chapter three Japan's Double-Pronged Strategy: Military and Non-Military The Japanese approaches to China of I897-18g8 mirrored an emerging double-pronged strategy for binding China to Japan. One prong was military, the other non-military. Each prong in­ volved separate constellations of actors, with little overlap. The military orchestrated its initiatives through its efficient Army General Staff, or Sanbo Honbu. The non-military had no com­ parable coordinating center, since the Japanese government was some years away from having (or even trying to formulate) a unified China policy. Despite the lack of coordination, military and non-military ele­ ments were inspired by similar sets of motives. These included national pride, national self-interest, and a sense of cultural affinity and indebtedness to China. In conversations with Chi­ nese, the Japanese tirelessly invoked their two countries' mutual interests. MILITARY STRATEGY Kamio Mitsuomi exemplifies a military man who spoke frankly to the Chinese about Japanese strategic motivations. In late Decem­ ber 1897, invited back to Wuhan to speak to Zhang Zhidong, Kamio asserted on behalf of Kawakami Soroku that Japan "urgently desires alliances with Great Britain and with China as a means of resisting Russia and Germany, and as a strategy for self­ protection. "1 In this same vein, in mid February 18g8, Kamio, U tsunomiya, and a third officer, Kajikawa Jiitaro (d. 1902), 2 also cited by Wang Wenshao for courtesies rendered, met with Hunan­ based reformer Tan Sitong (1866-18g8). After expressing regrets about the war with China, they went on to propose a league or Military Strategy union between China and Japan, and to offer Japanese assistance to China. In so doing, they argued, Japan would only be acting in its own best interest. 3 "These Japanese have enumerated the advantages and disadvan­ tages [of cooperation] most lucidly," Zhang Zhidong wrote in his 2 January 1898 report to the Zongli Yamen. "It seems very much in our best inte~est. "4 The man writing these words was a cautious realist. From years of service at difficult posts, he had developed a national vision. As Governor General of Guangdong and Guangxi provinces during the Sino-French War of 1884-1885, Zhang had provided able logistical support to this war lost by China. That loss converted Zhang into a committed "self-strengthener." Hence­ forth he devoted great energy to local military, educational, and industrial enterprises, first from his base at Guangzhou and after 1889 from his new base at Wuhan.5 In the war with Japan of1894-1895, Zhang was again mobilized into action. First from Wuhan and then from Nanjing as Acting Governor General of Liang:Jiang while Liu Kunyi was on tempo­ rary military duty in the north, Zhang issued a steady stream of proposals and support measures in defense of Chinese interests from the Yellow Sea in the north to the Yangzi Valley in central China, all the way to Taiwan in the south. 6 Wartime defeat spurred him yet again to greater effort. Almost immediately after the war, he proceeded with earlier plans to build a Self-Strengthening Army (Ziqiang Jun), founding first the modern Jiangnan Officer Academy Qiangnan Lushi Xuetang; 1895-1909) at Nanjing, and then the Hubei Military Preparatory School (Hubei Wubei Xue­ tang; 1896-1906) at Wuchang. Attributing Japan's military victory to its adoption of the German military model, Zhang proposed in a memorial approved on 2 February 1896 that China likewise adopt the German model and found new military academies. 7 In line with this, he modeled his own military training programs on that of Germany, hiring thirty-five German officers and advisers for his Nanjing academy and six for his academy at Wuchang.8 At Wuchang after 18g6, however, the arrogant attitudes and domineer­ ing manner of certain German advisers prompted student out­ bursts and staff rebellions, leading in 1898 to at least one forced resignation of a senior Chinese military school administrator. 9 25 .