Political servants, professional guardians, or both? Political appointees in independent organizations under the Fidesz-KDNP supermajority in Hungary (2010-14) By Eva Zemandl Submitted to Central European University Doctoral School of Political Science, Public Policy, and International Relations In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctoral of Philosophy Supervisor: Uwe Puetter Budapest, Hungary 2017 CEU eTD Collection Declaration I hereby declare that no parts of the thesis have been accepted for any other degrees in any other institution. This thesis contains no material previously written and / or published by another person, except where appropriate acknowledgment is made in the form of bibliographical reference. .............................................. Eva Zemandl Budapest, Hungary, 19.03.2017 CEU eTD Collection i Abstract The most puzzling and unresolved issue surrounding political appointments is reflected in the normative tension between Weberian principles, on the one hand, and political leaders’ increasing demand for professional responsiveness to political and policy needs, on the other. The intrigue of this debate is particularly relevant in light of the increasing depth, breadth, and frequency of political appointments in Hungary under the parliamentary supermajority of the second ruling Fidesz-KDNP government (2010-14). Yet, the extent to which political appointees act as political servants against professional norms, advice, or judgment, particularly in more politically independent organizations, and their larger implications for organizational change remains under-researched. In the endeavor to address this gap and motivated by the context of Fidesz-KDNP’s political project of radical transformation, the dissertation departs from the normative debate and analyzes: to what extent did political appointees in independent organizations of public interest serve the partisan agenda under the Fidesz-KDNP supermajority in Hungary (2010-14)? And how did they influence organizational change? Firstly, it constructs and employs ideal-types of behavior, modes of appointee behavior, from Meyer-Sahling’s modes of politicization (2008) and incorporates organizational change theory (Newman, 2000) to generate propositions about the likely level and nature of change. Secondly, it makes an empirical contribution by exploring the manifestations of appointee behaviour in two independent organizations, the National Bank of Hungary and the Hungarian Accreditation Committee. Data collection, synthesis, and analysis rely on a qualitative case study approach, process tracing, and two sets of triangulated data – elite interviews and document analysis. CEU eTD Collection ii Acknowledgements This dissertation was a monumental life-changing endeavor. The journey has culminated in: a half-decade of living and writing a doctoral thesis in what is probably one of the most fascinating and frustrating countries in our contemporary times; fully immersing myself in a challenging linguistic environment which was a daily yoga for my brain; conversations with people in the midst and on the fringes of Hungarian political life; weeks and months of iterative reviews of interview material, documents, and my countless chapter drafts; lifelong comraderie and friendships; and a supervisor’s faith in my talents (ones I didn’t believe I possessed). Although the analysis and writing are mine, the completion of this dissertation was based on a team effort. I would like to thank in particular my supervisor, Uwe Puetter, who recognized the unique intellectual potential of this project long before the broader implications became clear to my senses, for patiently coaxing me closer and ever closer to the finish line. I would further like to thank Marie-Pierre Granger, Tamás Meszerics, Evelyne Huebscher, Jan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling, Kristina Irion, Erin Jenne, Andreas Goldthau, Achim Kemmerling, Gábor Toka, András Bozóki, Péter Balázs, György Jenei, György Gajduschek, Liviu Matei, László Kontler, Gergely Kováts, Norbert Sabic, Bart Vanhercke, Dora Piroska, and Pinar Donmez for helping to get the ball rolling, engaging me in many, many fruitful discussions, offering constructive feedback and vital information, and ongoing support. I am eternally grateful to all my interview partners (who will remain unnamed for reasons of confidentiality/anonymity) for giving me a chance, opening up, and sharing their experiences and impressions with me. Some were particularly supportive, encouraging, and provided further information (they know who they are). I am truly humbled; these pages would be otherwise blank, with no story to tell. I am indebted to the faculty, staff, and doctoral students of CEU’s Doctoral School of Political Science, Public Policy, and International Relations, as well as the School of Public Policy, for the administrative, moral, and intellectual support; as well as comraderie and friendships (e.g., the residents of the “PhD trash lab”). A special thank you to Stefan Roch for accompanying me on this methodological journey and the ongoing, supportive feedback. I am moreover grateful for the Central European University Foundation, Budapest’s financial support. I would in particular like to thank the Quality of Government Institute at Gothenburg University in Sweden for inviting and hosting me for a research visit in the fall of 2014 (special thank you to Bo Rothstein, Marina Nistotskaya, Carl Dahlström, Victor Lapuente, Marcia Grimes, Alice Johansson, Dalila Sabanic, Andreas Bågenholm, and the institute’s PhD students for the constructive feedback and for warmly welcoming me to Gothenburg). I am eternally grateful to those who have long believed in my intellectual potential and encouraged my academic pursuits, namely Tom Casier (whose pep talk during my first year of the PhD helped restore my battered faith in myself), Jeremy Kendall, Margarita Leon, Carola Wittman, and Bradley Scharf. Finally, this doctoral journey would have been impossible without the unwavering love, support, patience, and sense of humor of my husband David Marcisak, my parents, Judit and Istvan Zemandl, and my beautiful, vibrant, and CEU eTD Collection intelligent daughter, Bella Marcisak: thank you for embracing me, the gift of laughter, and perspective. iii Table of Contents 1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 1 2 Literature, theory, and methodology ........................................................................................ 11 2.1 Literature review .......................................................................................................................... 11 2.1.1 Political appointments as politicization ........................................................................ 11 2.1.2 Literature on political appointments ............................................................................. 13 2.1.3 Contribution to the literature ......................................................................................... 25 2.2 Theoretical framework ............................................................................................................... 28 2.2.1 Modes of appointee behavior ........................................................................................ 28 2.2.2 Organizational change ..................................................................................................... 33 2.2.3 Linking appointee behavior and organizational change ............................................. 34 2.3 Case study design and methods ................................................................................................ 36 2.3.1 Qualitative case study design .......................................................................................... 36 2.3.2 Methods and interpretation ............................................................................................ 40 3 Political servants, professional guardians, or both? The case of the National Bank of Hungary ........................................................................................................................................ 45 3.1 The MNB’s legacy and metamorphosis ................................................................................... 47 3.1.1 MNB’s legacy of professionalism .................................................................................. 49 3.1.2 MNB’s metamorphosis under Fidesz-KDNP ............................................................. 51 3.2 Modes of appointee behavior at play ....................................................................................... 56 3.2.1 Analysis of the partisan mode of behavior................................................................... 56 3.2.2 Analysis of the professional mode of behavior ........................................................... 89 3.2.3 Analysis of the organizational mode of behavior ...................................................... 108 3.3 Chapter conclusions and discussion ....................................................................................... 116 4 Political servants, professional guardians, or both? The case of the Hungarian Accreditation Committee ......................................................................................................... 121 4.1 MAB’s evolution: The endeavor for autonomy and independence ................................... 122 4.1.1 Functional