PART I Images of International Relations MM02_VIOT0000_05_SE_CH02.indd02_VIOT0000_05_SE_CH02.indd 3377 330/12/100/12/10 11:00:00 PPMM MM02_VIOT0000_05_SE_CH02.indd02_VIOT0000_05_SE_CH02.indd 3388 330/12/100/12/10 11:00:00 PPMM CHAPTER 2 Realism: The State and Balance of Power MAJOR ACTORS AND ASSUMPTIONS R ealism is an image of international relations based on four principal assumptions. Scholars or policymakers who identify themselves as realists, of course, do not all perfectly match the realism ideal type. We find, however, that the four assumptions identified with this perspective are useful as a general statement of the main lines of realist thought and the basis on which hypotheses and theories are developed. First, states are the principal or most important actors in an anarchical world lack- ing central legitimate governance. States represent the key units of analysis , whether one is dealing with ancient Greek city-states or modern nation-states. The study of international relations is the study of relations among these units, particularly major powers as they shape world politics (witness the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War) and engage in the costliest wars (World Wars I and II). Realists who use the concept of system usually refer to an international system of states. What of non-state actors? International organizations such as the United Nations may aspire to the status of independent actor, but from the realist perspective, this aspiration has not in fact been achieved to any significant degree. Realists tend to see international organizations as doing no more than their member states direct. Multinational cor- porations, terrorist groups, and other transnational and international organizations are frequently acknowledged by realists, but the position of these non-state actors is always one of lesser importance. States remain the dominant actors. Second, the state is viewed as a unitary actor. For purposes of theory building and analysis, realists view the state as being encapsulated by a metaphorical hard shell or opaque, black box. We need not look much inside this shell or black box. A country faces the outside world as an integrated unit. Indeed, a common assumption associ- ated with realist thought is that political differences within the state are ultimately resolved authoritatively such that the government of the state speaks with one voice for the state as a whole. The state is a unitary actor in that it is usually assumed by realists to have one policy at any given time on any particular issue. To be sure, ex- ceptions occur, but to the realists these are exceptions that demonstrate the rule and that actually support the general notion of the state as an integrated, unitary actor. 39 MM02_VIOT0000_05_SE_CH02.indd02_VIOT0000_05_SE_CH02.indd 3399 330/12/100/12/10 11:00:00 PPMM 40 CHAPTER 2 Realism: The State and Balance of Power Even in those exceptional cases in which, for example, a foreign ministry expresses views different from positions taken by the same country’s defense min- istry, corrective action is taken in an attempt to bring these alternative views to a common and authoritative statement of policy. “End running” of state authorities by bureaucratic and nongovernmental, domestic, and transnational actors is also possible, but it occurs unchecked by state authorities in only those issues in which the stakes are low. From the realist perspective, if the issues are important enough, higher authorities will intervene to preclude bureaucratic end running or action by nongovernmental actors that are contrary to centrally directed policy. Third, given this emphasis on the unitary state-as-actor, realists usually make the further assumption for the purpose of theory building that the state is essentially a rational (or purposive) actor. A rational foreign policy decision-making process would include a statement of objectives, consideration of all feasible alternatives in terms of existing capabilities available to the state, the relative likelihood of at- taining these objectives by the various alternatives under consideration, and the benefits or costs associated with each alternative. Following this rational process, governmental decisionmakers select the alternative that maximizes utility (maxi- mizing benefit or minimizing cost associated with attaining the objectives sought) or at least achieves an acceptable outcome. The result is a rank ordering of policy preferences among viable alternatives. As a practical matter, the realist is aware of the difficulties in viewing the state as a rational actor. Governmental decisionmakers may not have all the factual in- formation or knowledge of cause and effect they need to make value-maximizing decisions. The process may well be clouded by considerable uncertainty as decision- makers grope for the best solution or approach to an issue. They also have to deal with the problem of human bias and misperception that may lead them astray. In any event, the choice made—if not always the best or value-maximizing choice in fact—is at least perceived to be a satisfactory one. It is a satisficing or suboptimal choice—less than a value-maximizing choice, but still good enough in terms of the objectives sought. The assumptions of states being both unitary and rational actors are particularly important in the application of game theory and other rational- choice methods to deterrence , arms control, balance of power, the use of force, and other studies of interest to realists. Fourth, realists assume that within the hierarchy of issues facing the state, national or international security usually tops the list. Military and related politi- cal issues dominate world politics. A realist focuses on actual or potential conflict between state actors and the use of force, examining how international stability is attained or maintained, how it breaks down, the utility of force as a means to resolve disputes, and the prevention of any violation of its territorial integrity. To the realist, military security or strategic issues are sometimes referred to as “high politics,” whereas economic and social issues typically are viewed as less important or “low politics.” Indeed, the former is often understood to dominate or set the environment within which the latter occurs. Given the state’s objectives, goals, or purposes in terms of security, it seeks and uses power (commonly understood in material terms as capabilities relative to other states), which is a key concept to realists as is the balance of power among states. The structural realist (or neorealist) puts particular emphasis on the security MM02_VIOT0000_05_SE_CH02.indd02_VIOT0000_05_SE_CH02.indd 4400 330/12/100/12/10 11:00:00 PPMM Major Actors and Assumptions 41 implications of the distribution of power (or underlying structure) of the interna- tional system of states: unipolar (one great power), bipolar (two great powers), or multipolar (three or more great powers). States use the power they have to serve their interests or achieve their objectives. To most realists, the struggle for (or use of) power among states is at the core of international relations. In the words of Hans J. Morgenthau: “International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim or means to an end.” 1 Further comment is necessary concerning assumptions two and three. The im- portant point is that from the standpoint of methodology , the image of a unified, rational state is truly an assumption, not a description of the actual world. Realists who embrace positivism use such assumptions to build theories, not describe real- ity. Assumptions should be viewed not in terms of descriptive accuracy, but rather in terms of how fruitful they are in generating insights and valid generalizations about international politics. From this point of view, assumptions are neither true nor false; they are more or less useful in helping the theorist derive testable proposi- tions or hypotheses about international relations. Once hypotheses are developed, they are tested against the real world. The image of the unified, rational state is, therefore, the starting point for realist analysis, not a concluding statement. This is true whether one is a classical realist emphasizing the impact of history, international law, and actions taken by political leaders or a present-day neo- or structural realist who believes the basis for a theory of international relations has to have at its core an understanding of the distribution of capabilities across states. Morgenthau, a classical realist, explained the utility of the rational, unitary actor assumption as follows: We put ourselves in the position of a statesman who must meet a certain problem of foreign policy under certain circumstances, and we ask ourselves what the rational alternatives are from which a statesman may choose . and which of these rational alternatives this particular statesman, acting under these circumstances, is likely to choose. It is the testing of this rational hypothesis against the actual facts and their consequences that gives meaning to the facts of international politics and makes a theory of politics possible. 2 The point is that neorealist theorizing that focuses primarily on material structure (the distribution of power or capabilities) as the principal explanatory variable depends on the same rationalist assumptions as classical realists. This is despite the fact classical