186 Chapter V Ration Riots as Popular Politics in West Bengal In the earlier chapters, we went through the ‘Hungry Bengal’ debate that began to re-surface in the state from the early 2000s. In this chapter, a descriptive and analytical study will be undertaken on the tumultuous protests in the districts of Birbhum, Burdwan, and Bankura that broke out in 2007 over the allegation of the ‘mal-distribution’ of food under the Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS). These protests came to popularly know as “ration riots”. The chapter will focus more on the events of the two districts of Birbhum and Burdwan. After the course of the protests, a new turn in politics was noticeable: many gram panchayats and panchayat samity of the said two districts witnessed a change in guard in the panchayat elections in 2008. Attempts will also be made to understand if there was a correlation between these two, i.e., ‘ration riots’ in 2007 and the defeat of the left in the gram panchayats in the panchayat elections in 2008. in West Bengal. But before going into in-depth study let us understand the background of the ‘ration riots’. 5.1. The Background Since its inception, the Public Distribution System (PDS) in India has had many loopholes. Irregular supply, distribution of a much lower quantity of commodities than the fixed quota, rampant corruption, improper distribution of ration cards, the remoteness of the Fair Price Shops (FPSs) from its jurisdiction area, the irregular opening of FPSs, etc. had been the perennial problems of the PDS.1 To cement these loopholes, the government of India launched TPDS in June 1997. However, the problem persisted. 187 We have already discussed how the Right to Food case caught the attention of the people on the malfunctioning of the TPDS. It was found that the improper/inadequate procurement and distribution of the food grains caused gigantic food stock to rot down in the Food Corporation of India (FCI) warehouses. We have also discussed in the previous chapters the poor status of social security schemes especially TPDS and how it affected the people. Now let us have a brief sketch of the condition of TPDS before the ‘ration riots’ broke out in the state in 2007. During the financial year 2006-2007, the government of West Bengal repeatedly claimed that there was a reduction in the allocation of wheat by the FCI. If we look into the allotment of wheat and rice for West Bengal the allegations made by the state government may be substantiated. Table 5.1: Monthly Average Allotments of Wheat and Rice for West Bengal (2001-02 to 2006-07) BPL APL AAY Total 2001-02 104.5 75.4 9.2 189.1 2002-03 141.9 353.9 25.6 521.4 2003-04 141.9 340.8 25.6 508.3 2005-06 120.7 340.8 46.9 508.3 2006-07* 94.5 218.4 38.9 351.7 *2006-07 figures are up to December 2006. To make the Table compatible the authors converted them as monthly averages. Data for 2004-05 was not readily available. Source: Bhattacharyya and Rana (2008) Table 5.1 corroborates the fact that there was a sharp and sudden decline in the allocation of wheat and rice in the financial year of 2006-07. And, with the 188 reduction of the allotment of wheat under TPDS the price of wheat in the open market went high. Table 5.2: Central Allocations and Open Market Price of Wheat Months 2005 2006 of Wheat of Wheat (Rs per kg) (Rs per kg) (Rs per Open Market Market Open Market Open Price of Wheat Price of Wheat Price (in ’000 Tonnes) (in ’000 Tonnes) (in ’000 Central Allocation Allocation Central Allocation Central January 374.4 7.79 180 8.49 February 370.5 7.75 179.5 8.54 March 370.5 7.45 179.5 8.36 April 371.1 7.31 172.3 8.32 May 371.1 7.34 172.8 8.63 June 371.1 7.46 108.9 8.78 (P) July 370.8 7.5 114.7 9.02 (P) August 164.5 7.75 114.7 9.67 (P) September 164.5 7.79 - 9.48 (P) October 165.3 7.83 - 9.8 (P) November 179.5 8 - 9.67 (P) December 180 8.3 - 10.05 (P) P: Provisional Source: Rana and Bhattacharya (2008) Table 5.2 is showing that the allocation of wheat reduced considerably in 2005. In 2005, the allocation of wheat in July was 370.8 tonnes