1, PIAGET»S GENICTIC EPISTEMOLOGY; A THEORETICAL CRITIQUE OF MA.IN EPISTEMIC CONCEPTS LESLIE SMITH A thesis submitted at the University of Leicester for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. December 1981 School of Education, University of Leicester. UMI Number: U323106 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Disscrrlation Publishing UMI U323106 Published by ProQuest LLC 2015. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 -îM-esri , .7 ' 11. Recognition.I'm pleased by it, of course, but it's pretty catastrophic when I see how I'm understood. JEAN PIAGET The great man who at any time seems to be launching some new line of thought is simply the point of intersection or synthesis of ideas which have been elaborated by a continuous process of cooperation. JEAN PIAGET From the amoeba to Einstein, the growth of knowledge is always the same. KARL POPPER How difficult it isi How much more difficult psychology is than physics. ALBERT EINSTEIN 111. Foreword My own view of the work of Jean Piaget is that it embodies an exciting, novel and challenging conception of human knowledge and that his theory possesses a comprehensive breadth of vision that makes it a major intellectual achievement, I mention ray personal view at the outset, not in the expectation that it is necessarily shared by others but rather because it is my personal view, one which is not a view that others have to share to want to read further in this study. As it happens, I started my doctoral research with ambivalent views about the achievements of Piaget’s theory. I soon found, however, that my understanding of Piaget's theory was completely inadequate. The present study represents my attempt to repair this deficiency. I have tried to let Piaget "speak for himself" in those sections which deal with his theory. Passages which tax the ingenuity of the reader abound in his writings. Sometimes, however, Piaget writes with an eloquence and pregnance of thought and Margaret Boden's advice "read Piaget" well repays the effort expended in establishing the finer points of his theory. It will be apparent that my text is replete with references and there are two reasons why this is so. One reason is because many studies of Piaget are content barely to note the title of a book or paper. The other reason is because if my interpretation of Piaget's views is accepted, or rejected, it is important to know the precise source in the "library" of Piagetian writings. Readers who prefer to have at the outset a synoptic guide to the present study are invited to read the preview in section 1.1 or the review in 10.1. Since this is a study of Piaget's theory, I have attributed to him alone views which are, in part, the product of work undertaken IV, with his colleagues and associates. My practice has convenience, rather than accuracy, in its favour and I extend my apologies to Piaget's co-workers if their efforts are passed, over in silence, A good many people, at different universities and conferences, have been kind enough to join argument with me: I sincerely thank them for their interest, suggestions and, most important of all, objections. Naturally, I have wanted to have the last word as to what my own views should be. There are, however, two people that I especially wish to mention for their contribution to my research. Derek Wright supervised the whole of my research and I have benefitted from the inspiration, support and interest that he has generously given to me. It was his writings that initially aroused, a decade ago, my interest in psychology. Any present understanding that I have of Piaget's theory is now due primarily to the example of sympathetic elucidation combined with critical evaluation set by him. The misunderstanding that remains is, of course, mine. I thank him warmly and commend him to others, I doubt whether I could have started or completed this research without the encouragement, patience and understanding of ray wife, I thank her - what's more she did the typing as well! PUGET'S GENETIC EPISTEMOLOGY; A THEORETICAL CRITIQUE OF MAIN EPISTEMIC CONCEPTS CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 Aim of Study 1.2 Methodology of Study CHAPTER 2 raOBLEMS OF EPISTEMOl.OGY 2.1 Introduction 14 2.2 Reason and Experience 15 2.3 Piaget's Objection to Philosophical Epistemology 23 2.4 Piaget's Genetic Epistemology 36 2.5 Necessity in Piaget's Theory 40 2.6 Conclusion 48 CHAPTER 3 OBSERVABLE KNOWLEDGE 3.1 Introduction 50 