View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Calhoun, Institutional Archive of the Naval Postgraduate School Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 2007-06 Better lucky than good operation earnest will as gunboat diplomacy Kelley, Stephen Andrew Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/3463 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS BETTER LUCKY THAN GOOD: OPERATION EARNEST WILL AS GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY by Stephen Andrew Kelley June 2007 Thesis Co-Advisors: Daniel J. Moran James A. Russell Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED June 2007 Master’s Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: Better Lucky Than Good: Operation Earnest Will as 5. FUNDING NUMBERS Gunboat Diplomacy 6. AUTHOR(S): Stephen Andrew Kelley 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School REPORT NUMBER Monterey, CA 93943-5000 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING N/A AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited A 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) In 1987 the United States agreed to register eleven Kuwaiti oil tankers under the American flag and provide them naval protection at the height of the Iran – Iraq War. Motivated primarily by Cold War considerations, the United States embarked on a policy of “neutral intervention” whose intended effects were certain to be disadvantageous to Iran. American planners failed to adequately anticipate Iranian reaction to the American policy, which led to a number of violent naval actions and American retaliatory strikes on Iranian oil facilities. Nevertheless, by April, 1988, the United States had largely achieved its declared objectives, which were to secure the safe transit of Kuwaiti oil through the Gulf, and forestall the expansion of Soviet influence in the region. On April 29, 1988, however, the United States expanded the scope of the protection scheme, extending the U.S. Navy’s protective umbrella to all neutral shipping in the Persian Gulf. This decision divorced the American policy from its original limited objectives, increased the likelihood of further confrontation with Iran, and laid the groundwork for the destruction of an Iranian airliner by USS Vincennes (CG-49). 14. SUBJECT TERMS: United States, Kuwait, Iran, Iran – Iraq War, Persian Gulf, Gunboat 15. NUMBER OF Diplomacy, Tanker War, Merchant Shipping, Operation Earnest Will, Operation Nimble Archer, PAGES Operation Praying Mantis, USS Vincennes 109 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UL NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited BETTER LUCKY THAN GOOD: OPERATION EARNEST WILL AS GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY Stephen Andrew Kelley Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy B.S., Maine Maritime Academy, 1993 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL June 2007 Author: Stephen Andrew Kelley Approved by: Daniel J. Moran Thesis Advisor James A. Russell Co-Thesis Advisor Douglas Porch Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT In 1987 the United States agreed to register eleven Kuwaiti oil tankers under the American flag and provide them naval protection at the height of the Iran – Iraq War. Motivated primarily by Cold War considerations, the United States embarked on a policy of “neutral intervention” whose intended effects were certain to be disadvantageous to Iran. American planners failed to adequately anticipate Iranian reaction to the American policy, which led to a number of violent naval actions and American retaliatory strikes on Iranian oil facilities. Nevertheless, by April 1988, the United States had largely achieved its declared objectives, which were to secure the safe transit of Kuwaiti oil through the Gulf, and forestall the expansion of Soviet influence in the region. On April 29, 1988, however, the United States expanded the scope of the protection scheme, extending the U.S. Navy’s protective umbrella to all neutral shipping in the Persian Gulf. This decision divorced the American policy from its original limited objectives, increased the likelihood of further confrontation with Iran, and laid the groundwork for the destruction of an Iranian airliner by USS Vincennes (CG-49). v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 A. PURPOSE.........................................................................................................1 B. IMPORTANCE................................................................................................2 C. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES.............................................................4 D. CHAPTER OUTLINE.....................................................................................6 II. THE ROOTS OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT..................................................................9 A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION.......................................................................9 B. THE CARTER DOCTRINE...........................................................................9 C. THE U.S. NAVY IN THE PERSIAN GULF: A BRIEF HISTORY.........16 D. CHAPTER SUMMARY................................................................................18 III. THE TANKER WAR: 1981 - 1986...........................................................................19 A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION.....................................................................19 B. IRAQI OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY...................................................21 C. IRANIAN OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY.............................................21 D. WAR IN THE PERSIAN GULF: 1981 – 1986............................................22 E. ASSESSMENT OF IRAQI ATTACKS .......................................................26 F. ASSESSMENT OF IRANIAN ATTACKS..................................................28 G. THE U.S. AND THE TANKER WAR.........................................................30 H. CHAPTER SUMMARY................................................................................32 IV. OPERATION EARNEST WILL: AMERICAN OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY................................................................................................................35 A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION.....................................................................35 B. THE USS STARK INCIDENT ......................................................................36 C. U.S. OBJECTIVES ........................................................................................42 1. Strategic Objectives ...........................................................................42 2. Political Objectives.............................................................................43 3. Economic Objectives..........................................................................44 D. AMERICAN STRATEGY AND ASSUMPTIONS ....................................45 E. GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY ...........................................................................47 1. Purposeful Force Gunboat Diplomacy.............................................48 F. FACTORS INFLUENCING IRANIAN ACQUIESCENCE .....................49 G. CHAPTER SUMMARY................................................................................52 V. OPERATION EARNEST WILL: JULY, 1987 – APRIL, 1988 ............................55 A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION.....................................................................55 B. THE BRIDGETON INCIDENT....................................................................56 C. THE CAPTURE OF IRAN AJR ...................................................................58 D. THE “BATTLE OF FARSI ISLAND” ........................................................60 E. OPERATION NIMBLE ARCHER..............................................................61 F. THE MINING OF USS SAMUEL B. ROBERTS ........................................62 G. WAR AT SEA: OPERATION PRAYING