Articles How Authoritarian Regimes Maintain Domain Consensus: North Korea’s Information Strategies in the Kim Jong-un Era Adam Cathcart, Christopher Green, and Steven Denney Te Review of Korean Studies Volume 17 Number 2 (December 2014): 145-178 ©2014 by the Academy of Korean Studies. All rights reserved. 146 Te Review of Korean Studies Pyongyang’s Strategic Shift North Korea is a society under constant surveillance by the apparatuses of state, and is a place where coercion—often brutal—is not uncommon.1 However, this is not the whole story. It is inaccurate to say that the ruling hereditary dictatorship of the Kim family exerts absolute control purely by virtue of its monopoly over the use of physical force. The limitations of state coercion have grown increasingly evident over the last two decades. State-society relations in North Korea shifted drastically when Kim Jong-il came to power in the 1990s. It was a time of famine, legacy politics, state retrenchment, and the rise of public markets; the state’s coercive abilities alternated between dissolution and coalescence as the state sought to co-opt and control the marketization process, a pattern which continued until Kim Jong-il’s death in 2011 (Kwon and Chung 2012; Hwang 1998; Hyeon 2007; Park 2012). Those relations have moved still further under Kim Jong- un.2 Tough Kim’s rise to the position of Supreme Leader in December 2011 did not precipitate—as some had hoped—a paradigmatic shift in economic or political approach, the state has been extremely active in the early years of his era, responding to newfound domestic appreciation of North Korea’s situation in both the region and wider world. In order to sustain its political dominance, the Kim government needs to prevent, refute, co-opt, and manipulate a burgeoning array of information spreading in society. Enhancing security along the country’s porous northern border or forcefully relocating civilians is not sufficient to assert control over fows of information, which * This research was supported by an Academy of Korean Studies Grant (AKS-2013-R-11). Andray Abrahamian, Matthew Reichel, and Alex Verman are thanked for their helpful comments on earlier drafts and specifc issues; Hwang Ju-hui is thanked for her steadfast and competent research assistance in Seoul. Versions of the various arguments and sections of this manuscript were presented and critically commented on at conferences at the University of Toronto, and Oxford and Cambridge Universities. Authors are listed in order of seniority; all contributed equally and bear collective responsibility for any factual errors or misrepresentations. 1. Te execution of Jang Song-taek in December 2013 was surely a prime indicator that coercion and the specter of state terror remain part of Pyongyang’s arsenal. At the same time, the scope of the actual purge was limited. For historical comparisons, see Harris 2013. 2. We employ revised romanization for all Korean names and places in this paper, with the exception of some that are already well known to most readers in a diferent form, most notably Kim Jong-un, Kim Jong-il, and Kim Il-sung. How Authoritarian Regimes Maintain Domain Consensus 147 can inspire people to leave, to contribute in situ to delegitimizing the regime, or just to make hitherto unheard of demands of the state.3 Thus, unable or unwilling to prevent information entering completely, the state faces challenges to its legitimacy (Kretchun and Kim 2012, 37). As a response, changes have been carefully implemented. Under the titular direction of Kim Jong-un, there have been adjustments to the state’s internal information strategies.4 These adjustments are strategic, designed to address areas of incongruence between the state and its external task environment. Te state is attempting to redefne its “reciprocity of expectations” with society.5 Research Objective and Scope Conditions Tis interdisciplinary research is predominantly concerned with the “state” and its administrative interaction with societal actors through multiple “information strategies,” which in turn constitute reciprocity of expectations. In order to analyze the information strategies employed under Kim Jong-un, we draw from three heuristically rich lines of inquiry: governmentality, studies of state-society relations, and organizational/institutional theory, specifcally James Tompson’s concept of “domain consensus,” which was later applied in political science by Tomas Callaghy. It is this latter conception of how state-society relations can be structured that we place at the spine of our theoretical approach. In the most general sense, “government” is an activity executed by the state that shapes the scope of human conduct by setting the boundaries of what is 3. The South Korean Ministry of Unification (2014a) publishes statistics on a range of inter-Korean matters. The categories include data on numbers of arriving defectors, and this shows that 1,514 defectors entered South Korea in 2013. Tis is more than the fgures in 2012 (1,502 arrivals), the frst year of Kim Jong-un’s rule, but a far cry from the 2,914 defectors that arrived in the South in 2009. 