i li1'it/i’ 1 L A ' . n G G U C . ' . j G A i i) ' U i .-D I A A.. D i i iij 1 D.i a AGACiJG. : A i OL.i.Til CAL AUAi.YS l.'S D 1 SSLKTAT.J ON. I resented in Partial Ful fillmen I of ehe Roqu j i-omen t s fur the Degree Doetoi' of Philosophy in uhe Graduate School of the Ohio Stat.e Uni versity By CHARLIE LYONS JR., ii. A., A. W. The Ohio State University 1956 Approved by? ■ £ . m z . y u ^ Adviser Department of Political Science AC1C. GW L E D G E J IE E '!'S -li.is sci!tly was made unde;' the superv »sion o f Dr. E. Allen helms, Pi'oi'essu)' uf Political Science, the Chio State University. The writer is extremely grateful i'or i.he critical and constructive advice and assistance of the members of the Supervisory Conuui ttee at the Ohio State Universi ty and of his advisers at the Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Poona, India. Special thanks and appreciation should go to the following persons: Dr. E. Allen Helms Professor of Political Science The Ohio State University Dr. Louis Nemzer Associate Professor of Political Science The Ohio State University Dr. ICazuo Kawai Associate Professor of Political Science The Ohio State University Dr. D. R. Gadgil, Director Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics Poona, India ^ ‘ Dr. N. V. Sovani, Assistant Director Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics Poena, India The writer would also like to acknowledge a debt of gratitude to Mr. Chunilal Sharma and Mr. Krishna Gopal of the All India Congress Committee*s press department, with­ out whose help much of the materials on the Indian press might not have been secured. And a special thanks to ii iii Mrs. Mary A. Hobdy of Grambling College who labored so conscientiously to put the manuscript in its final form. This writer*s greatest debt of gratitude is owed to his wife, Rosa, whose loyalty, devotion, perseverance, and continuous encouragement have made the completion of this task possible. AMERICAN ECONOMIC AID TO INDIA AMD THE INDIA: REACTION : A 10L I T I CAIN ANALYSIS Table of Con i on i CNATTER I. Statement vN ’He i :'< i ■ ! II, Nn:i led States Foreign Policy and Foreign Ass.i stance to India ...................... 1'ost war Evo 1111ion oP Uni ted Statas Foreign Policy Point Four in United States Foreign Policy III. American Assistance to India 1949-54 World Bank Loans and Services Point Four and Mutual Security Assistance Emergency Food Grain Loan United States Voluntary Agencies1 Assi tance IV. Some Historical and Cultura Bases of Indian Foreign Policy............ 89 Indiafs Colonial History and Aver’sion to Imperialism Some Basic Concepts of Indian Nationalism The Religious Factor and Gandhian Philosophy Some Basic Tenets of Postwar Indian Foreign.policy iv v ClfAFTE.i 'Indian Coverm. cut Il.l j oy a n d Ai..ericar,> Ass;i stance ............................... 1 J Feriod uf the .(ntor:i n: Gcvernr.r;:-.''-. Pci'.L.;d i id i:i' Lo Aid Period S.Lneo Aid VI. liaj o i• Po 1 x tica.1 Pa>' ties on Aiiiericar; Assistaiicc to India................... 157 The Political Pai’ty System in Jr;d:i a Reaction to American Assistance The Congress Party The Bharatiya Jan Sangh The Praja Socialist Party The Communist Party of India VII. The Indian Press of American Assistance...183 The Non-Communist Press and American Assistance Press Comment on the Indo-American Technical Cooperation Agreement The Communist and Pro-Communist Press The Business Press VIII. Conclusions 223 ( suroy ,!3,t sputr^r) spi°TA OAT^B.T^ffuioo • -j- r> rqe.v s s n : !V.:, .-so .i.pn CHAPTER I STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM The Western World over the last several centuries has evolved methods of production and of social organization by which it has been able to provide food, clothing, shelter, health, education, and leisure for the common man to a de­ gree never approached by any past civilization. Peoples outside the Western World, however, have shared only in minor degree in the material and social progress of these centuries. Ancient ways of making a living and ancient poverty have remained. From the point of view of many of these peoples the West’s modern development has meant mainly conquest and foreign rule. Today we face a new situation which poses a decisive test for Western civilization. The future of the underde­ veloped countries of Asia, Africa, and the Americas is a vital matter for the future of Western civilization, in­ cluding, of course, the security and the way of life of the American people. Economic development of these areas in cooperation with the West is a necessary part of the con­ ditions for Western survival and for the survival in the world of some of the West’s