Steven E. Miller n December 1991, U.S. Secretary of State James Ukraine has combined the rhetoric of denuclearization Baker visited Kiev to consult with the leaders of newly with behavior that has raised doubts about the sincerity Iindependent Ukraine. Nuclear weapons figured of its commitment to become a non-nuclear state. prominently in these There are a discussions. Pres- number of plausible ident Leonid explanations for Kravchuk of Ukraine VIEWPOINT: Ukraine’s ambigu- agreed that the with- ous nuclear policy.2 drawal of Soviet tac- One is that its com- tical nuclear weapons mitment to denucle- from Ukrainian soil UKRAINE'S FLAWED arize is sincere, but would commence implementation of immediately; and he NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY this commitment is assured Secretary of hindered by a variety State Baker that of practical and po- Ukraine was firmly litical difficulties. committed to becom- by Steven E. Miller A second interpreta- ing a non-nuclear tion suggests that weapon state. The Ukraine has not American delegation made a firm and fi- left Ukraine feeling that the visit had been a success and nal decision to become a nuclear weapon state, but for that the nuclear weapons issue had been addressed in a the time being does not wish to foreclose the option to satisfactory fashion.1 After this relatively promising be- do so.3 A third possible explanation of Ukraine’s am- ginning, however, the road has been far from smooth. biguous nuclear behavior is that Ukraine wishes to be- To be sure, Ukrainian leaders have on numerous occa- come a nuclear-armed power but is not yet prepared to sions reiterated the pledge to denuclearize. But the pe- face the international consequences of unambiguously riod since December 1991 has not witnessed the final embracing the nuclear option. Finally, a fourth argu- resolution of the denuclearization issue in Ukraine, and ment is that the nuclear weapons on Ukraine’s territory Kiev’s ultimate nuclear status remains in doubt. constitute potent bargaining chips, and that Kiev has From the American perspective, Ukraine’s behavior understandably sought, in its nuclear diplomacy, to get on the nuclear issue has been evasive, ambiguous, and as much as possible for these weapons before it gives frustrating. Thus, the U.S.-Ukrainian negotiations to them up. This approach is all the more irresistible—and reach an umbrella agreement that would permit the pro- all the more comprehensible—because Ukraine has few vision of U.S. denuclearization assistance dragged on other sources of leverage in its interactions with Mos- for more than a year, and agreement was not reached cow and the West.4 until October 1993; Kiev’s delaying tactics, which blocked Doubts about Ukraine’s nuclear intentions derive the provision of U.S. assistance to Ukraine, appeared to from the fact that the evidence so far does not exclude Washington to reflect a desire to stall the denucleariza- any of these interpretations. Further, all four of these tion process. Similarly, the Lisbon Protocol of May approaches are represented in the Ukrainian debate on 1992 made Ukraine a party to the START I agreement, nuclear policy.5 This essay assesses the merits of the but it was not until November 1993 that the Ukrainian “bargaining chip” explanation, the one most often cited Rada, under strong international pressure, finally rati- in the West to explain Ukraine’s nuclear diplomacy. fied START. Even then, it did so in a conditional man- ner that both Russia and the United States found unac- ceptable. Only in February of 1994 did Ukraine finally Dr. Steven E. Miller is Director of the International pass an acceptable START instrument of ratification. Security Program at the Center for Science and Meanwhile, Ukraine has yet to accede to the Nuclear International Affairs of the JFK School of Government, Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and its failure to do so Harvard University, and Editor-in-Chief of the journal prevents the entry into force of START I. In short, International Security. The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1994 47 Steven E. Miller ASSESSING UKRAINE’S BARGAINING CHIP Ukraine on the Agenda? STRATEGY With respect to attention, the supposition is that the According to a bargaining chip explanation, United States and other Western powers would have taken Ukraine’s behavior has represented a natural and sen- little note of Ukraine and paid little heed to its interests sible effort to make the best possible trade with one of and perceptions were it not for the continuing presence its few diplomatic assets--nuclear weapons. The preoc- of nuclear weapons on its territory. The on-going nuclear cupation of the United States and its industrial allies issue has required outside powers to interact with Ukraine with the nuclear issue, it is often argued, promoted