Truthmaking, Truth, and Realism: New Work for a Theory of Truthmakers Jamin Asay A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy. Chapel Hill 2011 Approved by: Keith Simmons William G. Lycan Dorit Bar-On John T. Roberts Thomas Hofweber © 2011 Jamin Asay ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ii ABSTRACT Jamin Asay: Truthmaking, Truth, and Realism: New Work for a Theory of Truthmakers (Under the direction of Keith Simmons) Truthmaker theory begins with the idea that truth depends upon reality. When a truth- bearer is true, that is because something or other in the world makes it true. My dissertation offers a theory of truthmakers that shows how we should flesh out this thought while avoiding the contentious metaphysical commitments that are built into other truthmaker theories. Because of these commitments, many philosophers have come to view truthmaker theory as being essentially tied to correspondence theories of truth, and to metaphysical realism. I argue that, quite to the contrary, truthmaker theory is distinct from correspondence theory, and that the former actually undermines the motivation for the latter. In fact, truthmaker theory can be used to argue for a particular kind of deflationism about truth. I also argue that debates about realism and anti-realism are best viewed through the lens of truthmaker theory, which is not—contrary to what many have thought—an essentially realist approach to metaphysics. Anti-realists of various stripes can also make use of truthmakers. The anti-realism of such views depends upon either the nature of the truthmakers they use, or the nature of the truthmaking relation itself. iii For my first-year cohort: Adam Cureton, Felipe De Brigard, Katie Elliott, Emily Given, and Emily Kelahan iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS It’s customary to end one’s acknowledgments with the one to whom one owes the most thanks, to “save the best for last” (while acknowledging that he or she is “last but not least”). I don’t care about custom. My first and most important thanks for support on this project go to my partner Emily Matchar, who has been a source of constant encouragement and companionship from start to finish, across several years and several continents. The nature of our relationship has evolved while I’ve been writing this dissertation, but her support has been unwavering. If my prose were anywhere near as pleasurable to read as hers, these four hundred pages would be far more bearable. Next I extend my warmest thanks to my advisor and dissertation director Keith Simmons, who has selflessly spent countless hours reading, commenting on, and talking with me about my work. Keith has forged through draft after draft of these pages (and there are a lot of them), and they would be far worse had they not received his critical scrutiny. I thank him for taking me on as a student, and letting me submerse him in the literature on truthmaking. As members of my dissertation committee, and moreover just as supportive and enthusiastic colleagues, Dorit Bar-On and Bill Lycan have been invaluable commentators on my work. I have learned much from them over the years. I’m also grateful to Thomas Hofweber and John Roberts, who have both signed on late in the game to serve as readers for the dissertation, but who have been supportive of the project from the beginning. v My thanks also go to the numerous individuals who have taken the time to read and meet with me about my work. This distinguished list includes Bob Adams, David Armstrong, Simon Blackburn, Rachael Briggs, Mark Jago, Matt Kotzen, Marc Lange, Ram Neta, Laurie Paul, Michael Pendlebury, Huw Price, Geoff Sayre-McCord, Jonathan Schaffer, and surely others I have neglected to mention. My work has also benefitted from the many audiences who have heard various pieces of it. This includes various audiences from the University of North Carolina, the 2009 Australasian Association of Philosophy Annual Conference, the work-in-progress series at the University of Sydney (both for faculty and postgraduates), the Rethinking Mind and Cosmos conference (with gracious commentary from Alison Fernandes), the 2010 joint meeting of the North and South Carolina Philosophical Associations, the 2010 Midsouth conference (where I was supplied with helpful comments by Matthew Carlson), the 2010 Annual Meeting of the Ohio Philosophical Association (with helpful commentary by Dimitria Gatzia), and the 2010 Rocky Mountain Ethics Conference. Institutional support has been provided by the Department of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, my home department. I am incredibly grateful to all the faculty for their support during my tenure as a graduate student, and to all my fellow students for many years of friendship and philosophical companionship. The only way not to leave someone out would be to list everybody who has been through the department in the last six years. But let me still thank in particular Seth Bordner, Jason Bowers, Patrick Connolly, Dana Falkenberg, Elizabeth Foreman, Drew Johnson, Dave Landy, Cathay Liu, Clair Morrissey, Dave Ripley, Nate Sharadin, Elanor Taylor, and Piers Norris Turner. I have learned much from all of you, and deeply appreciate your friendship over the years. A special vi thanks also go to the departmental staff who have kept everything running behind the scenes over the years. To Sarah Blythe, Jennie Dickson, Kelly Finn, Diane Lupton, Claire Miller, Gucki Obler, Carlo Robustelli, Adam Schaefer, Theresa Stone, and Lance Westerlund: thanks for all you do and have done. I am also immensely grateful to the Department of Philosophy at the University of Sydney, and the Centre for Time, which supported me for one semester in 2009. I drafted this entire dissertation while in Sydney, in large thanks to the stimulating intellectual environment that is Sydney’s philosophical community. In particular, I thank Huw Price for extending his invitation to me, and I in turn extend my thanks to Sam Baron, Rachael Briggs, Pete Evans, Alison Fernandes, Patrick Greenough, Matthew Hammerton, Mark Jago, Ian Lawson, Nick Malpas, and Raamy Majeed for graciously welcoming me into Sydney’s philosophy community. Finally, a special thanks go to the surviving members of my first-year cohort: Adam Cureton, Felipe De Brigard, Katie Elliott, Emily Given, and Emily Kelahan. I cannot overestimate the effect that my fellow students have had on my philosophical development. I dedicate this dissertation to you, which only seems appropriate since no one has had to hear me drone on over the years about truth and realism more than all of you. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction................................................................................................................................1 1. Truthmaking and Truthmakers ......................................................................................5 1.1. Background and theoretical desiderata ..............................................................5 1.2. The truthmaking relation....................................................................................8 1.2.1. Preliminaries ..........................................................................................8 1.2.2. Standard accounts of the relation.........................................................13 1.2.3. Truthmaking and the analytic/synthetic distinction.............................21 1.2.4. Troubles for truthmaking .....................................................................26 1.2.5. Settling for the synthetic ......................................................................28 1.2.6. Paradox avoided...................................................................................38 1.3. The scope of truthmaking ................................................................................43 1.3.1. The doctrinal approach to truthmaking................................................43 1.3.2. The methodological approach to truthmaking .....................................48 1.4. Conclusion.......................................................................................................59 1.5. Appendix: truthmakers and truth-conditions ...................................................62 2. Truthmaking and Truth................................................................................................72 2.1. Seeing truth in truthmaking .............................................................................74 2.2. How not to separate truth and truthmaking......................................................81 2.3. Truthmaker theory is not a theory of truth.......................................................93 2.4. Truthmaking against correspondence ............................................................103 viii 3. Truthmaking and Deflationary Truth.........................................................................121 3.1. Deflationary theories of truth.........................................................................121 3.2. The compatibility of truthmaking and deflationism ......................................131 3.2.1. The case against compatibility...........................................................131 3.2.2. Truthmaking and linguistic deflationism...........................................136 3.2.3. Truthmaking and conceptual deflationism.........................................138 3.2.4. Truthmaking and metaphysical