"THE DYNAMICS OF MINORITY RULE: INTRA-PARTY POLITICS AND MINORITY GOVERNMENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE'• by Moshe Maor A Thesis Submitted in Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at The London School of Economics University of London March 10, 1992 UMI Number: U048619 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Disscrrlation Publishing UMI U048619 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 ABSTRACT The aim of this study is to provide a theoretical and empirical explanation of the question: How do conflicts within a party affect its coalitional behaviour insofar as such conflicts may influence the bargaining power of party elites in the parliamentary arena? There are three major themes around which the theoretical explanation is organized. The first theme is that 'party institutionalization' and the nature of intra-party conflicts are important factors in shaping the ability of the party elites to neutralize internal conflicts. The second theme - a particular application of the first - is that the strength of a party in the parliamentary bargaining plane (i.e. its relative bargaining power) lies in its organization weakness. The third theme reveals that political parties, which are characterized by the existence of heterogeneous and diffused mechanisms for internal dissent, can handle internal conflicts in a variety of ways without forcing members to leave the party. Based upon a comparative analysis of intra-party conflicts and minority governments in Denmark, Norway, France, Italy and the U.K., the study suggests that weakly institutionalized parties can enter into conflict inducing coalition negotiations without risking their hold on their membership, whereas inter-party negotiations can lead to disintegration of highly institutionalized parties as members may be forced to leave the party as their primary mechanism for expression of discontent. A major implication of this study is that in multi-party systems in which minority situations occur, the most attractive strategy (i.e. in terms of bargaining power) for highly institutionalized parties occupying a governmental position is the formation of informal minority governments, whereas the most attractive strategy for weakly institutionalized parties is the formation of formal minority governments. ACKNOWLEDGMENT As perhaps befits an effort to bring together such diverse elements as theories of coalitional behaviour and intra-party politics, a simple paradox and party elites' interviews, this dissertation has been long in the making. In the course of writing it, I have enjoyed the stimulating environment of the Government Department at L.S.E., and have accumulated debts to a group of wonderful friends-teachers and teachers-friends. Over these years, I had the good fortune to enjoy the help, challenges and the converging or diverging comments of my supervisors, Gordon Smith and Howard Machin. In a very skillful way, they always knew how to interpret my broken English and how to gather meaningful insights from my thoughts and feelings. I was also fortunate to benefited from the criticism of Desmond King whose rigorous thinking contributed a solid foundation for this work. Numerous people read separate chapters or gave comments when I presented them in various conferences and informal forums: Lars Bille, Erik Damgaard, Gianfranco Pasquino, Gideon Doron, Angelo Panebianco, John Madeley, Hilmar Rommetvedt, Alan Beattie, Vincent Wright, Rob Elgie, Jan-Erik Lane, Knud Heidar, Lawrence Rose, Rosa Mule, Razin Sally and II Trevor Gunn. I am grateful to them for their advice and support. No less important was the role of friends and colleagues in taking care of the logistic aspects of the visits to five European capitals. I would like to thank Hadasa Bezalel, Birte and Erik Haagh, Henry Valen, Ole Andersen, Soren Villadsen and Geoffrey Pridham. I would like to acknowledge also the help of Valeria de Bonis, Giovanni Orsina, Anita Ferraro and Christina di Pietro who tirelessly translated hours of interviews. Their work greatly improved the quality of my dissertation. Michael Glass, A. J. Barnes, Mitza Edge and Simon Hix read what I had considered the final draft of the manuscript and persuade me that more iteration was necessary. The thesis was made possible by the joint financial support of Argov Fellowship, Overseas Research Studentships, The Central Research Fund of the University of London, Anglo- Jewish Association, Mr. Ian Karten and an anonymous Swiss fund. Didi, my closest friend, was