4. Te question of Kim Jong-un's personal role in the shaping of policy is not one that we take up in depth in this paper, but it continues to prompt varying levels of critical analysis. Contrasting views can be found in Jang Jin-sung’s Dear Leader (2014) and “Kim Jong Un: North Korea's Supreme Leader or Puppet?” (Te Guardian 2014a). 5. It is important to note that this research concerns normative mechanisms of authoritarian control. It does not have explanatory power in terms of authoritarian power-sharing, which concerns intra-elite dynamics. For more detail on the conceptual diference between these two terms, see Svolik 2012, 3-13. 148 Te Review of Korean Studies and is not acceptable behavior.6 It is a deliberate attempt on the part of those governing to influence, regulate, and control the governed. To study “the art of government,” what is typically called “governmentality,” means, according to Mitchell Dean, to “analyze those practices that try to shape, sculpt, mobilize and work through the choices, desires, aspirations, needs, wants and lifestyles of individuals and groups” (Dean 2010, 20). In liberal regimes, government normally channels the free will of individuals constrained by the rule of law, which has itself been shaped with public input. Tis method acknowledges the people’s liberal relationship with the government, albeit with the credible threat of violence in reserve, a threat that is clearly codified in advance in the form of legislation. Conversely, in authoritarian modes individual freedom is bounded, often to a significant extent, and the ends of government are not dictated by or validated through the people but by alternate means—including coercion applied, often deliberately, on an arbitrary basis. It would, however, be a mistake to assume that authoritarian regimes always use coercion to shape the field of action and individual autonomy. Even in North Korea, a highly repressive example, there must be “reciprocity of expectations,” as Max Weber understood it (Bendix 1977, 279), between the governed and the governing.7 Weber pointed to three “pure types” of legitimate rule—legal, traditional, and charismatic; any one of these, he held, “[l]oses its character by persistently violating the limitation that is based on the reciprocity of expectations between ruler and ruled.” Such a reading of state- society relations, based on mutual adherence to expectations, can be reframed, in the words of Stephen Krasner (1984, 226), as the problem of “conformity or congruence of the state with its environment.” What Krasner calls “public stasis and private dynamism” generates friction, until such time as the former responds to dynamically emerging societal demands (Krasner 1984, 234).8 6. Our understanding of the basic function of government is informed by the literature on “governmentality” and can be read in Mitchell Dean’s (2010) writing on the subject. 7. Thomas Callaghy (1980) channels Weber’s idea of the reciprocity of expectations using Reinhard Bendix’s (1977) defnitive work Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait. 8. In his 1984 review article, “Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics,” Krasner was concerned with how the latest literature was dealing with “the state” as a How Authoritarian Regimes Maintain Domain Consensus 149 Tis is precisely what is taking place in North Korea today. In this paper we are concerned with how the state—both as an actor and as an arena of action— adjusts its information strategies to meet these new circumstances. The state seeks to establish general consensus on reciprocity of expectations. There are three specific types of consensus, defined by their fundamental nature: voluntary/normative, utilitarian, and coercive. All states employ all three types to a varying degree: together they constitute “domain consensus,” or, a state-society consensus on the domain of the state. In his examination of Zaire under President Mobutu Sese Seko, political scientist Thomas Callaghy examines domain consensus at length, describing the concept as that which allows “societal groups and administrative agents to understand the role of the state, what it will and will not do, as well as the locus and extent of political power” (1980, 469). According to Callaghy, domain consensus is formed around three inter- connecting planes upon which state-society interactions take place. The first plane is the voluntary and normative. This form of consensus exists when citizens acquiesce to the right of a ruler(s) to rule, and voluntarily adhere to the norms that obtain under the prevailing system of governance. Democratic elections, which generate majority rule, are among the most effective ways of sustaining a normative domain consensus. A dictatorship, which by defnition lacks the legitimating narrative of free and open elections, must rely predominantly on propaganda to achieve the same or similar result (The Guardian 2014b).