this and compelled them to take account of Ukraine’s inter- approach by making it clear that they attached a high ests. value to denuclearization. Following this logic, eventu- It is certainly true that Ukraine has attracted a lot of ally Kiev will conclude that it obtained all that it can international attention by its nuclear diplomacy. But get for its nuclear weapons, and denuclearization will there are several problems with this argument. First, proceed more smoothly. much of the attention Ukraine has received has been If this has in fact been Ukraine’s policy, how well negative, damaging its reputation and making it the tar- has it served Kiev’s interests? This question can only get of international pressure. It is hard to see why this be answered by weighing the costs of the policy against is desirable. Second, it is far from clear that outside the benefits sought and gained. The cost side of the powers are more understanding of or more sympathetic ledger is not inconsiderable. Ukraine’s nuclear policy towards Ukrainian interests just because Kiev has been has inhibited the development of good and close rela- difficult on the nuclear question. It seems at least equally tions with the United States and the West. It has de- likely that Kiev’s nuclear policy has made Western elites layed the provision of assistance and the development more suspicious of Ukraine’s designs and more doubt- of cooperative programs. It has drained the reservoir of ful of Ukraine’s attractiveness as a potential friend and good will toward Ukraine and, indeed, generated exas- partner. Lastly, it seems implausible that Ukraine would peration and even ill will among those in the West have been ignored were it not for the nuclear issue. It charged with negotiating with Kiev on the nuclear is- is one of the largest states in Europe; it is rich in re- sue. It has called into question Ukraine’s reliability as sources and potentially wealthy; it occupies a strategi- a negotiating partner. It has complicated Ukraine’s re- cally important geographic position; and Ukraine’s fate lations with Western capitols and institutions.6 It has and its relations with Russia are widely understood to given the United States and Russia a powerful common be major factors determining the security order in the interest (in Ukraine’s denuclearization) and provided former Soviet Union--and hence, in Europe. Even with- Moscow with a lever that it has not been shy about out nuclear weapons, Ukraine would command atten- using against Kiev. And it has caused Ukraine to be tion. In short, using nuclear diplomacy to gain atten- defined as a potential nuclear proliferation trouble spot, tion seems a dubious policy: it is neither necessary (be- joining an unattractive club that includes North Korea, cause Ukraine is in any case too important to ignore) Iraq, and Iran.7 All told, Ukraine’s relations with the nor desirable (because there is little profit in attracting West have been less good, its isolation has been greater, negative attention). its coffers have been poorer, and its international politi- cal position vis-a-vis Russia has been weaker, as a re- Warheads for Dollars? sult of Kiev’s nuclear policy. This is the price that Ukraine has paid for its bargaining chip strategy. Ukraine’s nuclear diplomacy also seems to have been On the other side of the ledger, Ukraine has pur- motivated by a desire to maximize the financial benefit sued three main benefits: attention, money, and secu- derived from the elimination of the nuclear weapons on rity guarantees. The decisive issue in assessing Ukraine’s its territory. This, it is often suggested, is a perfectly bargaining chip strategy is whether it has gained suffi- natural desire, especially given Ukraine’s widely adver- ciently in these three areas to warrant the price it has tised and severe economic difficulties; it has a desper- paid. Close examination suggests that Ukraine’s nuclear ate need for Western financial help. Thus, by adopting diplomacy has not paid great dividends. a bargaining chip strategy, Kiev hopes to drive up the 48 The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1994 Steven E. Miller financial price that outside powers will pay for denucle- cated early on and have not increased substantially as a arization. consequence of Ukraine’s delaying tactics. Certainly, this is a defensible line of policy. But the A parallel situation exists with respect to economic key issue in not whether the policy makes sense in the assistance. Any realistic assessment of the ability and abstract, but whether it has paid off in practice. Here willingness of the West to provide such assistance would again, a negative verdict seems warranted. Nearly three have led to the conclusion that the sums likely to be years of bargaining chip diplomacy have not produced available under any circumstances would be modest.