a prime partner in this work. Her sharp intellect and emotional support were the key for making this dream come true. London March 1992 III CONTENTS Page Abstract --------------------- I Acknowledgements ----------------- II List of Figures ----------------- VIII List of Tables ----------------------- VIII Abbreviations ------------------ IX 1. INTRODUCTION! THE LACUNA OF COALITIONAL BEHAVIOUR - 2 1.1 The Study of Minority Governments: Formation and Performance ——————————————— 6 1.2 Intra-party Politics and Coalitional Behaviour ————————————————— 16 1.3 The Concept of 'Party Institutionalization' and The Dynamics of Minority Rule - ----- 20 2. THE RESEARCH STRATEGY -------------- 29 2.1 The Theoretical Framework ---------- 31 2.1.1 Basic Assumptions ------------ 32 2.1.2 The Bargaining Problem ———————— — 35 2.1.3 The Process of Coalitional Behaviour: The Relevancy of 'Party Institutionalization'- 40 2.1.4 The Paradox — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 4 3 2.1.5 Factors Influencing Bargaining Power: A Typology — 45 2.2 A Sample of West European Party Systems - - - 52 2.3 A Survey of Elites ------------- 53 3. INTRA-PARTY POLITICS AND MINORITY GOVERNMENTS IN DENMARK, 1975-1982, 1988-1990 --------- 62 3.1 Party Strength and Constitutional Context - - 65 3.2 SD Elites between Party Follower's Hostility and Decisive Preferences of 'Economic Recovery' and 'Government Stability', 1975-1982 - - - - 69 IV 3.2.1 The Development of the SD's Alliance Strategy ———————————————— 70 3.2.2 The Intra-Party Consequences of the SD's Alliance Strategy ------------ 76 3.3 Are Intra-Elite Conflicts Bound to Lower a Party's Bargaining Power? : The RV's Case, 1988-1990 ------------------ 86 3.4 Conclusions ----------------- 95 4. INTRA-PARTY POLITICS AND MINORITY GOVERNMENTS IN NORWAY, 1976-1990 - - - 97 4.1 Party Strength and Constitutional Context - - 100 4.2 The Highly Institutionalized DNA : A Tale of an Unchanged Strategy of Informal Alliances - 107 4.2.1 The Position of Odvar Nordli (1976-1981) and Gro Harlem Brundtland (1986-1989) within the DNA —————————————— 107 4.2.2 The DNA Alliance Strategy and its Intra- Party Consequences ———————————— 110 4.3 Coping with Conflicts within one of the Coalition Partners: The Advantage of Kare Willoch's Dominant Position within the Conservative Party, 1981-83, 1985-86 - - - - 117 4.4 SP Cabinet Members between Government Solidarity and Parliamentary Group Hostility,1989—90 —————————————— 128 4.5 Conclusions ----------------- 138 5. THE HISTORIC COMPROMISE, ITALY, 1976-1979 - - ----- 140 5.1 Party Strength and Constitutional Context - - 143 5.2 A Compromise at any Price: Towards the Breaking Up of PCI's 'Conventio ad Excludendum' ————————————————— 150 5.3 PCI Elites between Party Follower's Hostility and DC's Elite Adaptation ---------- 162 5.4 The Wages of Bargaining Power: DC's Strategy of Confrontation during 1976-1979 - - 171 V 5.5 Conclusions ----------------- 180 6. THE LIB-LAB PACT, THE U.K., 1977-1978 - ----- - - - 183 6.1 Party Strength and Constitutional Context - - 185 6.2 The Product of Bargaining Between Two Party Leaders ------------------- 191 6.3 Coping with Intra-Elite and Elite-Follower Conflicts: The Experience of the Weakly Institutionalized Labour and Liberal Parties - 200 6.4 A Successful Resolution of Internal Conflicts: One Way to Gain Bargaining Power ------- 210 6.5 Conclusions ----------------- 221 7. ROCARD'S MINORITY GOVERNMENT, FRANCE, 1988-1990 - - 223 7.1 Party Strength and Constitutional Context - - 225 7.2 The Presidential Factor in Minority Government Formation —————————————————— 229 7.3 Coping with Intra-Elite and Elite-Follower's Conflicts: The Consequences of the PS's Internal Fluidity and the PCF's Structural Ridigity - - 238 7.4 Rocard's Pay-off of a Cautious Trade-Off - - - 247 7.5 Conclusions ----------------- 255 8. CONCLUSIONS: THE INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANT OF COALITIONAL BEHAVIOUR —————————————— 257 8.1 The Dynamics of Minority Rule -------- 260 8.2 The Institutional Determinant of Coalitional Stability ------------------ 270 8.3 Closing the Lacuna of Coalitional Behaviour - 277 NOTES ------------------------- 280 Introduction ------------------- 280 Chapter Two ------------------- 286 Chapter Three ------------------- 290 Chapter Four ------------------- 294 Chapter Five ------------------- 300 Chapter Six ------------------- 309 Chapter Seven ------------------- 316 Conclusions ------------------- 320 VI APPENDICES -- ------ -------- 323 2.1 Oppositional Influence by Country