Life in Common: Distributive Ecological Justice on a Shared Earth A thesis submitted to the University of Manchester for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in the Faculty of Humanities 2018 Anna Wienhues School of Social Sciences Blank page 2 Contents Section Page List of Tables 4 Abstract 5 Lay Abstract 6 Declaration 7 Copyright Statement 8 Dedication 9 Acknowledgements 10 Introduction 12 1. Biocentric Ecological Justice in Context 29 Part 1 2. Common Habitation of the Earth: Justice and Ecological Space 53 3. Against Humanity’s ‘Original Ownership’ of the Earth 81 Part 2 4. The Capabilities Approach and Ecological Justice: A Critique 107 5. Sharing the Earth: A Biocentric Account of Ecological Justice 130 6. Biodiversity Loss: An Injustice? 160 Part 3 7. Sharing Ecological Space: Demands of Environmental and Ecological Justice 183 8. Just Conservation: Scarcity and the Half-Earth Proposal 221 Conclusion 254 Bibliography 262 75,723 words 3 List of Tables Table Page 1. Summary of the levels of scarcity and ecological and environmental justice demands 203 4 Abstract The University of Manchester Anna Wienhues Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) Life in Common: Distributive Ecological Justice on a Shared Earth January 2018 This thesis lies in the overlap of environmental political theory and environmental ethics. More specifically, it focuses on the intersection between distributive ecological justice –justice to nature – and environmental justice – distributing environmental ‘goods’ between humans. Against the backdrop of the current sixth extinction crisis, I address the question of what constitutes a just usage of ecological space. I define ecological space as encompassing environmental resources, benefits provided by ecosystems and physical spaces and when considering its just usage I not only take into account claims to ecological space held by other humans but also the demands of justice with regards to nonhuman living beings such as animals and plants. In order to address my overall research question, I look at three areas of inquiry in particular. My first area of concern is questions around how environmental justice can be made compatible with a theory of ecological justice. Here I defend a specific definition of ecological space and provide a critique of theories of justice that are based on the view that humanity has an ‘original ownership’ of the Earth. Secondly, I defend a biocentric approach to distributive ecological justice based on all living beings constituting together a ‘community of fate’, and I additionally clarify the relationship between justice and biodiversity loss. Lastly, considering that the current situation of life on Earth does not resemble the circumstance of ‘moderate scarcity’ where all needs could theoretically be met (as usually assumed by the most influential theories of justice), I inquire into how demands of environmental and ecological justice differ in different circumstances of scarcity, and what could be considered a ‘just compromise’ between these two domains of justice. I then apply these last considerations to the ‘Half-Earth proposal’ for creating large protected areas for nonhuman species, which has been advocated by E. O. Wilson and other ecologists as a means to slow the current rate of anthropogenic species extinctions. In essence, the Half-Earth proposal might be ambitious, but I argue there are good reasons to consider it as one building block of a (distributively) just future for life on Earth. 5 Lay Abstract In this thesis I argue for applying the language of justice not only to human relations with other humans, but also to human relationships with all living organisms such as animals, plants and bacteria. The reason for this is that humans have to share the Earth not only with each other, but also with all other life forms. All living beings need adequately large habitats with functioning ecosystems in order to be able to live a flourishing life, but currently, humanity undermines the ability of many other species to do so. After developing this theoretical framework, I apply it to the sixth mass extinction crisis, which is an environmental problem that receives considerability less attention than, for example, climate change. In the context of a human-caused mass extinction of species on Earth, I inquire into how the human use of the Earth’s resources and spaces constitutes an injustice to nonhuman organisms and how this could be reconciled with also doing justice to other human beings. These are difficult questions, but they need to be answered if one wants to find a just compromise between human and nonhuman needs on a shared Earth. By applying my arguments in this thesis, conservation activists should be able to argue that the frequency of species extinctions is not just morally lamentable but also an injustice that needs to be stopped. In practice, this provides the needed philosophical support for the ‘Half-Earth proposal’ for creating large protected areas for nonhuman species, which has been advocated by E. O. Wilson and other ecologists as a means to slow the current rate of human-caused species extinctions. 