into its own democratic nation-state in which the native Papuans would administrate the territory. The diplomatic game between the Netherlands and Indonesia in the case study of New Guinea provides an outlook on the politics and methods of diplomacy in an era of decolonization. This game shows why actors change their diplomatic strategy or remain the same on the basis of a preferred outcome and an anticipation of moves of the opponent. In the case of New Guinea, the Dutch government would commence the game as player I as it took the initiative in changing its strategy in order to break the deadlock of negotiations. This was achieved by