50 GENERAL DYNAMICS F-111B | STORY: STEWART WILSON The one that got away The General Dynamics F-111 overcame masses of ‘bad press’ in its early days and many technical difficulties to be recognised as arguably the best strike bomber of its era. But there was one version which failed due to the flawed philosophy behind its development: the F-111B carrier-based fleet defence fighter for the US Navy. GENERAL DYNAMICS F-111B 51 Above: The first F-111B (Bu151970) fleet defence fighter first flew on 18 May 1965 but three years later the programme was cancelled after just seven had been built. The main external difference to the land- based F-111 models is the shortened nose. US Navy THE F-111 QUALIFIES as a remarkable aircraft on all counts. It incorporated a high level of new and advanced technology, overcame its problems and went on to perform superbly as a strike and later electronics warfare platform. In retrospect it can be seen that the US Navy’s F-111B was never going to work. It was a victim of its political architect’s vision for an aircraft that could be both a large land-based strike bomber and a naval fighter. That architect was US Secretary of Defense Robert Strange McNamara, whose ‘procedural commonality’ philosophy was intended to create industrial, technical and financial efficiencies. It had the opposite effect. Grumman was given prime responsibility for the F-111B programme due to General Dynamics’ lack of experience with naval aircraft. Grumman, on the other Rollout of the first F-111B from Grumman’s hand, had a long and illustrious history in that field. >>> Long Island, New York facility. Note the Gulfstream I and C-2A Greyhound in the background. Grumman 52 GENERAL DYNAMICS F-111B Above: The first F-111B in flight in 1965 with its underfuselage airbrake extended. As on all F-111s, this also served as the door for the main undercarriage. US Navy Below: US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara (centre), author of the ‘procedural commonality’ concept which resulted in the F-111. He is photographed here in Vietnam with General William Westmoreland. To quote another writer: “This was the perceived role by the press, most politicians version which would have proven McNamara's and of course the public. ‘commonality’ concept.... had it worked.” It To them a fighter was an aircraft which didn't, and the F-111B never served with its shot down other aircraft, something which intended customer. This was neither General despite its ability to carry air-to-air missiles for Dynamics’ nor Grumman’s fault, rather the self-defence, the F-111 never was. flawed philosophy under which it was Its ultimate success resulted from not only developed. sorting out the technical problems, but also recognising that McNamara’s ‘Jack Of All SHAKY START Trades’ philosophy was impossible to achieve First flown in December 1964, the F-111 and accepting that the F-111 was – despite its suffered serious issues during its development designation prefix – a strike bomber. and early service career: an advanced powerplant that wasn't properly matched to PROCEDURAL COMMONALITY its inlets; excessive weight; excessive drag; first production aircraft to use turbofan engines In 1960, the USAF and US Navy issued massive cost increases; and structural with afterburners, the Pratt & Whitney TF30. separate requirements for a new Tactical problems in the variable-geometry wings' Considering how effective the mature F-111 Fighter Experimental (TFX) and Fleet Air carry-through box, the structural heart of the turned out to be in the strike role, it's worth Defence Fighter (FADF), respectively. That all wings and the point from which they pivot. recounting the aircraft's intended roles as seen changed in January 1961 with the arrival of The variable sweep wings (or `swing wings' by those who wrote its original requirements. the John F Kennedy presidency and a new as the media dubbed them) were only one of It was to be a tactical bomber, strategic bomber, Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara. the several ‘firsts’ incorporated within the tactical fighter, reconnaissance platform and a McNamara was a man on a mission. F-111. Although the wing geometry was the naval heavy fleet defence fighter all in one. As a former Vice President of the Ford Motor area which generated the most interest in the It proved to be impossible to reconcile all Company, he was a successful businessman popular press and the F-111 was the first these requirements satisfactorily despite the and economist who, as a senior executive of aircraft with variable sweep to enter service, F-111's advanced design features. The carrier- a large corporation, was an advocate and a couple of its operational characteristics borne fleet defence fighter version – the F-111B practitioner of efficiency in business. His indicated its true importance. – was the main bugbear and was abandoned attitude to