SECURING PEACE AN ACTION STRATEGY FOR SRI LANKA JUNE 2004 Authors Jeremy Barnicle Linda Frey Reyko Huang Edgar Janz Elizabeth Johnson Mikhael Kouly Audrey J. Lee A. Tafadzwa Pasipanodya Joshua Weber Jennifer Yip Project Advisor Frederick Barton SECURING PEACE AN ACTION STRATEGY FOR SRI LANKA JUNE 2004 A Report Prepared by the Workshop on Post-Conflict Reconstruction Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Sri Lanka Action Strategy Report 1 of 40 TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS................................................................................. 4 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS........................................................... 5 ABOUT THE REPORT.................................................................................... 6 A WAR RAVAGED COUNTRY: THE STATISTICS...................................... 9 CONTEXT OF THE CIVIL WAR IN SRI LANKA....................................... 12 PROBLEM ANALYSIS: PRIMARY THREATS TO LASTING PEACE IN SRI LANKA ................................................................................................... 14 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AN ACTION STRATEGY............................. 22 LONG-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SUSTAINING PEACE........... 30 CONCLUSION............................................................................................... 32 CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS....................................................................... 33 BIBLIOGRAPHY........................................................................................... 35 MAP OF SRI LANKA AND DEPLOYMENT SITES................ BACK COVER Sri Lanka Action Strategy Report 2 of 40 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS We would like to acknowledge the many people who assisted in the production of this report. Specifically, from UNHCR Colombo we would like to thank Neil Wright, Sri Lanka Representative, and Chandreenie Kariyawasan for their thorough help in preparing for field visits in Sri Lanka. In addition, we are grateful to Laurie Pierce and her staff at USAID/OTI, including Ashan Malalasekera. We offer appreciation to Mr. Kethesh Loganathan from the Center for Policy Alternatives in Colombo and Ms. Shevanthi Jayasuriya, Secretariat for Co-ordinating the Peace Process. From our visit to the Northern-Central region of Sri Lanka we would like to thank Doug Graham, Programme Director, World University Service of Canada; Rani Singaraja, Society for Welfare Education and Awareness Training; Visaka Dharmadasa, Chairperson, Association of War Affected Women; and finally Radhika Wijetunge, Graduate Student, Princeton University, and her parents, who gave us a frame of reference on which to base our field work. The following people in the North and East of Sri Lanka were also extremely helpful: Brenda Barrett, Regional Program Manger of OIT-USAID, Trincomalee; Rohini Singarayer, formerly Project Director of the Integrated Food Security Programme; Brita Helleland and other staff of UNHCR-Trincomalee, all of whom offered generous assistance in arranging interviews and facilitating our research and transportation around the region. We are also grateful to the staff of ZOA in Batticaloa, particularly Anneke van Eyk; and to J. David Sathananthan, District Programme Officer of WUSC, for guiding us around the Valachchenai region. In the North we would like to thank Kei Murata, UNHCR; Sanjana Hattotuwa, Rotary World Peace Scholar; Joe Ariyaratnam, Associated Press; Mario Gomez, Berghof Foundation; and Vasuki Nesiah, International Center for Transitional Justice. In the Southern Region we would like to give special acknowledgment to Conrad Ranawa ke, Field Director of INDECOS, his family, and the entire staff of INDECOS for their warm hospitality and open conversation. We would further like to thank Rev. Yatalamatte Vipassi; L.C.K. Pathirana, Manager Commercial Bank of Ceylon; and Ananda Fernando, Director, YES, for his energy and hospitality in Hambantota. We further thank the various people who helped to critique our work, especially Teresita Schaeffer, Director of South Asia Program, CSIS and Bathsheba Crocker, Fellow and Codirector of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project, CSIS; Anthony Garrett, Vice President, InterNews; Pamela Aall, Director of Education Program, U.S. Institute of Peace; Leif Trana, First Secretary, Embassy of Norway; and Ernest Corea, former Sri Lankan Ambassador to the United States; and extend our thanks to Morgan Courtney and Rebecca Linder, staff members at CSIS, for their assistance. We would like to thank the administration and staff at Princeton University who helped facilitate all aspects of this report, especially Dean Anne-Marie Slaughter; Assistant Dean Terri Harris