NORD 73,3_f3_306-323 12/16/04 4:41 AM Page 307 Nordic Journal of International Law 73: 307–323, 2004. 307 © 2004 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands. Criminal Responsibility of Journalists under International Criminal Law: The ICTR Experience ALEX OBOTE ODORA* 1. Introduction Within a few months after the invasion of Rwanda by the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) in October of 1990, President Habyarimana and his senior advi- sors knew that the RPF had been reduced by losses during the first months to a number less than half that of the Rwandan army.1 The Rwandan government and military leaders also knew that their own army was backed by several hun- dred highly trained and well-armed French troops.2 However, President Habyarimana and his advisors, with the support of the media, exaggerated the risk in hopes of increasing political support for themselves.3 Historical conflicts between the two major ethnic groups, the Hutu and Tutsi, formed the basis of Habyrimana’s anti-Tutsi propaganda campaign.4 Propagandists, who included journalists, echoed and magnified the anti- Tutsi hatred and suspicion perpetrated by Habyarimana and officials around him, the so-called Akazu.5 Under the cover of the freedom of expression, jour- nalists and propagandists blared forth messages and disseminated, at first more discreetly by government officials and party functionaries, and later openly inflammatory information such as many of the conclusions about the “enemy” presented in the military memorandum of 21 September 1992 by * LLD (Stockholm University-Sweden); LLM (Stockholm University-Sweden); LLB (Hons) (Makerere University – Uganda) Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. The views expressed are personal and do not reflect that of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, or that of the United Nations. 1 A. De Forges, Leave None To Tell The Story, (Human Rights Watch, New York and International Federation of Human Rights, Paris, March 1999), p. 65. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 R. Omar, Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance (Africa Rights, Revised 1995 Edition) pp. 1–96. See also G. Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis 1959–1994: history of a genocide (Hurst, London, 1995), pp. 41–90. 5 Akazu is a group of persons linked to President Habyarimana through marriage, family, pol- itics and business, but all dedicated to the preservation of Hutu Power. NORD 73,3_f3_306-323 12/16/04 4:41 AM Page 308 308 ALEX OBOTE ODORA Chief of Staff of the Rwanda Army, Col. Deogratias Nsabimana to all com- manders identifying and defining the “enemy”.6 In an earlier memorandum dated 27 July 1992 to the Army Chief of Staff signed by Lt. Col. Nsengiyumva Anatole, G2 Officer at the Staff Headquarters of the Rwandan Army, on behalf of all soldiers, the enemy was defined as INKONTANYI, RPF and the Tutsi ethnic group.7 Propagandists developed the same themes over and over, both before and during the genocide perpetrated between April and June of 1994. One of the most virulent voices of hate was the Kangura newspaper. This particular newspaper began spewing forth attacks on the RPF and on all Tutsi civilians immediately after the October 1990 invasion.8 Other newspapers and journals that received support from government officials, party functionaries and busi- nessmen linked to the Habyarimana regime joined in the propaganda soon after.9 The newspapers were published and sold in the capital, Kigali, but urban workers who often went home for weekends carried copies of the better-known newspapers out to the hills for dissemination.10 Many Rwandans cannot read or write; consequently the radio became even more effective than the newspapers in delivering the message of hate directly and simultaneously to a wide audience. In some areas, the government dis- tributed radios free to local authorities before the genocide.11 The number of radios available to the local population increased considerably and conse- quently assisted the radio journalists in efficiently disseminating the anti-Tutsi propaganda. The radio broadcasts were used to incite Hutus to kill Tutsi. For example, in March 1992, Radio Rwanda warned that Hutu leaders in Bugesera were going to be murdered by Tutsi, false information meant to spur the Hutu massacres of Tutsi.12 6 A. De Forges, Leave None To Tell The Story, supra, note 1, pp. 62–64. 7 See, Memorandum dated Kigali, 27 July 1992 addressed by Lt. Col. Nsengiyumva to the Army Chief of Staff and copied to H.E. President of the Republic of Rwanda and marked ‘Confidential’ – See the so-called Military I Trial; Prosecutor v Theoneste Bagasora, Gratien Kabiligi, Aloys Ntabakuze & Anayole Nsengiyumva Case No. ICTR-98–41–T. See also A. De Forges, Leave None To Tell The Story, supra note 1, on Military Defines ‘The Enemy’pp. 59–64. 8 Ibid., p. 66. 9 According to Chrétien et al., Rwanda, Les Medias, p. 45, (unofficial translation) at least eleven of the forty-two new journals founded in 1991 were linked to the Akazu. 10 Some 66 percent of Rwandans are literate and those who knew how to read were accus- tomed to reading for others. In many cases, most of the cartoons used in the papers were graphic in a manner that they could not be misinterpreted and the cartoons underscored the writ- ten word. 11 F. Chalk, ‘Hate Radio in Rwanda’ in H. Adelman & A. Suhrke (ed.) The Rwandan Crisis from Uganda to Zaire: Path of a Genocide (Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, USA, 1999), pp. 93–107. 12 A. De Forges, Leave None To Tell The Story, supra note 1, p. 68..