e Ontology, Etiology, and Moral Psychology of Action: Aristotle and Today by Bryan C. Reece A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Department of Philosophy University of Toronto © Copyright by Bryan C. Reece () e Ontology, Etiology, and Moral Psychology of Action: Aristotle and Today Bryan C. Reece Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Department of Philosophy University of Toronto Abstract Aristotle’s theory of action answers two central questions in Action Theory today: What causes action? What role do psychological attitudes play in action? Chapter dispels misunderstandings about Aristotle’s theory of causation. Inuential interpretations assume that Aristotle’s material, formal, and nal causes are explanatory only as constituents of an efficient-causal event, and that all efficient causes are productive. Productive efficient causes are those for which the effect is numerically distinct from the causal activity of the cause. Aristotle makes neither assumption. Instead, he thinks that some efficient causes are not productive, and that material, formal, and nal causes are explanatory in their own right rather than as constituents of efficient-causal events. Chapter 2 argues that Aristotle countenances four causes of action: Agents’ bodies are material causes of their self-movements, their occurrent psychological attitudes (such as desire and decision) are formal causes, agents themselves, as self-movers actualizing a ii particular potentiality, are efficient causes, and agents’ goals are final causes. This view challenges the prevailing assumption that psychological attitudes are efficient causes of actions. They are instead formal causes—paradigms for acting and parts of what defines the sort of action that the action is. Aristotle’s four-causal view makes progress in addressing problems for recent theories of action. Chapter 3 treats Davidsonian and Anscombean theories, the most prominent. Davidsonians face the problem of deviant causal chains (where psychological attitudes cause actions accidentally) and of the disappearing agent (the agent herself plays no role identifiable as agency). Anscombeans encounter the problem of deviant formal causation (a foreseen side-effect is wrongly counted by the theory as part of the intended aim) and of disappearing agency (without appeal to psychological attitudes, it is difficult to account for agential control). Aristotle's account makes headway on these problems. Chapter 4 treats constitutivist theories, which insist that agential control over action is at least partially constitutive of the action rather than a matter of antecedent efficient causes. Existing constitutivist accounts misconceive the causal role or range of psychological attitudes that are relevant for agential control. Constitutivists can advance by understanding psychological attitudes as Aristotelian formal causes of action. iii In loving memory of James, a true scholar, who early on encouraged my philosophical pursuits. iv Acknowledgments I have received signicant support for writing this dissertation from many sources. My supervisor, Lloyd Gerson, as well as my committee members, Brad Inwood and Phil Clark, have given uncountable bits of helpful advice, stimulating challenges, and suggestions for reading. eir quick, yet thorough, feedback on chapter dras was invaluable, as was their expertise in their respective elds. I could not have attempted a project of this scope without having the benet of their combined knowledge. I want to thank my examiners, James Allen and Chris Shields, for contributing their expertise through thoughtful reading of the dissertation and participation in the defense. David Charles has been a great help to me at various stages of the project’s development. He met with me regularly during my period of research travel in Oxford in to assist me in rening my core ideas. He has continued to take an active interest in the dissertation, reading and discussing multiple chapters with me. James Allen, Sarah Broadie, Rusty Jones, Chuck Latham, Christopher Taylor, and Sergio Tenenbaum gave helpful comments on chapter dras or substantial parts thereof. Martin Pickavé, Juan Piñeros, Ravi Sharma, Benjamin Wald, and Jennifer Whiting provided feedback on several key arguments. I presented parts of chapters at the University of California at Berkeley in November , at the University of Toronto in March , at the University of Oxford in October , at the American Philosophical Association Central Division Meeting (Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy session) in March , and at the University of v Cambridge in March , and benetted from constructive criticism from audience members on each occasion. I am particularly grateful for the extensive feedback from