SWEET AND SOUR CANDID TALKS TO IMPROVE U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS CHU SHULONG PAN ZHENQIANG DAVID M. FINKELSTEIN EVANS J.R. REVERE MA HONG ALAN D. ROMBERG MICHAEL MCDEVITT J. STAPLETON ROY NIU XINCHUN WANG GUOXING Introduction by DONALD S. ZAGORIA Our Mission The National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP) was founded in 1974 by Professor Hans J. Morgenthau and others. It is a nonprofit activist organization dedicated to the resolution of conflicts that threaten U.S. interests. Toward that end, the NCAFP identifies, articulates, and helps advance American foreign policy interests from a nonpartisan perspective within the framework of political realism. American foreign policy interests include: • preserving and strengthening national security; • supporting countries committed to the values and the practice of political, religious, and cultural pluralism; • improving U.S. relations with the developed and developing worlds; • advancing human rights; • encouraging realistic arms control agreements; • curbing the proliferation of nuclear and other unconventional weapons; • promoting an open and global economy. An important part of the activity of the NCAFP is Track I ½ and Track II diplomacy. Such closed-door and off-the-record endeavors provide unique opportunities for senior U.S. and foreign officials, think- tank experts, and scholars to engage in discussions designed to defuse conflict, build confidence, and resolve problems. Believing that an informed public is vital to a democratic society, the National Committee offers educational programs that address security challenges facing the United States and publishes a variety of publications, including its bimonthly journal, American Foreign Policy Interests, that present keen analyses of all aspects of American foreign policy. CONTENTS Introduction . 2 Donald S. Zagoria ARTICLES An Overview of Potential for U.S.-China Strategic Cooperation and How to Manage the Differences. 3 J. Stapleton Roy The Major Differences and Conflicts between the U.S. and China . 8 Chu Shulong Sino-U.S. Economic Relations: Too Good to Continue? . 14 Wang Guoxing and Ma Hong Comments on U.S.-China Military Relations: Where We Have Been, Where We Are and Where We Are Headed. 20 David M. Finkelstein The Context in which Military-to-Military Activities between the United States and the Peoples Republic of China Occur . 25 Michael McDevitt Chinese-U.S. Military Relations: The Need for a New Vision. 38 Pan Zhenqiang Managing the Cross-Strait Issue. 49 Alan D. Romberg U.S.-Taiwan Policy: Origin and Trend . .58 Niu Xinchun The United, States, North Korea and the Six-Party Talks: Problems, Prospects, and New Challenges . 64 Evans J.R. Revere APPENDIX Conference Report: “A U.S.-PRC Strategic Dialogue at the Track II Level: Reducing Strategic Mistrust” . 74 Donald S. Zagoria – 1 – Introduction By Donald S. Zagoria relations have experienced many ups and downs over the past several decades. And the yearU.S.- 2010 was China a particularly troublesome time for those relations. There were differences between the two great powers over U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, President Obama’s meeting with the Dalai Lama, China’s reluctance to condemn North Korea’s provocations against South Korea, a China-Japan spat over disputed islands, China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea, the granting of the Nobel Peace Prize to a Chinese dissident, and trade and currency issues. But the more important source of tensions and mutual mistrust in U.S.-China relations is not in these short-term problems, all of which have been present for a long time. Rather, they lie in more basic structural factors in the relationship. As one Chinese analyst in this volume puts it, the first and most basic source of tension is the “long-term uncertainty” of the nature of the relationship. Are China and the United States friends, potential enemies or neither friend nor foe? A second structural impediment to the relationship lies in the differing political systems and ideologies of the two great powers. Finally, there are fundamental differences of national interests (see Chu Shulong’s essay). An American writer in this volume, Ambassador J. Stapleton Roy, identifies the structural factors in somewhat different terms. Roy argues that China is now rising faster than any country in history and this makes China the one country in the world that has the potential to pose a fundamental challenge to U.S. supremacy. Moreover, as China’s power grows, so will its self-confidence, its range of options and, perhaps, its propensity for confrontational actions to pursue its interests. But although the two writers agree that there are basic structural factors in the U.S.-China relationship that contribute to an unhealthy level of tension and mutual suspicion, they also agree that the two sides have many important common interests, and they need to work together to manage their differences. The current leaders of the two countries share this view. In a recent visit to the United States, China’s Premier Wen Jiabao said that the common interests of the two countries outweigh their differences. And Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in a speech in late October 2010 that it was “not in anyone’s interest for the United States and China to see each other as adversaries.” So, the two sides are working together to chart a more positive and cooperative relationship. But in order to chart such a relationship between the two great powers, we at the NCAFP believe that it is necessary not just to have official dialogues but also to have a variety of more informal exchanges in which officials, former officials and scholars from the two sides can talk to each other with a degree of candor that is not always possible in official exchanges. It was in this spirit that the NCAFP and China’s Tsinghua University recently launched a Track II strategic dialogue designed to explore ways to build cooperation and manage differences. The first of these dialogues took place in New York in November 2010. The papers contained in this volume were presented to that forum. We believe that our goal of fostering candid dialogue between the two sides was realized. One of our participants, Captain Stacy Pedrozo, a former aide to Admiral Robert Willard and now a military fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, had this to say about our forum. “As usual, your deep and trusting relationships with many scholars and policymakers from China and the U.S. are critical to producing some of the most effective dialogue regarding U.S.-China relations. This particular meeting showcased your ability to generate frank discussions on topics where we may not agree, but where both sides see the need for improvement. After almost two decades of working with the Chinese, I think that you have the unique ability to host meetings which generate the most informative and candid discussions.” In a similar vein, Chu Shulong wrote us after the meeting that “all the Chinese participants felt that they learned a great deal, much more than from other similar conferences and meetings.” The main conclusion to be drawn from this dialogue is that the two sides understand that, despite their many differences, they need to find ways to work together on their many common interests and challenges. This will require some rethinking on each side. – 2 – An Overview of Potential for U.S.-China Strategic Cooperation And How to Manage the Differences By J. Stapleton Roy he impact of the global financial crisis on the international situation confirms earlier judgments that China is presenting the United States with its preeminent foreign policy challenge in the next few decades. TChina’s rise is directly linked to the outlook for U.S.-China relations in a variety of ways. Never before in history has a country risen as rapidly as China is now doing. Never before in history has a rise of this magnitude occurred at a time when the disparity in military strength between the dominant country and the rest of the world is as great as it is today. This means that China’s rise will not only impact the regional balance of power. Even more important, it makes China the one country in the world that has the potential to pose a fundamental challenge to U.S. supremacy. Just as the United States had difficulty adjusting to its dominant role in the immediate post-Cold War period, China is searching for the answer to how best to use its new wealth and power to advance its interests. Developments over the last two years suggest that China has not yet reached a domestic consensus on the question of how to strike the right balance between assertiveness and accommodation. Chinese views of their country’s position as the rising superpower differ from those of outside observers. In Chinese minds, they wish to become strong in order to protect themselves against exploitation by other powers, not so they can dominate others. The Chinese are undoubtedly sincere in this belief, but the fact remains that as China’s power grows, so will its range of options. Like the United States, China is showing that it is vulnerable to the intoxicating aspects of power that can manifest themselves in the tendency to inflate aims imprudently and to display less sensitivity to the interests and concerns of others. This will have consequences for East Asia because unlike the United States in the late 19th century, China must share its region with other major powers. Thus far, the countries of East Asia have welcomed China’s rise and benefited from the growing trade and investment ties that have accompanied China’s rapid economic development and emergence as a major global trading country.