3.2 Piaget and the Mind-Body Problem 51 3.3 The Copy Theory of Knowledge 54 3.4 Normative Facts 60 3.5 Observable Knowledge: Perception 65 3.6 Observable Knowledge: Consciousness 71 CHAPTER 4 COGNITIVE STRUCTURliS 4.1 Introduction 80 4.2 Stages in the Growth of Knowledge 81 4.3 Action 89 4.4 Cognitive Structures 96 4.5 Action-Schemes 100 4.6 Operational Schemes 107 CHAPTER 5 EQUILIBRATION 5.1 Introduction 119 5.2 Sub-Processes of Equilibration 120 5.3 Equilibratory Models 135 5.4 Abstraction and Generalisation 140 5.5 Conclusion 146 CHAPTER 6 THE ATTRIBUTION OF OPERATIONAL KNOWLEDGE 6.1 Introduction 151 6.2 Language and Operational Knowledge 152 6.3 Case-Study: Transitivity 165 6.4 Case-Study: Inclusion 176 6.5 Conclusion 184 CHAPTER 7 THE SOCIAL SUBJECT 7.1 Introduction 186 7.2 The Social Objection 188 7.3 The Solitary Knower 198 CIRPTim 8 THE INFANT SUBJECT 8.1 Introduction 208 8.2 The Copernican Revolution 209 8.3 The Intentionality of Perception 218 8.4 Observation and the Infant 225 8.5 Representation and the Infant 228 8.6 Reflective Abstraction and the Infant 232 8.7 Action-Coordination in Infancy 234 8.8 Conclusion 237 CHAPTER 9 EQUILIBR/VTION AND NECESSITY , 9.1 Introduction 241 9.2 Necessary Conditions and Knowledge-Acquisition 242 9.3 Understanding Necessity 245 9.4 Necessity for Equilibration 249 vi. CHAPTER 10 CONCLUSION 10,1 Main Conclusions 256 APPENDIX A MISTRANSLATION 2?0 REFERENCES 283 1. (1.1) INTRODUCTION (l.l) Aim of Study What is the relation between logic and knowledge? The easy way to answer this question is to construe it as a question about the content of knowledge, for there would be general assent to the claim that nobody can have knowledge of that which runs counter to logic. Nobody can simultanaoualy know both of a pair of contradictory statements, for example, and so conformity to logic is an essential prerequisite of that which knowledge is knowledge of* There is a different way, however, in which the question might be construed, for the question might arise about knowing rather than the content of what is known. Taken in this way, the question is perplexing and difficult for it is not obvious whether and how logic has any application to the process of knowledge-acquisition, Jean Piaget's theory of genetic epistemology construes the question about the relation of logic and knowledge in this second sense and its primary concern is to show the point of application of logical norms when a subject acquires knowledge. Both the problem and proposed answer have a forbidding degree of complexity as well as powerful fascination. The present study is a contribution to the continuing discussion of Piaget's theory of knowledge. Even though nothing in the sequel will disconfirm the claim that Piaget has made 'the greatest single contribution' (Wright & Taylor 1970, p.49?) to the explanation of how intelligent thought arises, it is no easy task to determine the exact nature of that contribution and,in consequence, its value. The central aim sub-divides into three objectives which can now be stated as a preview to the discussion in the chapters ahead:-. Objective 1, The first objective is to show how Placet's genetic epistemology has its source in philosophy and, in particular, in the theory of 2. (1.1) Immanuel Kant. Piaget's theory has its roots in the classical debate between rationalist and empiricist philosophers about the role of reason and experience in knowledge and especially in Kant's mediating theory of knowledge. In chapter 2 a brief review of this debate is.followed by a statement of the distinctive aspects of Kant's theory, aspects which are taken over with modification by Piaget. Piaget's central objection to theories such as Kant's is illustrated, namely that it is an empirical question as to which logical norms are used by a subject in the acquisition of knowledge. Genetic epistemology is proposed by Piaget to be a study that provides an empirical resolution to philosophical problems. Grounds for the legitimacy of this proposal, together with a rebuttal of the objection that any such study is incoherent, are provided, Piaget's theory is schematically formulated as a theory which attempts to state empincally necessary conditions of a subject's knowledge of logical necessity which occurs by a process of equilibration that is necessarily constructive. In short, the first objective is to show how Piaget's theory is one that has philosophical antecedents and psychological consequences.