Reed; Surabela Fabian, Melissa Lee, Regina Burke, Ann Lengyel, and the staff of the Graduate Program Office; and Karyn Olsen. We would like to thank the Robertson Foundation for their generosity in making this project possible. Finally, the CSIS Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project would like to thank the Hewlett Foundation, the United Nations Foundation, the Better World Fund and the Carnegie Corporation of New York for their generous support. The report authors are entirely responsible for the content and judgments in this report. Sri Lanka Action Strategy Report 3 of 40 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS CFA Ceasefire Agreement CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies GoSL Government of Sri Lanka HSZ High-Security Zone IDP Internally displaced person IMF International Monetary Fund ISGA Interim Self-Governing Authority JVP People’s Liberation Front LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam NGO Non-Governmental Organization PA People’s Alliance UNF United National Front UNP United National Party UPFA United Peoples Freedom Alliance SCOPP Secretariat for Coordination of the Peace Process SLFP Sri Lanka Freedom Party SLMC Sri Lankan Muslim Congress SLMM Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission Sri Lanka Action Strategy Report 4 of 40 ABOUT THE REPORT OBJECTIVE Sri Lanka has experienced over twenty years of internal armed conflict. With a ceasefire agreement in place between the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), there is a renewed possibility for peace. However, much work needs to be done before a final peace settlement is negotiated. What steps do Sri Lanka and its supporters need to undertake in order to transition from the current ceasefire to a more stable and peaceful post-conflict period? Given the changing composition and perspectives of the GoSL and the LTTE the need to plan for and enable peaceful transformation is more urgent than ever. This report is concerned with the window of opportunity existing in the upcoming 24 months. During this immediate period, practical steps must be taken to ensure that the ceasefire lasts, allowing Sri Lanka the time to consolidate its peace and finally enter a stable post- conflict period. Creating a secure foundation for longer-term peace building efforts is critical; it will require a secure and stable environment to address root causes of the conflict, dismantle conflict-generating institutions, and create structures and practices that effectively prevent further armed conflict. This report offers a practical and priority-focused action strategy plan that will assist Sri Lankan and international actors to create an enabling environment in which a foundation for peace in Sri Lanka can be laid. The action plan, consisting of integrated and innovative strategies coupled with practical recommendations, offers a fresh perspective for those actors – both domestic and international – who are active in the peace process and in the political and economic development of Sri Lanka. It is the hope of the authors that the report will make a unique contribution to this broad community in its ongoing efforts toward establishing peace in the country. LIMITATIONS The civil war in Sri Lanka is undeniably complex. It involves various combinations of actors at conflict with each other, including Sin hala -Tamil, PA-UNP parties, LTTE- alternative Tamil political groups, and Tamil-Muslim. The causes of conflict in Sri Lanka are multifaceted, spanning economic, political, cultural, religious, and geographic considerations. In addition, the causes and consequences of the conflict have in many cases become intertwined. After 20 years of civil war, positions are sufficiently entrenched to predict that the peace process will require a long-term investment on behalf of the negotiators. Although some say each day the cease-fire is extended moves Sri Lanka one step further from a return to violent conflict, this does not mean that each day brings the country closer to a long-term political solution. Therefore, it is crucial that a political commitment to peace be sustained for the duration of this protracted process. Moreover, the parties to the conflict, Sri Lanka Action Strategy Report 5 of 40 as well as the Sri Lankan people, will need to demonstrate significant patience and restraint to ensure that the process remains on track despite the many setbacks that are certain to frustrate progress. Recognizing the complexity of the Sri Lankan conflict and the many obstacles to its ultimate resolution, this report does not purport to establish a comprehensive conflict analysis framework. Instead, it seeks to identify a set of priorities for immediate action to address several key factors that are currently inhibiting progress towards peace. Recommendations emerging from the analysis aim