Klaus Corcilius on the occasion of my talk at Berkeley and subsequently. I have had very benecial conversations about the content of the dissertation with Randolph Clarke, Ursula Coope, David Enoch, Dorothea Frede, Daniel Graham, Fred Miller, Jennifer Hornsby, Anna Marmodoro, and Gisela Striker. Many of the themes of this dissertation were developed during my time with the Corpus Christi College Centre for the Study of Greek and Roman Antiquity in May–June , made possible by the University of Toronto School of Graduate Studies Research Travel Grant. My PhD research has been generously funded by the Vanier Canada Graduate Scholarship and the Robinson Fellowship in Classical Philosophy at the University of Toronto. I want to thank Sidney Robinson in particular for generously taking an active interest in my academic trajectory throughout my PhD program. Finally, I want to thank my family for the encouragement and love they have given me. I have already mentioned my cousin, Rusty Jones, who rst introduced me to philosophy and has been my closest philosophical companion ever since. My parents, Wyatt and Cynthia Reece, as well as my grandparents, Charles and Jennie Vaughan, have seen to my academic welfare from the start. My wife, Sharon, has patiently supported my efforts and has seen me through all of the highs and lows of the dissertation. Her love vi sustained this work through to completion, and I am thankful to her for everything she has done to make it possible. vii Contents Abstract ii Acknowledgments v INTRODUCTION CHAPTER . ARISTOTLE’S FOUR AITIAI . e arguments of recent commentators . Against recent commentators . Ontological priority . Aitiai: causes, explanations, or something else? . Are the aitiai coordinate causes? CHAPTER . ARISTOTLE’S FOUR CAUSES OF ACTION . Kinêseis and the four causes . e four causes in action explanations . Skill, desire, decision, and the four-causal interpretation CHAPTER . ARISTOTLE’S VIEW AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO DAVIDSONIAN AND ANSCOMBEAN ACCOUNTS . Davidsonian views . Anscombean views . How Aristotle’s view helps . Aristotle and the strengths of Davidsonian and Anscombean views viii CHAPTER . FORMAL CAUSES OF ACTION: TOWARD A NEW CONSTITUTIVIST THEORY . What is constitutivism? . Steward’s denial of the relevance of intentional mentality for control . Wu’s Many-Many Problem and structuring causation . Korsgaard on agential unity, deliberative decision, and akratic acts . Intentional mental items as Aristotelian formal causes of action CONCLUSION Bibliography ix INTRODUCTION is dissertation addresses two central questions in action theory: What causes action? What role do desire, decision, and other psychological items play in action? e majority of philosophers of action divide into two camps over these issues. Davidsonians think that psychological items, or events involving them, are the causes of action. Anscombeans prefer not to talk about causes of action at all, but rather about the purportedly less obscure notions of goal-orientedness and the practical syllogism. ey think that psychological items, with the possible exception of practical knowledge, are not very important in an account of action. Both groups claim Aristotle as their ancestor. is is remarkable for several reasons, two of which I will mention. First, and obviously, if two opposed views both derive from Aristotle, the most likely explanation is either that Aristotle’s view is a muddled mess, Aristotle’s view is extraordinarily capacious, or Aristotle’s view has been misunderstood. I think it is somewhat capacious and very misunderstood. e second reason is that Aristotle does not seem particularly interested in the sort of project that Davidsonians and Anscombeans undertake, namely prosecuting a study of action isolated from its broader physical, metaphysical, psychological, and ethical context. Aristotle is certainly interested in the nature of action, but we nd in his extant works no treatise dedicated to its study. We might have expected practical science to study praxis (action) in its own right, but instead it comprises ethics and politics. Action is constantly present, however, not only in Aristotle’s works on practical science, but throughout his corpus. is profusion suggests that the most promising way to study Aristotle’s remarks on action is to approach them as a system, but without ignoring the context in which they appear. I will say more about methodology aer foreshadowing my arguments. While it is true that both Davidsonians and Anscombeans claim to be following Aristotle’s lead, most Aristotle scholars believe, or at least write in ways that make little effort to avoid suggesting, that Aristotle’s view is basically of the Davidsonian variety. Davidson’s broadly Humean