important contributions to hu­ man progress. Yet accompanying the post-war efforts of the more highly developed countries (especially the United States) to help the underdeveloped peoples to expand education, increase food production, improve agriculture, raise incomes, and promote community progress and welfare are grave dangers and difficulties. Most of these newly independent countries have just emerged from colonial control. What effect, if any, might this have upon their thinking with regard to development plans of the western nations? Can we assume the ready transferability of techniques and practices of development, and cultural patterns from one culture to another? What is good for Americans may not be good for or acceptable to Indians. The bridging of this cultural gulf provides the greatest challenge to those who would endeavor to provide new modes and techniques by which peace, free­ dom, and well-being might be secured. There are many problems involved in the American effort to assist India in its developmental efforts. American assistance to India as an aspect of the large-scale assistance program which the United States has initiated throughout various parts of the world and the Indian reaction to that American assistance have occasioned much debate in the United States. India*s supposed attitude toward the United States and its supposed reaction to American aid have caused some sections of American opinion to question strongly the advisability of continuing aid to that country. Indeed, there is a point of view in the United States which favors discontinuance of all aid to India unless or until India agrees to perform certain acts specified by the government of the United States. There are those wlio would use as standards for judging Indian reaction such things as whether the Indian government in gratitude for receiving American aid is willing to help the United States fight commumism and communist agression, to lift any restrictions on certain strategic materials, agree to vote with the United States and the Western nations in the United Nations, compliment the United States occasionally on the aid which it gives, and "stop applauding Russia anytime Russia does some insignificant* thing like when Russia sold 50*000 tons 1 of wheat to India." Those who adhere to this position base their stand on certain premises, whether or not they realize it, which may be crystallized into a certain pattern of thinking. As applied to India one might infer from the remarks of these critics that they would favor India becoming a sort of junior partner in the American scheme of collective security and that the policies of the Indian government should be the same as those of the United States. It might further be inferred that they believe the United States has the power to determine whether India develops, or what course it will take if it does; and that by withholding aid which 1— Congressional Record: 82nd Congress. 1st Session: Vol• 97,Part IV.(May 23, 1951), p. 5747* Statementsmade by Representatives Allen(Illinois), Maybank(S.C.) and Coac (Georgia). 4 India is presumed to need so badly, its government can be persuaded to come over into the American camp. Such viewpoints are based on some far-reaching assumptions and which naturally raise serious and central questions which shall be examined in some detail in this dissertation. The first of these assumptions relates to the Indian culture and background. They assume, either consciously or unconsciously, that the Indian culture and society are much like Western culture and societies and are sufficiently adaptable to allow India, like Western countries, to abandon its neutral position and move into the anti­ communist camp if the Indian leaders are truly grateful for American aid. They also assume that Indian history, the background of Indian leaders and the forces and factors which go into the making of the Indian scheme of values and modes of thinking are close enough to those of the West to make it relatively easy for the Indian government to make the kind of transition which they desire and suggest. Are we really dealing with people whose culture, and origin are basically similar to those of the West and do we readily understand their position and are we able to grasp something of their attitudes, their feelings, their state of mind, their view of events and of the world? What do these people bring with them onto the world stage at the present time? Emerging in a c o m p l e x of circumstances how easy is it for them to make adjustments, along lines chosen by their leaders, to their new conditions? These questions we shall endeavor to examine in the pages that follow.