wherein in August it came down to 164.5 tonnes. As a result, the price of wheat in the open market went up so 189 much so that in a single year there was an increase of 25 percent (wherein December 2005 the price of wheat in the open market was Rs. 8.30/kg, in December 2006 it reached Rs. 10.05/kg). There were also dramatic changes in the price of rice.2 In table 5.1 and 5.2, we have seen how there was a reduction in the allocation of wheat which caused the open market price of it to shoot up which in effect guided the population under the Above Poverty Line (APL) category to the ration shops. Therefore, it created a heavy pressure on the TPDS. Table 5.3: Percentage of Off takes of Rice and Wheat (2001-02 to 2006-07, up to December 2006) 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2005-06 2006-07 A Below Poverty Line (BPL) Andhra Pradesh 66.1 99.8 96.4 101.4 Karnataka 98.9 98.3 95.6 99.9 97.8 Kerala 99.1 58.6 82.3 98.1 97.9 Maharashtra 55.5 59.6 68.9 86.0 83.7 Tamil Nadu 77.1 75.2 102.3 99.6 80.6 West Bengal 41.7 56.0 71.4 89.4 73.8 India 56.3 60.3 70.1 81.5 74.7 B Above Poverty Line (APL) Andhra Pradesh 35.9 15.4 19.2 66.4 67.3 Karnataka 81.2 27.0 40.6 43.1 54.0 Kerala 6.5 9.6 7.6 17.9 22.2 190 Maharashtra 0.4 0.4 0.6 2.7 6.8 Tamil Nadu 0.0 0.6 6.0 43.9 40.6 West Bengal 20.8 6.6 11.7 25.2 24.1 India 18.0 5.9 9.0 18.1 26.7 C Antyodaya Anna Yojana (AAY) Andhra Pradesh 102.5 89.7 97.8 98.2 100.8 Karnataka 96.1 89.8 90.0 92.8 94.9 Kerala 86.1 99.5 99.4 96.9 99.9 Maharashtra 87.5 86.4 86.7 88.7 86.5 Tamil Nadu 69.8 99.0 103.8 102.0 99.0 West Bengal 51.8 66.1 71.0 80.8 81.8 India 85.6 85.7 91.4 92.2 89.3 Source: Bhattacharyya and Rana (2008) Though, in general, the off-take of West Bengal in both APL and Below Poverty Line (BPL) category was considerably good from the financial year 2001-02 when in the financial year 2006-07, the prices in the open market rose and the state government failed to lift the proper quota (As shown in table 5.3). Therefore, it was not possible to meet the demands of the people. This factor was accompanied by another one, i.e., the ‘corrupt’ image of the ration dealers in the popular mind. Studies found that the majority of dealers had aimed to gain profit.3 But the margin of profit in TPDS was very thin. To supplement it, the dealers often opted for black- marketing, hoarding, cheating, and other malpractices. It implied that administrative arrangements, rules, procedures that determined the effectiveness 191 and viability of FPSs to serve the public were not recognised and evaluated fully by the implementing authorities of TPDS in the State. Dwaipayan Bhattacharya referred to a letter by a dealer to the Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court, which alleged that a monthly loss incurred by a dealer was amounted to rupees 7,000 and asked the Chief Justice that “if one added monthly family expenses of around rupees 10,000 to that how could a dealer be expected to earn without taking recourse to corruption?”4 A fascinating study conducted by Transparency International India titled India Corruption Study 2005 reveals some probable factors that allowed the ration dealers/ FPS owners to choose the path of corruption.5 1) The transformation of PDS into TPDS in 1997 led to low profitability. 2) The credit provided to the ration dealers was very low so much so that they cannot even lift the entire quota from the government warehouse! 3) The ration dealers might also have to bribe the ration officials to get their quota delivered to the shops from the FCI. Moreover, they hardly had any control over the quality of food grains. An article in The Hindu found the same state of things in Kerala in 2013.6 4) The supplies from the FCI were uncertain and late coming. 5.2. Situating the ‘Ration Riots’ From the above discussion, we can deduct that at the state level the TPDS was not in good condition. Now pay attention to the contemporary political scenario in the state which will help us to situate the ‘ration riots’ in the broader context of erstwhile West Bengal politics.