Murat Laumulin (Editor's Note: This viewpoint was written and sent to The Nonproliferation Review from Almaty, Kazakhstan, in early December 1993. The Kazakh parliament ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on December 13th, 1993. On that same day, in Almaty, the United States and Kazakhstan signed the Agreement On Assistance with the Dismantlement of Soviet SS-18 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. In his essay, Dr. Laumulin explains the decisionmaking processes and rationale on the Kazakh side that led up to this important agreement. He also discusses Kazakhstan's expectations regarding Western behavior beyond the agreement.) azakhstan's position on nuclear issues became more Because the Soviet Union was a nuclear state, it had no clearly defined over the course of 1993. During the need for IAEA safeguards. Consequently, Kazakhstan also Kfinal months of 1993, the political life of the Repub- had no experience with such safeguards. Now, the Atomic lic of Kazakhstan was replete with events concerning nuclear Energy Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan--headed by questions. An anti-nuclear con- General Director V. S. Shkolnik- ference, organized by the Ne- -has developed a program for in- vada-Semipalatinsk movement, cluding Kazakhstan's nuclear fa- was held in Almaty at the end VIEWPOINT: cilities within the framework of of the summer. This latest con- the IAEA. Nevertheless, seri- ference differed from its prede- ous obstacles are being encoun- cessors in that the demand be- NUCLEAR tered in training personnel and ing made--closing the Lobnor providing technical back-up to nuclear testing site in Sinxiang POLITICS AND make sure that our nuclear fa- (Eastern Turkestan)--affected cilities are covered by IAEA diplomatic and intergovernmen- safeguards. A number of West- tal relations between the THE FUTURE ern states have pledged to coop- People's Republic of China and erate with the Republic of the Republic of Kazakhstan. In Kazakhstan in training person- recent times, the leadership of SECURITY OF nel to work at nuclear facilities. Kazakhstan has repeatedly Thus, with the passing of time, raised the issues of the test ban the level of security in our and China's adherence to it. KAZAKHSTAN nuclear industry is increasing, In September, delegations by unlike security in the military representing the governments of and political spheres, which was Kazakhstan and the United Murat Laumulin once guaranteed by Soviet States held intensive negotia- (translated by nuclear capabilities. tions, which resulted in the ini- Catherine Boyle) tialing of a framework agree- KAZAKHSTAN AND THE NPT ment on U.S. participation in, and financing of, the dismantling of Soviet SS-18 ballistic START I and START II appear ideal if Kazakhstan is to missiles. In Almaty, it was hoped that the signing of this think in terms of definitive disarmament. The reality of the document would signify Kazakhstan's true intention of ful- disarmament process has turned out to be somewhat harsher, filling the obligations set forth in the START I treaty and the however. The issues of nuclear disarmament and the non- Lisbon Protocol. Finally, during the first week of October, proliferation of nuclear weapons have now become inter- Kazakhstan was officially accepted into the International twined, as may clearly be seen from the stance adopted by Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at its headquarters in Vienna. the United States and Russia. Thus, joining the NPT is This means that for the immediate future all nuclear facili- ties in Kazakhstan will fall under IAEA safeguards--that is, Dr. Murat Laumulin is Second Secretary in the Department the agency's regulations for accounting, information, and of International Security and Arms Control of the Ministry monitoring. (Editor's Note: As of the date of this publica- of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan. In the fall of 1992, he tion, Kazakhstan has not yet concluded a safeguards agree- spent several months at the Monterey Institute as a visiting ment with the IAEA.) fellow with the Program for Nonproliferation Studies. The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1994 61 Murat Laumulin becoming a decisive factor in the resolution of not only those Soviet Union are being cut back; the issue of the remaining questions surrounding the implementation of START I, but nuclear states, France and China, joining the NPT is on the also a wide range of issues concerning Kazakhstan's devel- agenda. There have been instances in which countries pos- opment as a member of the world community. sessing nuclear weapons have voluntarily given them up Analysis of the existing situation indicates that there are (South Africa). Talks are ongoing regarding a comprehen- no alternatives insofar as ratification of the NPT is con- sive test ban. Regulations have tightened worldwide in an cerned. Kazakhstan will either become a party to the treaty effort to prevent the proliferation of nuclear components and as a non-nuclear