ME, MYSELF & MINE The Scope of Ownership _________________________________ PETER MARTIN JAWORSKI _________________________________ May, 2012 Committee: Fred Miller (Chair) David Shoemaker, Steven Wall, Daniel Jacobson, Neil Englehart ii ABSTRACT This dissertation is an attempt to defend the following thesis: The scope of legitimate ownership claims is much more narrow than what Lockean liberals have traditionally thought. Firstly, it is more narrow with respect to the particular claims that are justified by Locke’s labour- mixing argument. It is more difficult to come to own things in the first place. Secondly, it is more narrow with respect to the kinds of things that are open to the ownership relation. Some things, like persons and, maybe, cultural artifacts, are not open to the ownership relation but are, rather, fit objects for the guardianship, in the case of the former, and stewardship, in the case of the latter, relationship. To own, rather than merely have a property in, some object requires the liberty to smash, sell, or let spoil the object owned. Finally, the scope of ownership claims appear to be restricted over time. We can lose our claims in virtue of a change in us, a change that makes it the case that we are no longer responsible for some past action, like the morally interesting action required for justifying ownership claims. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: Much of this work has benefited from too many people to list. However, a few warrant special mention. My committee, of course, deserves recognition. I’m grateful to Fred Miller for his many, many hours of pouring over my various manuscripts and rough drafts. I’m similarly grateful to Steven Wall, David Shoemaker, Dan Jacobson, and Neil Englehart who round out my committee. Jonathan Miller, while not on my committee, effectively functioned like a member. Terrence Watson commented on every part of this dissertation, and was a sounding-board for all of the ideas contained within. David Faraci also listened patiently, and helped me sort out many arguments, especially on the topic of ownership, guardianship and stewardship, the section on the no-new-reasons condition of ownership in particular. Jacob Sparks and Mark Herman were lovely people who listened very patiently and helped out whenever they could. As did Mark Wells. Many of my students, but in particular those in my upper-year seminar entitled “Property, Persons, and Things,” let me talk about my dissertation frequently, and helped me get clearer on the arguments that had holes. The various students who made up our dissertation group, including Ben Dyer, Christoph Hanish, Nico Maloberti, Sangeeta Sangha, Brandon Byrd, Pam Philips, and so on, all played some role in helping me make my arguments, and improved my dissertation a great deal. I have conferenced several chapters of my dissertation. I am grateful to Mara from the University of Chicago whose comments at the Midwest Political Science Conference were thorough and very helpful. Students at the College of Wooster, Aaron Novick and Sean Hunter in particular, spent a great deal of time talking with me about my dissertation, and helping it become better. Garrett Thomson and Ronald Hustwit at the College were also significantly involved, and lent their ear every time I came up with what I thought was a good idea (I wasn’t always wrong about the evaluation). Pete Boettke, Pete Leeson, Chris Coyne, and Tyler Cowen at George Mason University gave several helpful comments when they invited me to give a talk for their workshop in Politics, Philosophy & Economics. I’m afraid I don’t remember the name of the philosopher who spent a great deal of time talking to me about my dissertation when I presented at the University of Warwick. Her comments led to more than a few changes, and I’m afraid she’ll have to be anonymous, in spite of the debt of gratitude that I owe her. The first part has benefited a great deal from Roland Hall, editor at the Journal of Locke Studies. The last part benefited from two anonymous referees at Ethics who, while ultimately rejecting my paper for publication, still thought there was something important there worth commenting upon at great length. The final part was written while I was a Summer Research Fellow with the Institute for Humane Studies. Their support was critical. William Glod not