6 Declaration No portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning. 7 Copyright Statement i. The author of this thesis (including any appendices and/or schedules to this thesis) owns certain copyright or related rights in it (the “Copyright”) and s/he has given The University of Manchester certain rights to use such Copyright, including for administrative purposes. ii. Copies of this thesis, either in full or in extracts and whether in hard or electronic copy, may be made only in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (as amended) and regulations issued under it or, where appropriate, in accordance with licensing agreements which the University has from time to time. This page must form part of any such copies made. iii. The ownership of certain Copyright, patents, designs, trademarks and other intellectual property (the “Intellectual Property”) and any reproductions of copyright works in the thesis, for example graphs and tables (“Reproductions”), which may be described in this thesis, may not be owned by the author and may be owned by third parties. Such Intellectual Property and Reproductions cannot and must not be made available for use without the prior written permission of the owner(s) of the relevant Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions. iv. Further information on the conditions under which disclosure, publication and commercialisation of this thesis, the Copyright and any Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions described in it may take place is available in the University IP Policy (see http://documents.manchester.ac.uk/DocuInfo.aspx?DocID=24420), in any relevant Thesis restriction declarations deposited in the University Library, The University Library’s regulations (see http://www.library.manchester.ac.uk/about/regulations/) and in The University’s policy on Presentation of Theses 8 In memory of Luigia Ragagnin 9 Acknowledgements First of all, I owe a great deal of thanks to my supervisors: Dr Sherilyn MacGregor and Professor John O’Neill. Throughout the years they have supported me with invaluable academic guidance and provided compassionate and patient support throughout the process of writing this thesis. I would especially like to thank Dr MacGregor for asking me to transfer from Keele University to the University of Manchester after her appointment at Manchester and facilitating my transition between institutions, as well as her flexibility on my heavily changing the content and methodology of my research. This refocusing of my thesis would also not have been as smooth without Professor O’Neill’s extensive expertise in environmental philosophy. I also would like to thank Professor John Vogler for taking over, on short-notice, supervision responsibilities during my last months at Keele University before I transferred to the University of Manchester. Many thanks are also owed to Ralph Evans for continued and extensive support with the English language. Many thanks are also owed to Professor Sorin Baiasu, Professor John Horton (both Keele University), Dr Christian Schemmel and Dr Paul Tobin (both University of Manchester) for their helpful and supportive comments on my research project during three annual reviews. Additional thanks are owed to Dr Liam Shields and Dr Jack Winter for their helpful comments on chapter three and to Linnea Luuppala for her encouraging and helpful comments on a full draft of this thesis. It is also important to note that this PhD research has been made possible with funding from the department of Politics, Philosophy, International Relations & Environment (SPIRE) at Keele University and also from the Sustainable Consumption Institute (SCI) at the University of Manchester. Moreover, I would like to thank the other PhD students at SPIRE, the SCI and the Manchester Centre for Political Theory (MANCEPT) for interesting discussions and support throughout this process. Especially I have to thank Adam Swinbank, Steffen Hirth and Harald Wieser for making day-to-day office life a communal experience. Finally, over the years I have presented chapters of this thesis at several conferences and seminar series, and I owe thanks to the helpful questions and comments of the audiences on all occasions. In particular I am thankful for the friendly support of the members of MANCEPT, the panellists of the ‘Relating to Nature’ workshop at the 2017 MANCEPT workshops and the doctoral researchers of the Leverhulme Climate Justice programme at the University of Reading. 10 Blank page 11 Introduction ‘If we choose the path of destruction, the planet will continue to descend irreversibly into the Anthropocene Epoch, the biologically final age in which the planet exists almost exclusively by, for, and of ourselves. I prefer to call this option by another name, the Eremocene, the Age of Loneliness’ (Wilson 2016, p.