state, thereby establishing normal relations dual-use materials. Moreover, solutions are being found for with all the major world powers and with the world commu- regional conflicts which were once the reason why certain nity as a whole, or be drawn into dangerous games with the states were developing their nuclear industries. These changes nuclear weapons legacy of the former Soviet Union. are encouraging, and Kazakhstan has an opportunity to con- Kazakhstan chose the non-nuclear path even before the col- tribute to this increase in world security. lapse of the Soviet Union, for a reason which is still fresh in While there are moral, economic, and political reasons for everyone's memory: the fight to close the test site at Kazakhstan to join the NPT, there are also well-grounded Semipalatinsk. No other country in the world has endured reasons for Kazakhstan's delay in ratifying the NPT. Never- as many nuclear tests as Kazakhstan: 459 nuclear explosions theless, certain spokespersons for the U.S. government main- were carried out on Kazakh soil (113 of which were in the tain that Kazakhstan is hiding behind Ukraine in order to atmosphere). The consequences of this testing affected the drag out the resolution of the nuclear weapons issue. In- life and health of the local population, as well as the eco- deed, there have recently been major changes on the nuclear logical balance of a vast expanse of land. It also made the scene: the Ukrainian Parliament ratified the START I treaty people of Kazakhstan strongly "allergic" to nuclear issues. and the Lisbon Protocol, but with amendments which de The closing of the nuclear test site, the withdrawal of nuclear facto make Ukraine a nuclear state. This has exacerbated weapons, and joining the NPT--these are all links in the tensions between Russia and Ukraine, generating concern in same chain, the final link of which is the actual ratification Washington. There can be no talk of Kazakhstan's adopting of the NPT. a wait-and-see attitude, however. In addition to the moral aspect of this question, there are Kazakhstan clearly cannot accept the Ukrainian way of also significant economic and political aspects. These is- solving this problem, as both Moscow and Washington un- sues relate to the considerable aid package that Kazakhstan derstand full well. It is in Russia's interest not to aggravate is to receive from the world community and a number of already controversial issues, particularly those concerning developed countries in order to introduce measures for dis- agreement on compensation for uranium taken from the war- mantling strategic nuclear missiles, dealing with the after- heads of dismantled missiles. It is in the interest of the effects of nuclear testing, and developing a peaceful nuclear United States (which is now obliged to resolve this Ukrai- energy program. This aid package hinges on Kazakhstan's nian crisis), not to let the same thing happen with Kazakhstan, unconditional adherence to the NPT as a non-nuclear state. which will need real security guarantees once START I is It is common knowledge that Kazakhstan has a tremendous implemented. This new situation presents an opportunity to supply of raw uranium at its disposal and, therefore, has raise cooperation between Kazakhstan and the United States great potential for developing its nuclear power industry. to a new level. We cannot trade this raw material and effectively develop Kazakhstan's gradual shift to non-nuclear status is cur- our own nuclear power industry without IAEA cooperation, rently undergoing a decisive stage in its development: that which is a condition of our joining the NPT. is, the ratification of the NPT and Kazakhstan's joining the For a quarter of a century following the signing of the NPT as a non-nuclear state. These actions bring to an end NPT, the promoters of nuclear nonproliferation experienced an entire era in Kazakhstan's history, over the course of which both successes and defeats. Despite monitoring by the IAEA, its territory has seen atomic and nuclear testing, the station- by nuclear states, and by the United Nations, a number of ing of strategic nuclear weapons, and the extraction and ex- countries succeeded in coming very close to creating nuclear port of raw materials for the Soviet nuclear power industry. weapons. They are known as "threshold," or New choices lie ahead of Kazakhstan, perhaps in connection "nearly-nuclear" states. Yet the overall trend in interna- with the creation and development of our own peaceful nuclear tional relations points towards a non-nuclear world. The structures, but these choices will be ours to make as a sover- huge nuclear arsenals of the United States and the former eign state. 62 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1994 Murat Laumulin sition, even from the republics that were loyal to Moscow. THE INCREASINGLY CONTRADICTORY NATURE OF Ukraine, with its considerable political, military, and eco- NUCLEAR ISSUES nomic clout, spoke out openly against this policy of forcing decisions upon the republics.