only guided me through that part of my dissertation, but provided valuable commentary on many parts of this dissertation besides. He iv didn’t have to, it was supererogatory, and so I’m deeply grateful. A draft of the final part of my dissertation was thoroughly looked over by many people, including Marya Schechtman who was under no obligation to spend as much time as she did helping a student from some other school do work on something that was not her own, and to provide enormously helpful comments and encouragement. It’s people like Marya who remind me why I want to be a philosopher more than anything else. I am also grateful to my family, my sister Agata in particular, for patiently humouring me. My sister was eager to read what I had written, and she offered much in the way of criticism, commentary, and words of encouragement. She’s a good egg, that one. All of the above, in fact, are good eggs. It is traditional to suggest that all errors are the fault of the author, that anything that is good is the result of some collaboration and some comments from people who helped a great deal. That’s traditional, but it’s surely false. What’s true is that what is good and what is bad in this dissertation is the result not only of me, but of a great number of people who either stepped in when they should have, or did not step in when, really, they should have. I put in a lot of labour, but so did others. I take full ownership for this work, good and bad, but the genesis, progression, and particular details of the ideas contained within are anyone’s guess, really. v CONTENTS INTRODUCTION. 2 PART 1 THE METAPHYSICS OF LOCKE’S LABOUR VIEW 1. THE LABOUR VIEW . 4 2. OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES . 7 2.1 THE SHALLOW LABOUR VIEW . 13 2.1.1 THE STRONG IDENTITY CLAIM . 13 2.1.2 THE WEAK IDENTITY CLAIM . 15 2.2 THE DEEP LABOUR VIEW . 16 2.2.1 PURPOSE . 17 2.2.2 VALUE/PRODUCTIVITY . 17 2.2.3 PROJECTS . 21 2.2.4 TRANSFER . 26 3. FURTHER OBJECTIONS . 30 3.1. ATTENDING TO Q . 33 3.1.1. THE RECIPROCITY CLAIM . 36 3.1.2. THE EMPATHY CLAIM . 36 3.1.3. THE ENFORCEMENT CLAIM . 37 3.2. THE CARBON-COPY IMMEDIATE REPLACER . 38 4. CONCLUSION . 40 vi 4.1. WHAT’S LEFT OF THE LABOUR VIEW? . 42 PART 2 OWNERSHIP, GUARDIANSHIP, STEWARDSHIP 5. RES NULLA . 44 5.1. THE PUZZLE . 46 5.2. MISSION & METHOD . 47 5.3. HONORE’S ACCOUNT AS A BUNDLE . 50 6. NO NEW REASONS . 54 6.1 LIABILITY & THE DUTY OF CARE . 56 6.2 RISK . 60 6.3 INCREASING RISK . 63 7. SELF-OWNERSHIP . 69 7.1 THE CIRCULARITY PROBLEM . 71 7.2 CLEARER CONCEPTUAL CONFUSIONS . 72 7.3 SOVEREIGNTY . 75 8. GUARDIANSHIP . 77 8.1 THE PARENT-CHILD RELATION . 81 8.1.1. TENURE OVER CHILDREN COMES WITH DUTIES . 83 8.1.1.1. “OWNING” CHILDREN IS DISTURBING . 86 8.1.2. MARKET-ALIENABILITY . 87 8.1.3. SELF-SEEKINGNESS . 91 vii 8.1.4. THE LIBERTY TO DESTROY . 92 8.2. GUARDIANSHIP . 93 8.3. OBJECTION: GENERAL BACKGROUND DUTIES . 95 9. STEWARDSHIP . 100 9.1. CULTURAL ARTIFACTS . 102 9.2. WHY CARE ABOUT ORIGINALS? . 107 9.2.1. FIRSTNESS: CITY OF ATLANTIS . 112 9.2.2. INDEPENDENT DISCOVERY: OBSCURE ARTIST . 113 9.2.3. INFLUENCE: MIRRORVERMEER . 115 9.3. CONCLUSION . 118 PART 3 THE PROBLEM OF THE CONTINUITY OF CLAIMS 10. OWNERSHIP OVER TIME . 120 10.1. THE BROADEST POSSIBLE FORMULA . 121 10.2. MOTIVATING THE PROBLEM . 123 10.2.1. RESPONSIBILITY . 124 10.3. THE OPTIONS . 127 10.3.1. MORALLY-RELEVANT METAPHYSICAL UNITS . 127 10.4. IDENTITY-RELEVANT VIEWS (VIEWS TRACKING IDENTITY) . 131 10.4.1. IDENTITY OF LIVING HUMAN BEING VIEW . 132 10.4.2. THE IDENTITY OF PERSONS VIEW . 135 10.4.3. THE IDENTITY OF SELVES VIEW . 138 viii 11. JUSTICE IN TRANSFER . 143 11.1. VIEWS TRACKING JUSTICE IN TRANSFER . 143 11.2. THE TACIT TRANSFER . 145 11.2.1. THE CONDITIONAL TRANSFER . 147 11.3. THE INHERITANCE VIEW . 150 12. INHERITANCE . 153 12.1. MY DEATH AND MY STUFF . 153 12.2. SYMMETRY OF HARM . 160 12.3. HARMS & WRONGINGS . 162 12.3.1. BACK TO THE INHERITANCE VIEW . 163 13. VIEWS TRACKING SOMETHING OTHER THAN RESPONSIBILITY . 165 14. CONCLUSION . 166 BIBLIOGRAPHY . 169 1 ME, MYSELF & MINE: THE SCOPE OF OWNERSHIP We teach them not to notice the different senses of the possessive pronoun, the finely graded differences that run from "my boots" through "my dog", "my servant", "my wife", "my father", "my master" and "my country", to "my God". They can be taught to reduce all these senses to that of "my.