39195 1881 SECOND SUPPLEMENT TO The London Gazette OF FRIDAY, 6th APRIL, 1951 Registered as a Newspaper THURSDAY, 12 APRIL, 1951 .The War Office, 1951. OPERATIONS IN BURMA FROM 12th NOVEMBER, 1944, TO 15th AUGUST, 1945 NOTE.—A set of maps for this Despatch is on separate sale at Is. Od. net. This set of maps also covers the operations described in the other Army and Air Despatches of the Burma Campaign from 16th November, 1943 to 12th September, 1945. The following Despatch was submitted to the Finally, I have attached a table of contents Secretary of State for War on the 4th of the Despatch and two other Appendices to February, 1947, by LIEUTENANT- which reference is made in the body of the GENERAL SIR OLIVER LEESE, Bart., Despatch. K.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., Commander-in- PART I Chief, Allied Land Forces, South-East NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS Asia. SECTION I (paras. 2-18) THE SITUATION ON INTRODUCTION TAKING OVER COMMAND Location of my H.Q.: Constitution of the 1. This Despatch covers the period from the command: Note on the topography and climate 12th November, 1944, on which date I of Burma: The task: Strategic plans already assumed the appointment of Commander-in- in existence: The new directive. chief, Allied Land Forces, South-East Asia, to the 15th August, 1945, when the Japanese 2. I took over 11 Army Group from General surrendered and when I relinquished my Sir George Giffard on the 12th November, appointment. I have included the planning 1944, with the new title of Commander-in- for subsequent operations, as it was initiated Chief, Allied Land Forces, South-East Asia. and carried on during the period under con- This appointment had just been created follow- sideration. But these plans are given in out- ing the decision to place the American and line only, because their execution is outside Chinese troops in South-East Asia under my the period of my command and because the control. Since the 20th June, 1944, after Japanese capitulation caused many modifica- the capture of Kamaing (in the Mogaung tions of the basic plan. Valley), Northern Combat Area Command I have divided my Despatch into three parts. had been under the direct operational control Part I is concerned with the course of opera- of the Supreme Allied Commander (Admiral 'tions and the planning and istrategy which The Lord Louis Mountbatten, later Earl determined them. In Part II I have gone Mounfibatten of Burma). This arrangement had into some detail of the administrative aspect, its origin in the refusal of General J. W. Stilwell, "which in this campaign assumed such import- who in addition to commanding Northern ance that it justifies this separate treatment. Combat Area Command was Deputy Supreme In Part III I have given some appreciations Allied Commander, to serve in a subordinate of the contributions made by those who took capacity to the Commander-in-Chief, 11 Army part in the campaign. It may be that, for the Group, although he had agreed to act under general reader, a perusal of Parts I and III will the operational control of the Commander, suffice to produce an adequate overall picture, Fourteenth Army, for a limited period, that is, but for the military student the importance of until the capture of Kamaing. When General the administrative side of the campaign needs D. I. Sultan, General Stilwell's successor, came special emphasis. under my command on the 12th November, a 1882 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 APRIL, 1951 difficult arrangement came to an end. An in- 20 Indian Divisions, 11 (East African) crement of United States staff officers under Division, the Lushai Brigade, 268 Indian Brigadier-General T. F. Wessels and Brigadier- (Lorried) Brigade, and 254 Indian Tank General R. T. Maddocks was added to my Brigade. 7 Indian Division was in the Kohima Headquarters to provide adequate American area and was destined for 4 Corps. 255 Indian representation. Tank Brigade at Imphal and 28 (East African) On taking over, I received my first Directive Brigade were also under Fourteenth Army. from the Supreme Allied Commander. Fifteenth Indian Corps (Lieutenant-General Sir A. F. Philip Christison) consisted of 25 and 26 3. My Advanced Headquarters were in the Indian Divisions, 81 and 82 (West African) process of moving from Delhi to Barrackpore, Divisions, 50 Indian Tank Brigade and 3 where they opened on the 1st December, 1944. Commando Brigade. Main Headquarters, Allied Land Forces, South- Northern Combat Area Command East Asia, at the insistence of the Supreme (Lieutenant-General Dan I. Sultan) consisted Allied Commander, were at Kandy where the of First and Sixth Chinese Armies, 36 Supreme Allied Commander and the Air Com- British