the business of defence spending In its land-based production form, the after seven prototypes had been flown. differed little from the financial management F-111 was the first aircraft able of making An unfortunate part of the whole exercise he employed at Ford. Where possible, wasteful blind, first pass attacks on precision targets was the designation of the aircraft as a duplication had to be got rid of. and the first capable of penetrating hostile air ‘fighter’, the result of the programme being The term ‘procedural commonality’ was space at extremely low altitudes in automatic called the Tactical Fighter Experimental used to describe what McNamara was trying terrain following (TF) mode with the Terrain (TFX) in its early days, the omission of the to achieve, and among his first targets were Following Radar (TFR) telling the autopilot key word ‘strike’ from this abbreviation the TFX and FADF projects which were where to point the aeroplane. It was also the causing a misconception of the F-111's combined into one as the TFX. GENERAL DYNAMICS F-111B 53 F-111 DESIGN COMMONALITY AIR FORCE COMMON • Basic Stucture • Propulsion System • Primary Flight Controls Crew Station Tyres • Secondary Power 85% COMMONALITY • Refrigeration Package • Crew Escape Capsule • Reconnaissance • Penetration Aids Nose Gear Fire Power Fixed Wing Control System Pylon Radome & Electronics Bay Wing Extension AMCS Tyres MLG Radome Arrester Hooks Nose Gear • M & TC Crew Station • Fuel System A General Dynamics diagram illustrating the areas of commonality and difference between the Air Force and Navy versions of the F-111. The ‘procedural commonality’ theory was intended to SIMILAR produce significant development, acquisition and operating cost savings. NAVY In February 1961 it was announced that the requirements of the US Air Force taking for the naval version), Boeing, Lockheed, one aircraft type with the maximum possible precedence over those of the US Navy. From McDonnell, North American and Republic. commonality between the various sub-types that point the Navy's version was effectively Initial evaluations revealed that none of the would be developed to meet the requirements doomed. submissions met the difficult requirements of both. Six companies responded to the Requests (sustained Mach 1.2 at low altitude was a Combining multiple roles within the same for Proposal at the end of 1961: General huge problem in itself) but that the Boeing basic design would save resources, time and Dynamics (Convair) and Grumman teamed and GD/Grumman designs were the best, in money, so the theory went. Despite warnings together (with the latter primarily responsible that order. >>> from just about everyone that such a project was simply not possible, McNamara pushed ahead. The Air Force/Navy antagonism began immediately the TFX programme began to be defined during the course of 1961. Not unnaturally, each service wanted its own specific requirements to be given priority and there were many clashes as to what form the aircraft should take. Fundamental things like how the two man crew should be seated. The USAF wanted a tandem arrangement because of lower drag and better visibility, while the Navy, although it preferred tandem seating for the same reasons, had to settle for a side-by-side design to ensure this large aeroplane's fuselage was not too long to be compatible with the aircraft carriers which would be its base. Progress was slow, causing McNamara to The first and second F-111Bs (Bu151970/71) intervene in October 1961 and announce that together over Long Island in 1965 with wings the TFX would be a fighter/strike type with swept fully forward and fully aft. US Navy 54 GENERAL DYNAMICS F-111B Another competition in April 1962 once The hearing took testimony from the landing field requirements) and high titanium again resulted in all the designs falling short companies involved, the USAF and Navy and content would also have probably caused of the mark but with the Boeing and GD several other interested government agencies. delays. submissions getting closer to it. As before, the Its conclusion supported McNamara’s decision The clincher – at least in McNamara’s eyes Boeing design was adjudged the most suitable. and also found that no improprieties had been and in view of his ‘procedural commonality’ In June 1962 the third and final competition committed, accusations of which had been philosophies – was the fact that the Boeing was opened. Both the Boeing and General freely bandied about. design had only 50 per cent commonality Dynamics designs were now acceptable in terms McNamara presented his case in favour of between the Air Force and Navy versions of performance and general specification with the General Dynamics/Grumman proposal whereas GD’s had 80 per cent. the Boeing project yet again on the top of the and won his adversaries over, citing better On 21 December 1962 General Dynamics list.