Division, and 5332 U.S. ("Mars") mander-in-Chief were located, while the Naval Brigade. First Chinese Army (General Sun Commander-in-Chief was nearby at Colombo. Li Jen) was composed of 30, 38, and 50 It was not, however, possible for me to Chinese Divisions, while the Sixth (General exercise command from Kandy of an Army Liao Yo Hsiang) was composed of 14 and 22 Group which was actively engaged on three Chinese Divisions. The Mars Brigade widely separated fronts, 15 Indian Corps in (Brigadier-General J. P. Willy) was in fact Arakan, Fourteenth Army in the Chin Hills, equivalent to a United States light division and west of the Chindwin River, and the British/ consisted of 475 United States Infantry Chinese/American forces comprising the Regiment, 124 United States Cavalry Regi- American "Northern Combat Area Com- ment, and one Chinese regiment. In addition mand " in Northern Burma. Even from Northern Combat Area Command possessed Barrackpore I was to find that it took me one Chinese 'tank brigade. 1,500 miles flying to visit the three fronts. Despite therefore the disadvantages of being Ceylon Army Command (Lieutenant-General separated by so great a distance from the Head- H. E. de R. Wetherall) consisted of a few quarters of the Supreme Allied Commander and locally enlisted battalions and Base units, and from those of his two other Commanders-in- also the small garrisons in the island bases Chief, it was necessary for me to base myself of Addu Atoll and Diego Garcia. on my Advanced Headquarters at Barrackpore. In India, assigned to my operations, but not which was in fact by far the larger echelon, under my command, were Special Force, made where all the day-to-day executive business of up of 14, 16 and 23 Infantry Brigades, 77 and the Headquarters was carried on. Actually 111 Indian Infantry Brigades and 3 (West Barrackpore had certain other advantages. African) Infantry Brigade, which together First, Headquarters, Eastern Air Command, formed six Long-Range Penetration Groups, 50 were located only a mile or two down the Parachute Brigade, two tank regiments (25 Hooghli. I was thus enabled to maintain that Dragoons and 149 R.A.C.), and certain small close touch with General G. E. Stratemeyer units. 17 Indian Division was in India in which was essential to our joint operations G.H.Q. Reserve and not under my command. while the battle for Burma was in progress. Secondly, I was in a good position to visit 5. In mid-November, a reorganization of Delhi, the Headquarters of the India Base the chain of command took place, which had through which all my supplies and personnel been planned by General Giffard with had to pass. .And, lastly, I was well placed to the object of freeing the Commander, visit formations training under G.H.Q., India, Fourteenth Army, from the control of opera- which had been allocated to my future opera- tions in Arakan, and from the responsibility tions, and in particular those at the Combined of administering the long and difficult lines of Training Centres at Cocanada and near communication in Assam. In this way he Bombay. would be enabled to concentrate his full atten- tion on the coming offensive across the My Main Headquarters at Kandy was in Chindwin River into Central Burma. Accord- reality -a strong liaison section under Major- ingly on the 15th November, Lines of Com- General I. S. O. Playfair, designed to main- munication Command was formed under tain close contact with Headquarters, Supreme Major-General G. W. Symes, with its H.Q. at Allied Commander, South-East Asia, and the Comilla. It comprised 202 L. of C. Area other Commanders-in-Chief. (H.Q., Gauhati), consisting of four sub-areas 4. On the 12th November, when I took over, and the Fort Hertz Area, and 404 L. of C. my command consisted of Fourteenth Army, Area of four sub-areas; it included a very made up of 4, 15 and 33 Indian Corps, the great number of Base and L. of C. units. The Northern Combat Area Command and Ceylon policy was to be that the rear boundaries of Army Command. In addition there were cer- Fourteenth Army and 15 Corps would be tain formations in India, which although not adjusted as the progress of operations allowed, under my command, were allocated for my in order to free them from rearward responsi- future operations; bilities. On the 16th November, 15 Corps was In Fourteenth Army (Lieutenant-General separated from Fourteenth Army and came Sir William Slim), 4 Indian Corps (Lieutenant- direct under my command. I thus had under General Sir Geoffry A. P. Scoones) consisted my command three major formations ini con- of 19 Indian Division and 23 Indian tact with 'the enemy, 15 Corps, Fourteenth Division, which was in the process of being Army and Northern Combat Area Command, withdrawn to India.